The Path to the new ethnicity -- "Is this any way for nice ethnic boys to behave?": The Blue-collar origins of the new ethnicity -- Instincts, feelings, and intimacies: the intellectual consolidation of the new ethnicity -- "I'm a practical guy who wants to live in a city that gives people of all kinds a chance to share": The Struggle for the progressive new ethnicity -- Consuming roots: popular culture representations of the new ethnicity -- "Let them do for themselves like we do!": The Right's appropriation of the new ethnicity -- Conclusion: "Loose cannons," Reagan democrats, and legacies.
Intro -- Title Page -- Copyright -- Dedication -- Contents -- Foreword by Admiral James Stavridis, USN (Ret.) -- Preface -- List of Abbreviations -- Introduction: Khenry and Anatol -- 1. Precedents and Back-Channel Games, 1968-1970 -- 2. At a Crossroads: Cienfuegos, SALT, and Germany-Berlin -- 3. "Playing a Game," Finding a "Lever": Back Channels and Sino-American Rapprochement -- 4. Divergent Channels: A "Watershed" on the Subcontinent -- 5. Vietnam in U.S.-Soviet Back Channels, November 1971-April 1972 -- 6. Cancellation Crises -- Conclusion: At the Summit, Achieving Détente -- Acknowledgments -- Notes -- Bibliography -- Index.
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In his 1978 memoirs, President Nixon claimed, "By using diplomatic signals and behind-the-scenes pressures we had been able to save West Pakistan from the imminent threat of Indian aggression and domination. We had also once again avoided a major confrontation with the Soviet Union."[1] Kissinger's far more detailed chapter on "the tilt," in the first volume of his memoirs, White House Years, complements and largely corroborates Nixon's. Kissinger argued that Nixon did not want to "squeeze Yahya" and tried to put forward a neutral posture to the bloodshed in East Pakistan so as not to encourage secessionist elements within an ally, Pakistan, which was divided into two wings over 1,000 miles apart astride India.[2] Above all, before his secret trip to China in July 1971, Kissinger wanted to preserve the special channel to the P.R.C., and he saw three obstacles to handling the situation in South Asia: "the policy of India, our own public debate, and the indiscipline of our bureaucracy." Kissinger stressed that the U.S. attempted to restrain India by making clear American opposition to Indo-Pakistani conflict and attempting to force the Soviet Union to control their ally, India. Nevertheless, the two South Asian countries marched towards conflict following a string of natural disasters in East Pakistan (later the independent nation of Bangladesh), an election loss for Pakistan President Yahya Khan to Mujib Rahman, and Yahya's subsequent crackdown in East Pakistan against Bangladeshi independence. [1] Nixon, RN, p.530. [2] Nixon famously wrote by hand on a memo of April 28, 1971, on "Policy Options Towards Pakistan: "To all hands. Don't squeeze Yahya at this time." Aijazuddin correctly notes that the language did not originate with the President, but actually with Alexander Haig, who wrote in a cover memo, "Henry has suggested you could include a note to the effect that you want no actions taken at this time which would squeeze West Pakistan." The cover memo is in Aijazuddin, The White House and Pakistan, p.241. The longer memo from Kissinger to the President in Ibid, pp.242-247; and FRUS, IX, pp.94-98.
In his 1978 memoirs, President Nixon claimed, "By using diplomatic signals and behind-the-scenes pressures we had been able to save West Pakistan from the imminent threat of Indian aggression and domination. We had also once again avoided a major confrontation with the Soviet Union.â€[1] Kissinger's far more detailed chapter on "the tilt,†in the first volume of his memoirs, White House Years, complements and largely corroborates Nixon's. Kissinger argued that Nixon did not want to "squeeze Yahya†and tried to put forward a neutral posture to the bloodshed in East Pakistan so as not to encourage secessionist elements within an ally, Pakistan, which was divided into two wings over 1,000 miles apart astride India.[2] Above all, before his secret trip to China in July 1971, Kissinger wanted to preserve the special channel to the P.R.C., and he saw three obstacles to handling the situation in South Asia: "the policy of India, our own public debate, and the indiscipline of our bureaucracy.†Kissinger stressed that the U.S. attempted to restrain India by making clear American opposition to Indo-Pakistani conflict and attempting to force the Soviet Union to control their ally, India. Nevertheless, the two South Asian countries marched towards conflict following a string of natural disasters in East Pakistan—later the independent nation of Bangladesh, an election loss for Pakistan President Yahya Khan to Mujib Rahman, and Yahya's subsequent crackdown in East Pakistan against Bangladeshi independence. [1] Nixon, RN, p.530. [2] Nixon famously wrote by hand on a memo of April 28, 1971, on "Policy Options Towards Pakistan: "To all hands. Don't squeeze Yahya at this time.†Aijazuddin correctly notes that the language did not originate with the President, but actually with Alexander Haig, who wrote in a cover memo, "Henry has suggested…you could include a note to the effect that you want no actions taken at this time which would squeeze West Pakistan.†The cover memo is in Aijazuddin, The White ...
