Suchergebnisse

The emergence of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) owed much to the need to enhance the UN's ability to act forcibly in the face of the most extreme cases of gross human suffering. Too often in the past such responses were emasculated or thwarted by the necessity to successfully navigate the UN Charter's prescriptions over the use of force, by the unwillingness of member states to provide military forces, or by a combination of the two. In accepting that certain types of inhuman activity can lead to the legitimate use of force within the UN Charter framework, the adoption of R2P appeared to resolve at least some of these problems, and as such it offered hope to those wishing to see the UN adopt a more assertive response to the grossest of human rights abuses. But, using stalemate over Syria as its backdrop, this article demonstrates the dubiousness of the claim that such a normative development can ever trump the hard edged political and strategic factors which determine when states will accept and/or participate in the use of force, and it suggests a radical solution to the dangers inherent in R2P's intimate association with military intervention.

Since the un's 2005 adoption of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) the five permanent members (P5) of the organisation's Security Council have been burdened with a special dual responsibility, entailing a special responsibility to maintain international peace and security, and a special responsibility to assist those imperilled by the mass atrocity crimes of their home state. The tensions which can arise within this dual responsibility is a largely under-explored aspect of the R2P literature. But consideration of it helps explain why, despite differing views over how best to balance individual and state rights, at times accentuated by clashing interests, the P5 have nevertheless found common R2P ground, most particularly in their largely concerted opposition to the idea of a 'responsibility not to veto' R2P-related resolutions within the Council.

The emergence of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) owed much to the need to enhance the UN's ability to act forcibly in the face of the most extreme cases of gross human suffering. Too often in the past such responses were emasculated or thwarted by the necessity to successfully navigate the UN Charter's prescriptions over the use of force, by the unwillingness of member states to provide military forces, or by a combination of the two. In accepting that certain types of inhuman activity can lead to the legitimate use of force within the UN Charter framework, the adoption of R2P appeared to resolve at least some of these problems, and as such it offered hope to those wishing to see the UN adopt a more assertive response to the grossest of human rights abuses. But, using stalemate over Syria as its backdrop, this article demonstrates the dubiousness of the claim that such a normative development can ever trump the hard edged political and strategic factors which determine when states will accept and/or participate in the use of force, and it suggests a radical solution to the dangers inherent in R2P's intimate association with military intervention.

This article examines recent UN Security Council deliberations over events in Libya and Syria and in particular assesses the extent to which Council members sought to justify their positions and voting behaviour by reference to the 'Responsibility to Protect' (R2P). It shows how limited invocations of R2P were with regard to Libya, before proceeding to demonstrate how, somewhat paradoxically, R2P-sceptics such as Russia and China subsequently drew upon concerns over the manner in which NATO implemented its UN-mandate in Libya to cast doubts over R2P during debates over Syria. Contemplating the implications of the Libyan and Syrian cases for the future of R2P, the article concludes by arguing that the concept's international standing can best be preserved through the excision of its most coercive elements; R2P should be reconstituted as a standard of acceptable sovereign behaviour and a mechanism geared towards the provision of international guidance and support, while decisions over coercive military intervention, inevitably infused with considerations of strategic interest, should be made outside the R2P framework. (International Affairs (Oxford) / SWP)

This article examines the attitudes of US, British, and Soviet policy-makers as they planned for the forthcoming peace during the Second World War. It charts how they moved from planning a 'peace by dictation' of the great powers, to planning one which would be based on a model of collective security involving all members of the United Nations alliance. The latter plan would reflect both the great powers' special responsibilities for maintaining international peace and security and the stake which lesser powers had in such a venture. In addressing these historical developments the article employs two concepts familiar to International Relations scholarship, namely concert and hierarchy. It shows how the understandings which the principal post-war planners had of these concepts - and crucially of their inter-relationship - changed over time and the consequences of these changes. The article makes two core claims: firstly, that as post-war planning progressed, the attitudes of the Big Three towards the acceptable nature of the great power-lesser power hierarchy changed radically; and secondly, that the structure and nature of today's United Nations Organisation is in significant part a consequence of these changes.

Hedley Bull argued that for a state to be classed as a great power it must be in the first rank in terms of military strength but also recognised by others to have, and conceived by its own leaders and peoples to have, certain special rights and duties. Adopting this approach, this article argues that Britain's great power credentials are far stronger than commonly appreciated and that, while the term is no longer in vogue, within government the idea that Britain is a great power remains an influential factor in determining British foreign and defence policy.

Hedley Bull argued that for a state to be classed as a great power it must be in the first rank in terms of military strength but also recognised by others to have, and conceived by its own leaders and peoples to have, certain special rights and duties. Adopting this approach, this article argues that Britain's great power credentials are far stronger than commonly appreciated and that, while the term is no longer in vogue, within government the idea that Britain is a great power remains an influential factor in determining British foreign and defence policy.