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Objective/context: This article analyzes the presidential primary elections in Chile from 2013 to 2021. As established by law, unlike in other Latin American countries, these elections are voluntary, simultaneous, and binding. Methodology: Presidential primary elections are studied in three dimensions: first, the institutions that regulate them; second, the electoral participation; and third, the results. For the analysis of the institutions, Law 20640 is explained. For electoral participation and the results of the primary elections, the statistical method is used, including a descriptive and inferential data analysis; the latter, mainly with multiple linear regression models and graphs of predicted values. Conclusions: Electoral participation in primaries significantly predicts participation in the general election and is strongly determined by the levels of poverty and rurality of the communes. Regarding the results, the Chilean experience shows that ideologically extreme candidates do not always triumph and that in some occasions—such as the 2021 elections—the relationship between the outcome of the primary elections and the candidates' electoral performance in the first round is far from robust. Originality: This study analyzes three electoral cycles of presidential primaries in Chile and combines an analysis of the institutions that regulate the process with the application of statistical models to explain turnout and electoral results.

Abundant evidence exists of the low electoral turnout of indigenous people. Among the reasons that explain this result are the weakness of political parties in representing indigenous people, the economic circumstances of ethnic minorities, and their experiences of discrimination. In general, these findings are based on analyses of national elections, and it is unclear if they hold equally at the subnational level. This study of the Mapuche ethnic group in Chile analyzed the electoral turnout in Chile's 345 municipalities for the national elections of 2013 and 2017 and the subnational elections of 2012 and 2016. The study found the following. First, the electoral turnout in municipalities with the highest concentration of Mapuche is above the average for subnational elections and comparable to the average for national elections. Second, the electoral turnout in these municipalities increases in those subnational elections in which candidates with Mapuche surnames compete. Third, the electoral turnout increases even more in those municipalities in which Mapuche mayoral candidates win in subnational elections.

AbstractBased on an administrative census of the 267,116 migrants registered for the 2017 presidential elections and a survey applied to 4771 migrants, we conclude that (1) the electoral participation of migrants shows a significant gender gap, with women participating in a higher proportion; (2) migrants who registered earlier in the electoral registers, are more likely to vote compared to the rest; (3) when migrants come from countries that implement compulsory voting, they increase their likelihood of voting in the receiving country; (4) the declaration of wanting to remain in Chile and not return to their countries of origin or migrate to another country increases the probability of voting, and the same happens with married migrants, with Chilean children, with a Chilean partner, and with a better economic situation; (5) social capital has a positive influence on electoral participation.

Los representantes se vinculan programática y no programáticamente con sus votantes. Ofrecen políticas públicas y resuelven demandas particulares de sus electores. Sobre esto último, en Chile la ley del lobby obliga a los alcaldes a hacer públicas sus agendas de relación directa con los ciudadanos, denominadas "audiencias". Analizamos 44.162 audiencias para los 345 municipios entre 2015 y 2016. Concluimos, primero, que más del 80% de las audiencias están asociadas a demandas personales de los ciudadanos (audiencias no programáticas) y no a solicitudes de política pública (audiencias programáticas). Segundo, que en año de elecciones locales los alcaldes otorgan más audiencias no programáticas, mientras que en año de elecciones nacionales otorgan más audiencias programáticas. Tercero, que las audiencias son más recurrentes en municipios rurales. Cuarto, que los alcaldes hacen mayor uso del mecanismo, pero dejan de utilizarlo cuando ganan la elección por amplio margen. Con los alcaldes novatos sucede lo opuesto.

The representatives are linked programmatically and not programmatically with their voters. They offer public policies and resolve demands of their constituents. On this last point, in Chile, the lobbying law obliges mayors to make public their direct relationship agendas with citizens, called "audiences". We analyzed 44,162 audiences for the 345 municipalities between 2015 and 2016. We conclude, first, that more than 80% of the audiences are associated with citizens' personal demands (non-programmatic audiences) and not with public policy requests (programmatic audiences). Second, in the year of local elections mayors grant more non-programmatic audiences, while in national elections year they grant more programmatic audiences. Third, that audiences are more recurrent in rural municipalities. Fourth, that the incumbent mayors make greater use of the mechanism, but they stop using it when they win the election by a large margin, the opposite being the case with the novice mayors. ; Los representantes se vinculan programática y no programáticamente con sus votantes. Ofrecen políticas públicas y resuelven demandas particulares de sus electores. Sobre esto último, en Chile la ley del lobby obliga a los alcaldes a hacer públicas sus agendas de relación directa con los ciudadanos, denominadas "audiencias". Analizamos 44.162 audiencias para los 345 municipios entre 2015 y 2016. Concluimos, primero, que más del 80% de las audiencias están asociadas a demandas personales de los ciudadanos (audiencias no programáticas) y no a solicitudes de política pública (audiencias programáticas). Segundo, que en año de elecciones locales los alcaldes otorgan más audiencias no programáticas, mientras que en año de elecciones nacionales otorgan más audiencias programáticas. Tercero, que las audiencias son más recurrentes en municipios rurales. Cuarto, que los alcaldes hacen mayor uso del mecanismo, pero dejan de utilizarlo cuando ganan la elección por amplio margen. Con los alcaldes novatos sucede lo opuesto.

