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There has been a recent increase in clashes between warships asserting rights to navigate and states asserting sovereignty over coastal waters. This book argues for a set of rules which respect the rights of coastal states to protect their sovereignty and of warships to navigate lawfully, whilst also outlining the limits of each. The book addresses the issue of the clash between warships and states by considering the general principles applying to use of force in the law of the sea and the law of national self-defence. It focuses on the right of coastal states to use force to prevent passage of warships which threaten their sovereignty, with particular reference to the specific maritime zones, as well as by warships to ensure passage or to defend themselves. The book also assesses the extent to which the law of armed conflict may be applicable to these issues. The conclusion draws together a set of rules which take account of both contemporary and historical events and seeks to balance the competing interests at stake. Providing a concise overview of the enduring issue of freedom of navigation, this book will appeal to anyone studying international law, the law of the sea, security studies and international relations. It will also be of interest to naval, coast guard and military officers as well as government legal advisors.

The Australian Defence Force, together with military forces from a number of western democracies, have for some years been seeking out and killing Islamic militants in Iraq, Syria and Afghanistan, detaining asylum seekers for periods at sea or running the judicial systems of failed states. It has also been ready to conduct internal security operations at home. The domestic legal authority cited for this is often the poorly understood concept of executive power, which is power that derives from executive and not parliamentary authority. In an age of legality where parliamentary statutes govern action by public officials in the finest detail, it is striking that these extreme exercises of the use of force often rely upon an elusive legal basis. This book seeks to find the limits to the exercise of this extraordinary power.

The Australian Defence Force, together with military forces from a number of western democracies, have for some years been seeking out and killing Islamic militants in Iraq, Syria and Afghanistan, detaining asylum seekers for periods at sea or running the judicial systems of failed states. It has also been ready to conduct internal security operations at home. The domestic legal authority cited for this is often the poorly understood concept of executive power, which is power that derives from executive and not parliamentary authority. In an age of legality where parliamentary statutes govern action by public officials in the finest detail, it is striking that these extreme exercises of the use of force often rely upon an elusive legal basis. This book seeks to find the limits to the exercise of this extraordinary power.

The previous Commonwealth Minister for the Environment, Mr Garrett, recently rejected a request to allow the importation of live bumblebees (Bombus terrestris L.) to mainland Australia. New South Wales and Victoria had already listed the introduction of bumblebees as, respectively, a key threatening process and a potentially threatening process. The Commonwealth, however, had previously declined an application to list the introduction of bumblebees as a key threatening process, although its Threatened Species Scientific Committee urged 'that extreme caution be shown in considering any proposal to introduce this species to the mainland.' The potential threat from bumblebees would appear to beg the questions posed by the precautionary principle. Would the presence of bumblebees to mainland Australia pose a threat of serious or irreversible environmental damage? Should a lack of full scientific certainty be used as a reason for postponing measures to prevent environmental degradation? This paper considers the role of the precautionary principle in regulatory approaches to the bumblebee. It seeks to establish the application of the precautionary principle to this particular potential environmental threat, including its relationship to the principle of conservation of biological diversity. It concludes that, despite widespread adoption of the precautionary principle in policy, legislation and case law in Australia, its impact on regulating bumblebees has not been consistent.

The research question posed, and considered in this paper, is 'in the absence of legislation, what is the role in, and more importantly what power might the Commonwealth have, when responding and recovering from a catastrophic disaster? Currently the Commonwealth has no overarching or specific counter-disaster legislation. This paper argues that even in the absence of legislation there is Commonwealth power to respond to emergencies within the areas of Commonwealth responsibility. Further there is an inherent power to deal with catastrophic disasters vested in the Crown as part of the prerogative power of the Crown and now incorporated into the Executive Power of the Commonwealth. Exactly what constitutes a 'catastrophic disaster' would be open to debate and, in the absence of legislation, may be the subject of judicial challenge. It is argued that a disaster where a state government is overwhelmed so that the state itself is at risk of collapse and there is no effective state government would be a national catastrophic disaster that would justify Commonwealth intervention in the affairs of the state in order to restore effective state government. What disaster, short of the collapse of state government, would be sufficient for direct Commonwealth action cannot be conclusively defined. In the absence of legislation and a truly catastrophic event, the Commonwealth's authority to exercise national leadership and coordinate Commonwealth, state and private assets will depend on good will and cooperation. The extent of the Commonwealth's executive power cannot be identified until the circumstances of the particular disaster have been identified. Failing to define, in legislation, the role and power of the Commonwealth will leave the Commonwealth to 'cope ugly' with any particular catastrophe. That may be acceptable as it will leave the Commonwealth with adaptive flexibility. It has however been a consistent recommendation of commentators that the Commonwealth should legislate to ensure that the Commonwealth is able to cope with an inevitable catastrophe. The absence of legislation makes it impossible to define, except in the most generic terms, what the Commonwealth's powers are