Since Moscow's formal intervention in the Syrian conflict in September 2015, the Russian Federation and the Syrian Arab Republic have concluded a 49-year lease for the use and expansion of the naval base at Tartus, and a separate agreement on stationing the Russian "aviation group" at Humaymim airfield in Syria. These agreements build off longstanding Russian-Syrian ties, treaties, and cooperation agreements, and form the legal basis for Russia's long-term presence in Syria. Further, the agreements denote the rights and protections Russian military members and contractors enjoy in Syria. ; https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/rmsi_research/1003/thumbnail.jpg
Socio-economic scenarios constitute an important tool for exploring the long-term consequences of anthropogenic climate change and available response options. They have been applied for different purposes and to a different degree in various areas of climate change analysis, typically in combination with projections of future climate change. Integrated assessment modeling (IAM) has used them to develop greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions scenarios for the 21st century and to investigate strategies for mitigating GHG emissions on a global scale. Analyses of climate change impacts, adaptation and vulnerabilities (IAV) depend heavily on assumptions about underlying socio-economic developments, but have employed socio-economic scenarios to a lesser degree, due mainly to the multitude of contexts and scales of such analyses. A more consistent use of socio-economic scenarios that would allow an integrated perspective on mitigation, adaptation and residual climate impacts remains a major challenge. We assert that the identification of a set of global narratives and socio-economic pathways offering scalability to different regional contexts, a reasonable coverage of key socio-economic dimensions and relevant futures, and a sophisticated approach to separating climate policy from counter-factual "no policy" scenarios would be an important step towards meeting this challenge. Such "Shared Socio-economic Pathways" (SSPs) should be specified in an iterative manner and with close collaboration between IAM and IAV researchers to assure coverage of key dimensions, sufficient scalability and widespread adoption. They can be used not only as inputs to analyses, but also to collect the results of different climate change analyses in a matrix defined by two dimensions : climate exposure as characterized by a radiative forcing or temperature level and socio-economic development as classified by the SSPs. For some applications, SSPs may have to be augmented by "Shared Climate Policy Assumptions" (SPAs) capturing global components of climate policies that some studies may require as inputs. Finally, sufficient coverage of the relevant socio-economic dimensions for the analysis of mitigation, adaptation and residual climate impacts may be assessed by locating the SSPs along the dimensions of challenges to mitigation and to adaptation. We conclude that the development of SSPs, and integrated socio-economic scenarios more broadly, is a useful focal point for collaborative efforts between IAM and IAV researchers. This is likely to be a long-term and iterative enterprise comprising a collection of different activities : periodically taking stock of the evolving scenario work in both research communities, linking up individual efforts, and pursuing collaborative scenario work through appropriate platforms that still need to be established. In the short run, an important goal is to produce tangible outcomes that would allow the 5th Assessment Report of the IPCC to take a more integrated perspective on mitigation, adaptation and residual climate impacts. ; Les scénarios socio-économiques constituent un important outil d'exploration des conséquences de long terme du changement climatique d'origine anthropique, et des options disponibles pour y répondre. Ils ont été appliqués pour différents objectifs et à des degrés différents dans plusieurs domaines de l'analyse du changement climatique, typiquement en combinaison avec les projections de changements climatiques futurs. Les modèles d'évaluation intégrés (MEI) les ont utilisés pour développer des scénarios d'émissions de gaz à effet de serre (GES) pour le XXIe siècle et pour examiner les stratégies d'atténuation des émissions de GES à l'échelle planétaire. Les analyses sur les "impacts, l'adaptation, et la vulnérabilité" (IAV) du changement climatique dépendent fortement des hypothèses relatives aux développements socio-économiques sous-jacents, mais elles ont utilisé dans une moindre mesure les scénarios socio-économiques, principalement en raison de la multitude des contextes et des échelles de telles analyses. Il reste aujourd'hui difficile de mettre en place une utilisation plus cohérente des scénarios socio-économiques, qui autoriserait une vision plus intégrée de l'atténuation, de l'adaptation et des impacts climatiques résiduels. Nous soutenons qu'une étape importante pour relever ce défi est l'identification d'un ensemble de scénarios qualitatifs globaux et des trajectoires socio-économiques correspondantes, qui pourraient être déclinés à différentes échelles spatiales et couvriraient de manière convenable les différentes dimensions socio-économiques des futurs possibles. De telles " trajectoires socio-économiques partagées " (TSP) doivent être spécifiées de façon interactive, par une étroite collaboration entre les chercheurs MEI et IAV pour garantir le traitement des dimensions les plus importantes, la possibilité de décliner les scénarios à différentes échelles, et pour favoriser une large utilisation des TSP par l'ensemble de la communauté. Ces TSP peuvent être utilisées non seulement comme une information d'entrée pour des analyses spécifiques, mais aussi pour rassembler les résultats de différentes études dans une matrice définie selon deux dimensions : l'exposition climatique, caractérisée par un forçage radiatif ou un niveau de température, et le développement socio-économique, décrit par les TSP. Les TSP pourront également être augmentées "d'hypothèses partagées de politique climatique" (HPP), qui décrivent les composantes globales des politiques climatiques, nécessaires à certaines études. Finalement, on pourra vérifier que les TSP réalisent une couverture suffisante des dimensions socio-économiques pertinentes pour l'analyse de l'atténuation, de l'adaptation, et des impacts climatiques résiduels, en les situant selon deux dimensions, la première mesurant la capacité à l'atténuation et l'autre la capacité à s'adapter. Nous concluons que le développement des TSP, et plus largement celui des scénarios socioéconomiques intégrés, est un point central des efforts de collaboration entre les chercheurs des communautés MEI et IAV. C'est probablement une entreprise itérative et de long terme comportant un ensemble d'activités très différentes : faire périodiquement un bilan du travail des deux communautés de recherche sur les scénarios, rapprocher les efforts individuels sur ce thème, et mener un travail collaboratif sur les scénarios via des plates-formes appropriées qui restent encore à instituer. À court terme, un objectif important est la production de résultats tangibles permettant au cinquième rapport d'évaluation du GIEC d'adopter un point de vue plus intégré sur l'atténuation, l'adaptation et les impacts climatiques résiduels.
