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Taxes levied on production processes (e.g. VAT), are today a very important source of government revenues in developed economies. Theories of optimal taxation conclude that these taxes are detrimental to production efficiency, when firms operate in perfectly competitive markets. These theories draw on the neoclassical approach, which regards firms as single production units. The present paper investigates the effects of taxation on production efficiency, accounting for the organization of an industry. The model shows that a lump-sum tax does not have any effect on the organization of the industry, while a non lump-sum tax can be designed that induces an organizational change of the industry. The paper shows that the effect of this "tax induced organizational change" on production efficiency ultimately depends on the characteristics of the market.

Taxes levied on production processes (e.g. VAT), are today a very important source of government revenues in developed economies. Theories of optimal taxation conclude that these taxes are detrimental to production efficiency, when firms operate in perfectly competitive markets. These theories draw on the neoclassical approach, which regards firms as single production units. The present paper investigates the effects of taxation on production efficiency, accounting for the organization of an industry. The model shows that a lump-sum tax does not have any effect on the organization of the industry, while a non lump-sum tax can be designed that induces an organizational change of the industry. The paper shows that the effect of this "tax induced organizational change" on production efficiency ultimately depends on the characteristics of the market.

Legal and political issues left the management of the 2015-16 refugee crisis mostly in the hands of national governments, but this is incompatible with an integrated economic area that has largely abolished internal borders. It is also incompatible with some founding European Union principles, such as the existence of a common European policy on the mobility of people. A greater role for European institutions and policies is needed both for policing the common borders and imposing common welcome policy standards for refugees, based on best practices. EU measures are also required to face the long-term problems related to immigration, as it is very likely that economic and demographic differences between the EU and neighbouring countries will lead to further crises in the future. Planning for this requires ample and dedicated resources, and a long-term strategy based on agreements with immigrants' countries of origin, a task that no EU country can pursue alone. Some progress has been made to strengthen the role of the EU, with the adoption of new directives, such as the Asylum Procedures Directive, and the establishment of the European Border and Coast Guard Agency. However, the situation is still far from satisfactory. There are major differences in refugee welcome and integration policies in EU countries, as shown by differences in asylum request outcomes in different countries and the different integration processes. There is also a serious lack of information about the skills and competences of refugees in different countries. This is a problem because this information is a necessary first step for an integrated welcome policy that might transform a challenge into an opportunity for aging European economies. Such differences between EU countries are not only inequitable but also inefficient. They lead to massive distortions in the functioning of European labour markets and create incentives for refugees to seek asylum in specific countries. Moreover, the promise made by EU institutions of a refugee relocation programme is presently not being kept, leaving the countries of first entry to carry disproportionate burdens. Legal procedures are part of the problem because the Dublin Regulation, approved under different circumstances, obliges the first-entry country to examine asylum requests. However, political obstacles play the main role. EU countries are very different in terms of their cultural attitudes towards immigration and it is difficult to impose a common solution on them. Practical solutions, based on the countries that do not want refugees making compensation payments, are probably the most realistic avenues to follow.

In the public debate, poor employment performance has often been associated with the existence of extensive labour market regulations and a lack of commitment to far- sighted public policies. This paper investigates the relation between policy myopia and labour market institutions. We develop a theoretical model in which policy myopia leads an incumbent government to choose institutions that allow the creation of rents in the labour market and reduce resources available to public goods provision and social expenditure. We test these predictions empirically using panel data for 21 OECD countries for the period 1985{2006. We show that policy myopia is associated with more regulated labour markets, lower unemployment benefit replacement rates, and smaller tax wedges on labour.

This paper investigates the relationship between political instability and labor market institutions. We develop a theoretical model in which some features of the political process, by reducing the future yields of policy interventions, induce an incumbent government to choose labor market institutions that create wage rents and divert resources from public good provision and social insurance. We test these predictions empirically using panel data for 21 OECD countries for the period 1985-2006. We find strong evidence that political turnover and political polarization - our measures of political instability - are associated with a more regulated labor market, lower unemployment benefit replacement rates, and a smaller tax wedge on labor. We show also that there are strong complementarities between different dimensions of political instability, and evaluate their impact on labour market institutions across countries.

Abstract. The offshoring of production by firms has expanded dramatically in recent decades, increasing their potential for economic growth. What determines the location of offshore production? How do countries' policies and characteristics affect a firm's decision about where to offshore? Do firms choose specific countries because of the countries' policies or because they know them better? In this paper, we use a rich dataset on Danish firms to analyze how decisions to offshore production depend on the institutional characteristics of the country and firm‐specific bilateral networks. We find that institutions that reduce credit risk and corruption increase the probability that firms will offshore there, while those that increase regulation in the labour market decrease this probability. We also show that a firm's probability of offshoring increases with the share of its employees who are immigrants from that country of origin. Finally, our analysis reveals that the negative impact of institutions that hinder offshoring is attenuated by a strong bilateral network of foreign workers.