Suchergebnisse

Addresses the moral & legal responsibility that may fairly be attributed to mid & late adolescents who commit criminal offenses & considers how adolescents' responsibility should affect the law's response. After offering a robust theory of responsibility that is rooted in current moral theories & practices of blame & punishment, the psychosocial & developmental literature is reviewed to determine whether or to what degree mid to late adolescents are morally responsible for their conduct & whether they are less responsible than adults. Also considered are the dispositional consequences implied by the theory of responsibility in general, & by what is known about adolescents in particular. It is concluded that neither data nor common sense can resolve the normative issue of juvenile responsibility. 28 References. Adapted from the source document.

The insanity defense must be retained because it is fundamentally just. Some mentally disordered defendants are so irrational at the time of their offenses that they lack the basic preconditions of moral responsibility, and therefore they must be excused. Retaining the insanity defense will not compromise public safety, nor will abolishing it lead to the remedying of associated social problems such as the substandard mental health care in jails and prisons. Nevertheless, there are real problems with the administration of the defense that must be addressed. The substantive tests must be revised, the burden of persuasion should be put on the defendant, the role of experts should be limited, and post-acquittal procedures must be made more rational. Impatience with the practical problems, which can be ameliorated by sensible reforms, should not cause society to abandon a basically fair doctrine.

The insanity defense must be retained because it is fundamentally just: some mentally disordered defendents are so irrational at the time of their offenses that they lack the basic preconditions of moral responsibility, &, therefore, must be excused. Retaining the insanity defense will not compromise public safety, nor will abolishing it lead to the remedying of associated social problems such as substandard mental health care in jails & prisons. Nevertheless, there are real problems with the administration of the defense that must be addressed: the substantive tests must be revised, the burden of persuasion should be put on the defendant, the role of experts should be limited, & postacquittal procedures must be made more rational. Impatience with the practical problems, which can be ameliorated by sensible reforms, should not cause society to abandon a basically fair doctrine. HA

Reviewing the work of legal philosopher Michael S. Moore, this volume examines how crimes ought to be defined, what justifies punishment, what moral commitments underlie the law, how our understanding of concepts such as causation impact law and morality, and how psychiatry and cognitive neuroscience relate to law

Reviewing the work of legal philosopher Michael S. Moore, this volume examines how crimes ought to be defined, what justifies punishment, what moral commitments underlie the law, how our understanding of concepts such as causation impact law and morality, and how psychiatry and cognitive neuroscience relate to law

The justice system in the United States has long recognized that juvenile offenders are not the same as adults, and has tried to incorporate those differences into law and policy. But only in recent decades have behavioral scientists and neuroscientists, along with policymakers, looked rigorously at developmental differences, seeking answers to two overarching questions: Are young offenders, purely by virtue of their immaturity, different from older individuals who commit crimes? And, if they are, how should justice policy take this into account? A growing body of research on adolescent development now confirms that teenagers are indeed inherently different from adults, not only in their behaviors, but also (and of course relatedly) in the ways their brains function. These findings have influenced a series of Supreme Court decisions relating to the treatment of adolescents, and have led legislators and other policymakers across the country to adopt a range of developmentally informed justice policies. New research is showing distinct changes in the brains of young adults, ages 18 to 21, suggesting that they too may be immature in ways that are relevant to justice policy. This knowledge brief from the MacArthur Foundation Research Network on Law and Neuroscience considers the implications of this new research.