Suchergebnisse

ABSTRACTThis paper analyses the institutional framework of the Spanish electricity and gas markets from their emergence at the beginning of the twentieth century until the liberalisation process encouraged by the European Union. European processes of liberalisation involving the introduction of regulation and competition and the application of non-hierarchical modes have raised the number of both public and private actors taking part in sectoral governance. However, none of these modes is new for the sector. A historical perspective shows the conditions under which the threat of governmental intervention and the discretion granted to sectoral governance differed significantly between sectors. While the threat to nationalise and monopolise the electricity sector contributed to the creation of a private agent and a model of self-regulation with a large measure of discretion, in the gas sector the public presence was strong and control tight. Thus, the paper concludes that one should not presuppose that old modes of governance are strongly governmental and hierarchical. The opposite proves to be the case in the Spanish electricity sector, where new modes of governance are now more linked to hierarchy.

The paper analyses how politics and adjudication answer similar questions in the context of policy making. It contrasts how societal problems are selected, defined, solved and legitimised by both disciplines. We raise these questions with regard to the liberalization of the European electricity markets. We reconstruct the decision-making process at the political and adjudicative arena taking place in this policy area. By so doing, we elaborate the differences and establish the links between politics and adjudication. We argue that what differentiates these two disciplines constitutes their very links; that is, the adjudicative and political arenas are linked precisely because they are different at various levels.