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Abstract: This article compares German and Belgian laws with regard to security interests in corporeal movables, economically analysing the differences to reach a normative conclusion. Belgium is currently implementing a major reform in this field, which, combined with the different stance of both regimes on transparency of security interests, begs the question of whether the Belgian reform could serve as an example to Germany. This article starts by comparing the evolutions both legal systems have undergone in the last century and which have started from opposite positions. While Belgium principally opposed non-possessory security interests for fear that this would annihilate transparency, Germany allowed for a broad system of non-possessory security interests through retentions or transfers of title, without any kind of publicity. Both systems underwent significant changes, which can roughly be divided into two categories: allowing for a floating charge on the business and reacting to business' legal innovations. These evolutions brought into focus the trade-off that used to exist between transparency and extension of the collateral base. These legal evolutions have set the stage for reform in Belgium, a reform that is based on the principle of register publicity of security interests. Next, this article explores the threat posed to non-possessory security interests by the possibility of acquisitions in good faith, in both regimes. Following the legal comparison, this article analyses the identified differences from an economic point of view, finding three key areas in which transparency can be beneficial. First, transparency reduces the social cost of using secured credit. Second, it makes collateral more effective in performing its function by reducing the scope for acquisitions in good faith taking precedence over security interests. Finally, transparency can also make collateral more effective by optimizing the functioning of the floating charge. In its final part, the article briefly goes into the challenges posed by setting up register publicity, more specifically with regard to privacy issues and gatekeeping. This article concludes that now that technology allows for transparency and the collateral base to be complements, economically speaking, Germany could, in fact, benefit from a reform following the Belgian model.

In Chapter II we investigate consumer behavior when facing target rebates, a rebate practice challenged by antitrust law. In three experiments, we confirm the hypothesis derived from Cumulative Prospect Theory (CPT), that target rebates are likely to create psychological switching costs that can make target rebates a tool dominant firms can use to inefficiently foreclose markets. In an experiment reported in Chapter III I confirm that guilt aversion, i.e., a preference to fulfill other people's expectations, plays out stronger if agents are socially close. The hypothesis was triggered by legal intuition but can also be derived from psychological theory and seems to structure the previous literature on guilt aversion well. The cautious ingroup-outgroup manipulation that generates the result makes allows the presumption that the effect is way stronger in the field where relationships rest on friendship, family ties or co-workership. In Chapter IV we study how intra-team conflict and knowledge thereof influence inter-team competition. We model intra-team conflict (hereafter: "conflict") by connecting a team's pricing decision to the intra-team profit division. Inter-team competition is modeled as a Bertrand duopoly with homogeneous goods. We vary market composition (two conflict-teams, one conflict-team and one no-conflict-team, two no-conflict teams) and the availability of information regarding conflict of the other team (hereafter: "information"). We find that (1) prices are higher in homogenous markets of conflict-teams than in homogeneous markets of no-conflict teams. (2) With information, prices in heterogeneous markets are as low as in homogenous markets of no-conflict teams. (3) Without information on the other team's conflict, prices in heterogeneous markets are as high as in homogenous markets of conflict-teams. (4) Information on the other team's conflict leads to higher prices in homogeneous markets but to lower prices in heterogeneous markets.

In Chapter II we investigate consumer behavior when facing target rebates, a rebate practice challenged by antitrust law. In three experiments, we confirm the hypothesis derived from Cumulative Prospect Theory (CPT), that target rebates are likely to create psychological switching costs that can make target rebates a tool dominant firms can use to inefficiently foreclose markets. In an experiment reported in Chapter III I confirm that guilt aversion, i.e., a preference to fulfill other peoples expectations, plays out stronger if agents are socially close. The hypothesis was triggered by legal intuition but can also be derived from psychological theory and seems to structure the previous literature on guilt aversion well. The cautious ingroup-outgroup manipulation that generates the result makes allows the presumption that the effect is way stronger in the field where relationships rest on friendship, family ties or co-workership. In Chapter IV we study how intra-team conflict and knowledge thereof influence inter-team competition. We model intra-team conflict (hereafter: conflict) by connecting a teams pricing decision to the intra-team profit division. Inter-team competition is modeled as a Bertrand duopoly with homogeneous goods. We vary market composition (two conflict-teams, one conflict-team and one no-conflict-team, two no-conflict teams) and the availability of information regarding conflict of the other team (hereafter: information). We find that (1) prices are higher in homogenous markets of conflict-teams than in homogeneous markets of no-conflict teams. (2) With information, prices in heterogeneous markets are as low as in homogenous markets of no-conflict teams. (3) Without information on the other teams conflict, prices in heterogeneous markets are as high as in homogenous markets of conflict-teams. (4) Information on the other teams conflict leads to higher prices in homogeneous markets but to lower prices in heterogeneous markets.

Ökonomische Argumente werden auch für Juristen immer wichtiger. Dieses Lehrbuch soll Juristen mit ökonomischen Methoden vertraut machen, um ihnen ein besseres Verständnis dieser Argumente zu geben. Es richtet sich dabei sowohl an Studierende als auch an Wissenschaftler und Praktiker. Für die dritte Auflage wurde das Lehrbuch aktualisiert und punktuell überarbeitet. Das eBook ist unmittelbar im Open Access verfügbar und wurde durch interne und externe Verlinkungen konsequent für die digitale Nutzung optimiert. "Da die Verzahnung rechtlicher und ökonomischer Aspekte in den meisten Lehrbüchern in der Regel viel zu kurz kommt [...], schließt es eine bedeutende Lücke in der juristischen und wirtschaftswissenschaftlichen Literatur." Studium 2017, Ausgabe 100, 20 "In Europa kursieren immer noch verschiedene Missverständnisse über die Rechtsökonomie, die wohl auch aus mangelnder Kenntnis der Methoden resultieren. Das Buch leistet somit einen Beitrag zur Aufklärung, indem es Grundkenntnisse vermittelt, über die jeder Rechtswissenschaftler verfügen sollte." Martin Gelter RabelsZ 2019, 461-464