Suchergebnisse

AbstractWe study the problem of sharing the revenues from broadcasting sports leagues among participating clubs. First, we characterize the set of rules satisfying two basic axioms: anonymity and additivity. Then, we decentralize the problem by letting clubs vote for rules. No majority equilibrium exists when they are allowed to vote for any rule within the characterized set. However, if the set is restricted in a meaningful and plausible way (just replacing anonymity by equal treatment of equals), majority equilibrium does exist.

The European Union (EU) spends more than one bil- lion euros per year ensuring translation and interpretation of 24 languages to preserve multilingualism. We examine how this budget should be fairly allocated, taking into account linguistic and economic realities of each member country. Our analysis tries to estimate the value of keeping English as a procedural language (in fact, almost a lingua franca) in the post- Brexit EU, where, today, just about one percent of the population speaks it as native language. ; Universidad Pablo de Olavide, Department of Economics, Carretera de Utrera, Km. 1, 41013, Seville, Spain

The EU spends more than one billion euros per year, translating and interpreting, to preserve multilingualism. We examine how this budget should be fairly allocated, taking into account linguistic and economic realities of each member country. Our analysis helps to estimate the value of keeping English as a procedural language (in fact, almost a lingua franca) in the post-Brexit EU, where just about one percent of its population will have it as native language. ; info:eu-repo/semantics/published

We analyze the role of poverty levels in the allocation of international development aid. We estimate "claims" for each recipient, based on the incidence and depth of poverty in its territory, and explore possible reallocations of the current (overall) official development assistance (ODA) based on those claims. We consider four allocation rules rooted in ancient sources: the Aristotelian proportional rule, two constrained egalitarian rules, inspired by Maimonides, and the Talmud rule. Each of them is grounded on different normative principles, which allows us to assess the recipients' claims in different ways. Our results indicate that the current allocation of international development aid cannot be supported by any of those rules, which makes us conclude that the allocation of ODA is not truly driven by the goal of eradicating world's poverty. ; info:eu-repo/semantics/published

We discuss compensation schemes that should give incentives to EU countries and citizens to acquire a lingua franca. We consider three possible candidates: English, French and German, which are already the most widely spoken languages. In our model, countries can claim compensations linked to the number of citizens who do not speak a given candidate language, and the distance between the official language in the country and the suggested lingua franca. We study two sharing schemes that are rooted in ancient sources: the Aristotelian proportional rule and the Talmud rule. The former prevents coalitional manipulations among countries, whereas the latter guarantees meaningful lower bounds for all countries. ; info:eu-repo/semantics/published