Los sistemas de partidos institucionalizados pueden convivir con una alta incongruencia programática entre élite y ciudadanía. Por el contrario, sistemas de partidos menos institucionalizados podrían estar en la posición de generar una mayor congruencia programática. Analizamos esta aparente anomalía en el Cono Sur de América Latina, comparando Argentina, Chile y Uruguay. Metodológicamente, utilizamos tres medidas de congruencia: promedios, comparación de distribuciones ( many to many ), distancia entre los votantes y un representante típico ( many to one ). Sobre esta última medida diseñamos modelos de regresión múltiple para identificar las variables que predicen mayor congruencia. Concluimos que en sistemas estables las preferencias electorales se mantienen a pesar de la distancia entre élite y votantes en algunos ejes de competencia, siendo Uruguay el caso más representativo.

Generalmente, los plebiscitos sucesorios que definen la continuidad de un dictador en el poder son analizados desde el punto de vista de la competencia entre las elites autoritarias y democráticas. Menos espacio se da al estudio de la opinión pública, lo que responde a la ausencia de encuestas que, muchas veces, los mismos regímenes autoritarios prohíben. Visto así, el caso de Chile es excepcional. El Centro de Estudios de la Realidad Contemporánea (CERC) realizó encuestas previas al plebiscito sucesorio de 1988, donde se decidía la continuidad del general Pinochet en el poder por otros ocho años. Con base en esta información, identificamos los determinantes políticos y sociales que explicaron el triunfo de la oposición. Mediante una serie de modelos binomiales y multinomiales, constatamos que la opción «no» tuvo mayor apoyo en los hombres, los jóvenes y las personas de nivel socioeconómico bajo, marcando una clara continuidad con los patrones de voto a los partidos de centro-izquierda previos al golpe de estado de 1973. Además, sostenemos que la opción «no» era la favorita incluso antes de la emisión de la propaganda televisiva. De esta forma, el caso de Chile es útil para evaluar los modelos de conducta electoral en escenarios no democráticos, identificando los factores a largo y corto plazo que explican los resultados políticos. ; Generally, successor plebiscites to define the continuity of a dictator in power are analyzed from the point of view of the competition between authoritarian and democratic elites. Less space is given to the study of public opinion, due to the absence of surveys that the very authoritarian regimes very often prohibit. Thus, the case of Chile is exceptional. The Center for Studies of Contemporary Reality (CERC) conducted surveys prior to the successor plebiscite held in 1988 to decide the continuity of General Pinochet in power for eight more years. Based on this information, we identified the political and social determinants that explained the triumph of the opposition. Through a series of binomial and multinomial models, we verified that the "No" option had greater support among men, young people and people of low socioeconomic status, clearly marking a continuity with the voting patterns for the center-left parties before the 1973 coup d'état. Moreover, we maintain that the "No" option was the preferred one even before the broadcast of television propaganda. Thus, the case of Chile is useful to evaluate electoral behavior models in undemocratic scenarios, identifying the long and short-term factors that explain political outcomes.

AbstractIn 2015, a center-left government introduced an electoral reform that replaced the binomial electoral system governing parliamentary elections since 1989 with a more proportional system. This article provides an account of the reform process, describes the new electoral law, and discusses the factors explaining the reform. We argue, first, that it was possible, due to the incentives the government provided, to secure the support of an ample majority of parliamentarians; also, a new and favorable political scenario had emerged, in which the support of the main right-wing parties was not necessary for the reform to pass. Second, we maintain that the reform sought mainly to resolve problems affecting the parties of the governing coalition related to negotiations of coalition lists for elections. As a complementary objective, the reform promoted a general interest by establishing rules that allowed a "fairer" system of representation and improved competitive conditions.

AbstractIn 1925 a new electoral system was introduced in Chile. This reform changed the electoral formula from a cumulative voting system to a proportional one (d'Hondt) and established new rules about district magnitude and form of voting. It has been argued that this reform was motivated by the emergence of new parties or the expansion of the electorate. This article offers an alternative explanation: in the case of Chile, the main reason for the electoral reform was the parties' need to solve problems of strategic coordination stemming from the characteristics of the Chilean cumulative voting system. In this context, the Chilean case shows that there are many routes to proportionality.