Suchergebnisse

Modern discussions of natural resources focus on increasing public control over extractive industries proposing measures that range from increasing the public's share of the gain via royalties and taxes to regulating extractive activities to prevent environmental problems to outright expropriation of private investments. This article argues that such efforts are counterproductive because the fundamental economic problem of natural resources is producing the knowledge necessary to locate and extract resource deposits. The public benefit comes from enabling the use of the resources and the increased economic activity their discovery produces rather than from royalties or expropriation. The key question in designing natural resource laws is thus their effects on the incentive to discover and manage resources. Private property rights in natural resources are the best way to provide such incentives. Fortunately, the combination of property rights and tort law principles (trespass and nuisance) enables property rights to solve environmental problems related to natural resource extraction as well.

Formed in 1961 to promote global economic and social well-being, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) has become the collective voice of rich countries on international tax issues. After an initial focus on improving commerce through addressing double taxation issues, the organization shifted to a focus on restricting tax competition and increasing automatic exchanges of tax information. In this paper we analyze the reasons for this shift in policy focus. After describing the history of the OECD's work on taxation, we examine the OECD's project against "harmful tax competition" as it has played out since its launch in the 1990s. We analyze the mechanisms behind the project from a public choice perspective. While typical economic models portray tax competition as a prisoner's dilemma between governments, a more powerful perspective is of the incentives of politicians and bureaucrats. We conclude that the project against tax competition is an example of the interplay between the interests of politicians and international bureaucrats. The OECD project illustrates the role that international organizations play in competition among interest groups.

Explores regulation via litigation through discussion of the US Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA's) suit against diesel engine manufacturers. Theories of regulation are looked at to make sense of the kind of action regulators take, applying such theory to regulation by litigation. Why litigation emerged when it did is addressed, & the circumstances under which litigation is pursued are identified. Three options available to the EPA when initiating a new regulation are delineated: regulation by rulemaking, negotiation, & litigation. EPA regulatory litigation against the electricity generator industry is overviewed before turning to diesel engine litigation. The regulatory history of heavy-duty diesel engines is traced from traditional regulation to the 1977 Clean Air Act Amendments to the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments. After discussing why, in this case, the EPA chose litigation, attention turns to a comparison of what the EPA anticipated in litigation & what the outcomes were, suggesting that, from a public interest theoretical perspective, litigators fell short of achieving what they might have reasonably expected. 28 References. J. Zendejas