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Working paper
Marshes draining in Early Modern Times: colonial projects? A comparison between France and England; Les dessèchements modernes : des projets coloniaux ?: Comparaison entre la France et l'Angleterre
In: Etudes rurales: anthropologie, économie, géographie, histoire, sociologie ; ER, Heft 203, S. 42-61
ISSN: 1777-537X
Corporate Provision of Public Goods in a Small Open Economy
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Contests with a Non-Convex Strategy Space
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Aspiring to Succeed: A Model of Entrepreneurship and Fear of Failure
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Who's Naughty? Who's Nice? Experiments on Whether Pro-Social Workers are Selected Out of Cutthroat Business Environments
In: Rotman School of Management Working Paper No. 2345102
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Mixed Motives and the Optimal Size of Voting Bodies
In: Journal of political economy, Band 120, Heft 5, S. 986-1026
ISSN: 1537-534X
Majority Rule and Utilitarian Welfare
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Working paper
Mixed Motives and the Optimal Size of Voting Bodies
In: Journal of political economy, Band 120, Heft 5, S. 986-1026
ISSN: 0022-3808
We study a Condorcet jury model where voters are driven by instrumental and expressive motives. We show that arbitrarily small amounts of expressive motives significantly affect equilibrium behavior and the optimal size of voting bodies. Enlarging voting bodies always reduces accuracy over some region. Unless conflict between expressive and instrumental preferences is very low, information does not aggregate in the limit, and large voting bodies perform no better than a coin flip in selecting the correct outcome. Thus, even when adding informed voters is costless, smaller voting bodies often produce better decisions. . Adapted from the source document.
On the buyability of voting bodies
In: Journal of theoretical politics, Band 23, Heft 2, S. 260-287
ISSN: 1460-3667
We study vote buying by competing interest groups in a variety of electoral and contractual settings. While increasing the size of a voting body reduces its buyability in the absence of competition, we show that larger voting bodies may be more buyable than smaller voting bodies when interest groups compete. In contrast, imposing the secret ballot is an effective way to fight vote buying in the presence of competition, but much less so in its absence. Regardless of competition, the option to contract on both votes and outcomes is worthless, as it does not affect buyability compared to contracting only on votes. The option to contract on votes and vote shares, on the other hand, is extremely valuable: it allows the first mover to effectively nullify competition and obtain its preferred policy at almost the monopoly cost.
Overcoming Ideological Bias in Elections
In: Journal of political economy, Band 119, Heft 2, S. 183-211
ISSN: 1537-534X
On the buyability of voting bodies
In: Journal of Theoretical Politics, Band 23, Heft 2, S. 260-287
We study vote buying by competing interest groups in a variety of electoral and contractual settings. While increasing the size of a voting body reduces its buyability in the absence of competition, we show that larger voting bodies may be more buyable than smaller voting bodies when interest groups compete. In contrast, imposing the secret ballot is an effective way to fight vote buying in the presence of competition, but much less so in its absence. Regardless of competition, the option to contract on both votes and outcomes is worthless, as it does not affect buyability compared to contracting only on votes. The option to contract on votes and vote shares, on the other hand, is extremely valuable: it allows the first mover to effectively nullify competition and obtain its preferred policy at almost the monopoly cost. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Ltd., copyright holder.]
Overcoming Ideological Bias in Elections
In: Journal of political economy, Band 119, Heft 2, S. 183-211
ISSN: 0022-3808
We study a model in which voters choose between two candidates on the basis of both ideology and competence. While the ideology of the candidates is commonly known, voters are imperfectly informed about competence. Voter preferences, however, are such that ideology alone determines voting. When voting is compulsory, the candidate of the majority ideology prevails and this may not be optimal from a social perspective. However, when voting is voluntary and costly, we show that turnout adjusts endogenously so that the outcome of a large election is always first-best. Adapted from the source document.
Passion Over Reason? Mixed Motives and the Optimal Size of Voting Bodies
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On the buyability of voting bodies
In: Journal of theoretical politics, Band 23, Heft 2, S. 260-288
ISSN: 0951-6298