Suchergebnisse

Truth and Tragedy. A Tribute to Hans J. Morgenthau. Edited by Kenneth Thompson and Robert J. Meyers, with the assistance of Robert Osgood and Tang Tsou. With a new postscript: Bernard Johnson's Interview with Hans J. Morgenthau. Transaction Books. New Brunswick (USA) and London 1984. 390 Seiten

The problem of "Realism in Foreign Policy" is a special manifistation of a general philosophic and intellectual problem which has been with us almost since the beginning of Western civilization. There are two fundamental attitudes that a man can take toward a political problem and a social problem in general. Either he can start with the assumption that this problem is the result of some historic incident, of some faulty institution or deficient social arrangement, and that by changing this arrangement of by transforming the institution that is, by bringing about some kind of reform the problem can be solved once and for all.

Let me say here, somewhat dogmatically since I do not have the time to prove the point, that international politics is subject to objective principles as much as military or naval strategy is.

The problem of "realism in foreign policy" is a special manifestation of a general philosophic and intellectual problem which has been with us almost since the beginning of Western civilization.

En este fragmento el autor hace una reflexión sobre la ayuda exterior, su necesidad y oportunidad o no, su justificación, y si tiene sentido en sí misma o no. Define para ello seis tipos de ayuda exterior, así como sus consecuencias y contenidos políticos, entre ellas entre ellas la humanitaria, la de desarrollo económico ?que hoy conoceríamos como de cooperación al desarrollo?, la ayuda militar o la ayuda de prestigio. Su conclusión es que la política exterior, como parte del arsenal político de una nación, debe caer en el dominio de la acción política, criticando la preponderancia de los economistas y su papel principal en la gestión de la misma, en la medida en que los objetivos últimos de dicha política deben ser el refuerzo político del país donante. Para Hans Morgenthau, que duda de la eficacia en términos de progreso y modernización de la ayuda económica, incluso en caso de éxito, los resultados de esta ayuda son inciertos y podrían ser potencialmente contraproducentes, en la medida en que cambiarían necesariamente el statu quo ?incluso provocando una revolución?, siendo preferible la ayuda al prestigio por sus efectos políticos inmediatos y beneficios para el donante.

Along this work, the author reflects on the foreign aid, its necessity and opportunity ?or not?, and whether it has value by itself. With this purpose, he defines six modalities of foreign aid, as well as their respective consequences and political contents, among them the humanitarian, the foreign aid oriented to economic development ?equivalent currently to development cooperation?, the military or the prestige aid. One of his main conclusions is that the foreign aid, as part of the political weaponry of a nation, must fall into the domain of political action, criticizing the primacy of economists and their protagonist role regarding the management of this aid, to the extent that the ultimate goals of this policy must be the political reinforcement of the donor. In the view of Hans Morgenthau, who doubts about the efficacy in terms of progress and modernization of the economic aid, even being a successful one, the results of this aid are unforeseeable and could be potentially counterproductive, to the extent that they would change necessarily the statu quo ?even provoking a revolution?, being preferable then the prestige aid for its immediate political effects and benefits for the donor. ; En este fragmento el autor hace una reflexión sobre la ayuda exterior, su necesidad y oportunidad o no, su justificación, y si tiene sentido en sí misma o no. Define para ello seis tipos de ayuda exterior, así como sus consecuencias y contenidos políticos, entre ellas entre ellas la humanitaria, la de desarrollo económico ?que hoy conoceríamos como de cooperación al desarrollo?, la ayuda militar o la ayuda de prestigio. Su conclusión es que la política exterior, como parte del arsenal político de una nación, debe caer en el dominio de la acción política, criticando la preponderancia de los economistas y su papel principal en la gestión de la misma, en la medida en que los objetivos últimos de dicha política deben ser el refuerzo político del país donante. Para Hans Morgenthau, que duda de la eficacia en términos de progreso y modernización de la ayuda económica, incluso en caso de éxito, los resultados de esta ayuda son inciertos y podrían ser potencialmente contraproducentes, en la medida en que cambiarían necesariamente el statu quo ?incluso provocando una revolución?, siendo preferible la ayuda al prestigio por sus efectos políticos inmediatos y beneficios para el donante.

It is, of course, trivial to say that the foreign policy of the United States is not only in a political and military crisis — and financial crisis you might add — but also in a moral crisis. This moral crisis has particular significance for the United States. Take, by way of contrast, the moral crises through which Soviet foreign policy has passed since the end of the second world war. Take, for instance, the moral crisis which it faced in consequence of the Hungarian Revolution of 1956, and the moral crisis it is still facing by virtue of its invasion of Czechoslovakia last year. Obviously those crises considerably decreased the prestige and influence of the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union has emerged from tbose crises as something different from what it was before. For the Soviet Union today can no longer claim to be the fatherland of socialism, the disinterested vanguard of the international proletariat.

Of the seeming and real innovations which the modern age has introduced into the practice of foreign policy, none has proven more baffling to both understanding and action than foreign aid. The very assumption that foreign aid is an instrument of foreign policy is a subject of controversy. For, on the one hand, the opinion is widely held that foreign aid is an end in itself, carrying its own justification, both transcending, and independent of, foreign policy. In this view, foreign aid is the fulfillment of an obligation of the few rich nations toward the many poor ones. On the other hand, many see no justification for a policy of foreign aid at all. They look at it as a gigantic boon-doggle, a wasteful and indefensible operation which serves neither the interests of the United States nor those of the recipient nations.

If peace and security are the earmarks of a successful foreign policy, the foreign policies pursued since the end of the first World War by the great Western powers were certainly less successful than any pursued by these powers since the end of the Napoleonic Wars. To say this, of course, is only to state the obvious. That the succession of failures is rooted in a marked decline in the political intelligence of the Western world is less obvious. Yet the recognition of that relationship is decisive for the understanding of the disease which holds the modern state system in its grip.