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Are politics local? Why? Where? When? How do we measure local versus national politics? And what are the effects? This book provides answers to these questions, within an explicitly comparative framework, including both advanced and developing democracies. It does so by using a statistically-based and graphical account of party nationalization, providing methodology and data for legislative elections covering scores of parties across dozens of countries. The book divides party nationalization into two dimensions - static and dynamic - to capture different aspects of localism, both with important implications for representation. Static nationalization measures the consistency in a party's support across the country and thus shows whether parties are able to encompass local concerns into their platforms. Dynamic nationalization, in turn, measures the consistency among the districts in over-time change in electoral results, under the presumption that where districts differ in their electoral responses, local factors must drive politics. Each of the two dimensions, in sum, considers representation from the perspective of the mix of national versus local politics.

"Using the United States as a basis of comparison, this book makes extensive use of roll-call data to explore patterns of legislative politics in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay. The patterns are defined by the extent to which parties, factions, delegations, or alliances - what the author collectively terms 'legislative agents' - are unified in their voting and hence are collectively identifiable to voters as being responsible for policy decisions. Then, to develop an indicator of the second central pattern, the book examines the propensity of the legislative agents to form policy coalitions with one another. It shows that agents in Chile and to some extent Uruguay are more coalitional than in Argenta and Brazil, but there is evidence that the agents work with one another in these latter countries as well. The U.S. parties have exhibited an important shift, moving from low levels of unity and frequent bipartisanship toward considerably higher levels of unity and more frequent polarization. In explaining patterns, the book considers the effects of the electoral system, legislators' ideology, cabinet membership, and other variables."--Jacket

This essay reviews the following works:

This essay reviews the following works:The Two Faces of Institutional Innovation: Promises and Limits of Democratic Participation in Latin America. By Leonardo Avritzer. Northampton: Edward Elgar, 2017. Pp. 192. $39.95 paperback. ISBN: 9781786436641. The DNA of Constitutional Justice in Latin America: Politics, Governance, and Judicial Design. By Daniel M. Brinks and Abby Blass. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018. Pp. xvi + 280. $34.99 paperback. ISBN: 9781316630914. Fixing Democracy: Why Constitutional Change Often Fails to Enhance Democracy in Latin America. By Javier Corrales. Oxford: OxfordUniversity Press, 2018. Pp. ix + 288. $31.95 paperback. ISBN: 9780190868901. ¿Por qué necesitamos una nueva constitución? By Claudia Heiss. Santiago de Chile: Aguilar, 2020. Pp. 140. $6.99 e-book. ISBN: 9789566063049. Democracy from Above? The Unfulfilled Promise of Nationally Mandated Participatory Reforms. By Stephanie L. McNulty. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2019. Pp. 248. $28.00 paperback. ISBN: 9781503608948. Cómo hicieron la Constitución de 1917. By Ignacio Marván Laborde. Mexico City: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 2017. Pp. 324. $15.95 paperback. ISBN: 9786077457664. Building Participatory Institutions in Latin America: Reform Coalitions and Institutional Change. By Lindsay Mayka. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019. Pp. xviii + 320. $80.41 hardcover. ISBN: 9781108470872. Democracy at Work: Pathways to Well-Being in Brazil. By Brian Wampler, Natasha Borges Sugiyama, and Michael Touchton. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019. Pp. xvii + 370. $79.71 hardcover. ISBN: 9781108493147.

This paper extends the study of party organization and legislative voting to factionalized party systems. After developing a typology of factional types, it argues that hierarchically organized factions respond to a competing incentive system. Factions have interests that push them to work together for the good of the party, but at the same time they have interests in distinguishing themselves for electoral purposes. Further, the electoral cycle drives the weights of these competing pressures, leading factional cooperation to break down as elections near. These patterns and incentives are particularly evident in Uruguay, and the paper uses roll call data from that country's legislature to test the propositions.

This paper extends the study of party organization and legislative voting to factionalize party systems. After developing a typology of factional types, it argues that hierarchically organized factions respond to a competing incentive system. Factions have interests that push them to work together for the good of the party, but at the same time, they have interests in distinguishing themselves for electoral purposes. Further, the electoral cycle drives the weights of these competing pressures, leading factional cooperation to break down as elections near. These patterns and incentives are particularly evident in Uruguay, and the paper uses roll-call data from that country's legislature to test the propositions ; El presente artículo aplica el estudio de la organización de partidos y el voto legislativo a sistemas de partidos con facciones. Tras desarrollar una clasificación de los diferentes tipos de facciones, se argumenta que las facciones jerárquicamente organizadas responden a un sistema competitivo de incentivos. Pese a que las facciones tienen intereses que las empujan a trabajar juntas por el bien del partido, al mismo tiempo, tienen interés en diferenciarse unas de otras por propósitos electorales. Además, el ciclo electoral dirige los pesos de estas presiones competitivas provocando la ruptura en la cooperación entre las facciones conforme se aproximan las elecciones. Estas pautas e incentivos son particularmente evidentes en el caso de Uruguay, por lo que el artículo utiliza datos del voto nominal del Legislativo del país para probar estos argumentos.