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In 1969, political scientist Jack Walker published 'The Diffusion of Innovations among the American States' in the American Political Science Review. 'Walker 1969' has since become a cornerstone of political science, packed with ideas, conjectures, and suggestions that spawned multiple lines of research in multiple fields. In good Kuhnian fashion, Walker 1969 is important less for the answers it provides than for the questions it raises, inspiring generations of political scientists to use the political, institutional, and policy differences among the states to understand policymaking better. Walker 1969 is the rock on which the modern subfield of state politics scholarship was built, in addition to inspiring copious research into federalism, comparative politics, and international relations. This Element documents the deep and extensive impact of Walker 1969 on the study of policymaking in the US states. In the process, it organizes and analyzes that literature, demonstrating its progress and promise.

AbstractThe cross-sectional variation among state legislative leaders' formal powers provides a unique opportunity to test a variety of hypotheses of the American legislative process that involve the causes and effects of these powers. But to date, measures of these powers have been developed primarily for single years or biennia, limiting their applicability, especially for drawing causal conclusions. In this note, I develop an index of state House speakers' formal powers for each biennia from 1981 to 2010 (for even-year-election states) and from 1982 to 2009 (for odd-year-election states).

Why are the leaders in some U.S.-style legislatures more influential than others? This study uses individual-level data on lawmakers' perceptions of their leaders' influence to test three general theories of legislative power delegation: legislative leaders have no real power, simple collective action theory, and Conditional Party Government theory. These perceptions of speakers' legislative influence are modeled with varying intercept, multilevel, ordered probit models. The analyses strongly support the simple collective action problem explanation of legislative leadership influence, in particular suggesting that collective problems caused by the internal dynamics of the legislative process drive the delegation of influence to leaders. Adapted from the source document.

Why are the leaders in some U.S.-style legislatures more influential than others? This study uses individual-level data on lawmakers' perceptions of their leaders' influence to test three general theories of legislative power delegation: legislative leaders have no real power, simple collective action theory, and Conditional Party Government theory. These perceptions of speakers' legislative influence are modeled with varying intercept, multilevel, ordered probit models. The analyses strongly support the simple collective action problem explanation of legislative leadership influence, in particular suggesting that collective problems caused by the internal dynamics of the legislative process drive the delegation of influence to leaders.

After an exceptionally swift reform movement in the 1990s, 15 states are now adjusting to the most significant institutional change to their governments in a generation legislative term limits. Beyond the basic task of identifying and cataloguing their various substantive impacts, term limits have presented scholars with an exceptional opportunity to test legislative theory for two reasons. First, most legislative theory is based on behavioral assumptions that term limits appear to affect systematically, such as the reelection motivation. Second, the distribution of term limits across the states gives scholars exceptional methodological advantages for testing theory. In this article, I review the scholarly literature on the impacts of state legislative term limits, describe their theoretically relevant implications and methodological advantages, and advocate using the reform to develop an important research agenda. Adapted from the source document.

AbstractAfter an exceptionally swift reform movement in the 1990s, 15 states are now adjusting to the most significant institutional change to their governments in a generation—legislative term limits. Beyond the basic task of identifying and cataloguing their various substantive impacts, term limits have presented scholars with an exceptional opportunity to test legislative theory for two reasons. First, most legislative theory is based on behavioral assumptions that term limits appear to affect systematically, such as the reelection motivation. Second, the distribution of term limits across the states gives scholars exceptional methodological advantages for testing theory. In this article, I review the scholarly literature on the impacts of state legislative term limits, describe their theoretically relevant implications and methodological advantages, and advocate using the reform to develop an important research agenda.