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In this reply, I will focus on the implications of Montero and Vidal-Puga's finding, acknowledging that their result is correct. Thus, what follows should not be interpreted as a defense of the Proposition 2 of Morelli 1999, but as a clarification of the impact of this correction for the demand bargaining research agenda as a whole.

I propose a new majoritarian bargaining model in which more than one implicit proposal can be on the table at the same time. Institutional differences from system to system affect the order of play, the equilibrium majorities, and the policy outcome. The ex post distribution of payoffs within a winning coalition is, however, invariant to fundamental institutional differences, and it is always proportional to the distribution of relative ex ante bargaining power. The bargaining process is modeled as a sequential demand game, in which players are called to propose a policy and to specify their desired share of the private benefits related to being in office. The order of play is endogenous, and the distribution of payoffs within an equilibrium majority usually does not depend on who is the proposal maker. The role of the head of state and the advantages to center parties are also studied.

This paper provides a game-theoretic model of representative democracy with endogenous party formation. Coalition formation may occur before and after elections, and the expected payoffs from the after-election majority game affect incentives to form parties before the elections. In this way Duverger's hypothesis can be formally explained by the strategic behaviour of political elites. If politicians care primarily about private benefits, the equilibrium policy outcome under a proportional electoral system coincides with the median party's position. On the othoer hand, with quasilinear utility, the distance from the median voter outcome may be lower with plurality rule.

Abstract
Epidemics create risks of social unrest. The great plagues of the past show that social tensions, accumulated over the epidemic and before, often erupted in serious uprisings in the years after the epidemic. Based on historical evidence, we predict that the protests inherited from the pre-COVID-19 period should be crowded out by epidemic-related unrest as long as the epidemic lasts, whereas in the aftermath of the epidemic we should expect the unresolved pre-epidemic grievances to resume even stronger, boosted also by the incremental social grievances related to the epidemic period. While the epidemic lasts, the status quo and incumbent governments tend to consolidate, but a sharp increase in social instability in the aftermath of the epidemic should be expected.