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The natural resources of the earth – from oil and water to minerals and land – are crucial to our basic economic and social existence. But who is entitled to control, use and benefit from them? Should anyone 'own' the natural bounty of our planet? In this book, distinguished political theorist Margaret Moore tackles these questions and examines the different positions in the debate. States claim the right to control the natural resources within their territory. Liberals argue for a system of private ownership rights, including over natural resources, while egalitarians dispute such claims and argue for equal rights to natural resources. Moore shows why these standard approaches to resource justice are wanting, and offers an original approach that examines the different ways in which people interact with resources in order to determine what good is at stake in any particular case. In the context of serious environmental crisis and looming resource conflicts, this innovative and timely book will be essential reading for all students and scholars interested in the environment, property, distributive justice, and future generations.

"Margaret Moore attempts here to offer a comprehensive normative theory of territory. The book provides an account both of the nature of rights to territory and of the nature of the right-holder, considering the arguments that might justify state territory as well as the appropriate relationship between the state, the people, and the land implied by that justificatory argument. After setting out the basics of the theory in the initial chapters, the author then compares her view to the main competing rival views (cultural nationalist and statist) and explains how her view handles the issues of boundary setting, corrective justice, natural resources, immigration and defensive rights. The volume provides the reader with a clear sense both of the existing state of the philosophical literature on territorial rights and of Moore's own views"--

AbstractThis essay argues that we have a duty to protect biodiversity hotspots, rooted in an argument about the wrongful imposition of risk and intergenerational justice. State authority over territory and resources is not unlimited; the state has a duty to protect these areas. The essay argues that although biodiversity loss is a global problem, it can be tackled at the domestic level through clear rules. The argument thus challenges the usual view of state sovereignty, which holds that authority over territory, resources, and migration (all of which are connected to the protection of biodiversity hotspots) is unlimited.

AbstractThe standard justifications for control over territory appeal to goods that are delivered to persons who inhabit the territory (self‐determination, justice). This raises the question: What justifies territorial rights in unoccupied places? This question is relevant to a pressing practical question concerning the permissibility of national and corporate interests in mining or gas drilling and other resource extraction activities in unoccupied places, some of which were either technologically impractical or prohibitively expensive in the past, but which now are possible. The territorial rights literature does not focus on unoccupied places, treating resource rights there as an extension of rights in occupied places, thereby suggesting that these activities could be justified in the same way. This article examines the distinctive normative contours of unoccupied spaces, and so considers a number of possible arguments to justify such rights. It focuses on rights to resources in relation to three different kinds of unoccupied places and suggests that the stewardship justification is the most promising (although there is some role for other arguments in relation to certain kinds of unoccupied places).

Abstract
This paper focuses on land as a domain in which legitimate expectations can give rise to entitlements. The central argument is that people are connected to other people and to projects, which are symbolically and materially rooted in particular places. This gives rise to an interest – an interest that is sufficiently weighty that it imposes obligations on other people – to protect stability of place. There are two ways in which legitimate expectations structure argument about land. It justifies liberty rights to remain in a place, and not be removed or expelled from it, independently of the coercion that often accompanies forcible expulsion, and argue for rights of return as a second-order right when this right has been violated. I also argue that passage of time in a changed context can affect people's legitimate expectations, and so their entitlements.