Suchergebnisse

El trabajo, situado en el marco de las relaciones regionales, tiene como objetivo explicar las razones por las cuales Uruguay define su politica de limites con Argentina y Brasil en el ano 1910. Para ello, el autor estudia la saga de tratados suscritos en el siglo XIX y destaca la "estrategia de equilibrio", jugada por los paises limitrofes en su relacion con Uruguay, de la cual no solo surgio la Convencion Preliminar de Paz, en 1828, sino tambien la completa reposicion de los derechos del pais sobre la margen oriental del rio Yaguaron y la laguna Merin, y el fin de la Doctrina Zeballos en 1910. (Cuad CLAEH/DÜI)

El presente articulo se propone replantear la polemica sobre los llamados "partidos de ideas" en el siglo XIX en el Uruguay. Mas concretamente, pretende revisar los postulados clasicos y juicios historicos que, contagiosamente, se han reproducido en la literatura que versa sobre los partidos politicos. Se presenta un estudio de caso, cuya pretension final se centra en la posibilidad de evaluar el proceso del Partido Constitucional, 1880-1903. La tarea de reconstruccion reposa en la valorizacion del proceso politico decimononico, al tiempo que procura acercarse al analisis de los aspectos organizativos de los partidos, sin por ello descuidar los componentes ideologicos y las relaciones con el contexto. (Cuad CLAEH/DÜI)

What explains political polarization across developing democracies? In contrast to extant studies, this article develops a novel argument that links electoral (in)stability at the party system level with varying levels of polarization. Specifically, we claim that increasing levels of electoral volatility generate high levels of uncertainty among partisan elites, which respond by setting clear policy positions that are frequently far away from the center in the ideological spectrum. As such, higher levels of volatility engender higher levels of polarization. Further, because the majority of party system change in developing democracies comes mainly from the emergence of new parties, we decompose the effects of stable party system volatility (for established parties) and replacement party system volatility (for newly competing parties) and hypothesize that higher levels of replacement volatility—as opposed to stable volatility—generate higher levels of polarization. Our main theoretical claims find strong qualitative and quantitative support.

Why have moderate electorates elected and reelected leftist governments in Latin America over the last twenty years? Scholars who rely on the classic Downsian logic of the median voter theorem have observed a process of ideological moderation among the most salient left-wing parties in the region. However, there have been no systematic attempts to evaluate the moderation thesis at the comparative level, either across Latin America or within cases over time. This article uses a directional model in the spatial modeling tradition to argue that the success of the left rests on the provision of clear leftist programmatic cues to voters. Data coming from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems for five Latin American countries during 1994 and 2014 show that left-wing parties won on left-wing platforms across the region, while an in-depth study on Brazilian elections reveals that leftist voters of the Workers' Party in 2002 were driven by programmatic cues that largely disappeared during the 2010 elections.

Why have moderate electorates elected and reelected leftist governments in Latin America over the last twenty years? Scholars who rely on the classic Downsian logic of the median voter theorem have observed a process of ideological moderation among the most salient left-wing parties in the region. However, there have been no systematic attempts to evaluate the moderation thesis at the comparative level, either across Latin America or within cases over time. This article uses a directional model in the spatial modeling tradition to argue that the success of the left rests on the provision of clear leftist programmatic cues to voters. Data coming from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems for five Latin American countries during 1994 and 2014 show that left-wing parties won on left-wing platforms across the region, while an in-depth study on Brazilian elections reveals that leftist voters of the Workers' Party in 2002 were driven by programmatic cues that largely disappeared during the 2010 elections. Resumen¿Por qué los electorados moderados de América Latina han elegido y reelegido gobiernos de izquierda durante las últimas dos décadas? Investigaciones basadas en el teorema del votante mediano sostienen la existencia de un proceso de moderación ideológica en los partidos de izquierda, orientados a competir y alcanzar el gobierno. Sin embargo, no existe ninguna evidencia sistemática a nivel comparado que avale esta hipótesis. Por el contrario, este artículo hace uso de un modelo direccional en la tradición de modelos espaciales para argumentar que el éxito electoral de la izquierda se asienta en la provisión de claras señales programáticas de izquierda a los votantes. Datos provenientes del Comparative Study of Electoral Systems para cinco países de América Latina durante el periodo 1999–2014, muestran que los partidos de izquierda han ganado sobre bases ideológicas de izquierda, mientras un estudio en profundidad sobre Brasil, muestra que los votantes del Partido de los Trabajadores en 2002 estuvieron guiados por bases programáticas de izquierda que desaparecieron durante las elecciones de 2010.

AbstractExtant studies have documented a positive correlation between country participation in International Monetary Fund–sponsored programs and collective protests in Latin America. However, anecdotal evidence indicates that there is a great deal of variation in the number of protests in recipient countries across the region. This article provides a theoretical argument that explains how the fund interacts with the level of party system institutionalization to affect the level of protest. The main prediction is that the level of protest decreases in recipient countries when the level of party system institutionalization is high. Empirical results from a sample of 16 Latin American democracies observed from 1982 to 2007 provide strong statistical and substantive support for the main hypothesis.

We investigate bill passage by party factions in Uruguay and show that those joining cabinet coalitions earn policy influence. The policy advantage of coalition is therefore not collected by the president alone, as often implied: partners acquire clout in law-making and use it to pass bills of their own and to strike deals with outside factions. Analysis of all bills initiated between 1985 and 2005 reveals that the odds of passing a bill sponsored alone by a majority cabinet faction was about 0.5, up from about 0.15 otherwise. Contingent upon the cabinet status of factions involved, the odds of co-sponsored bills conform well to patterns expected by a view that policy rewards are a fundamental part of the politics of coalition in presidentialism. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Ltd., copyright holder.]