National Questions: Theoretical Reflections on Nations and Nationalism in Eastern Europe
In: Soviet and Post-Soviet Politics and Society, vol. 250
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In: Soviet and Post-Soviet Politics and Society, vol. 250
In: Studies of the Harriman Institute, Columbia University
In: Studies in Soviet history and society
In: East/West: journal of Ukrainian Studies, Band 5, Heft 2, S. 227-229
ISSN: 2292-7956
Book review of Anne Applebaum. Red Famine: Stalin's War on Ukraine. McClelland & Stewart, 2017. xxxii, 464 pp. Illustrations. Maps. Notes. Selected Bibliography. Index. $42.00, cloth.
In: Communist and post-communist studies, Band 49, Heft 1, S. 25-36
ISSN: 1873-6920
There is a broad consensus among students of contemporary Russia that the political system constructed by Vladimir Putin is authoritarian and that he plays a dominant role in it. By building and expanding on these two features and by engaging in a deconstruction and reconstruction of the concept of fascism, this article suggests that the Putin system may plausibly be termed fascist. Not being a type of group, disposition, politics, or ideology, fascism may be salvaged from the conceptual confusion that surrounds it by being conceived of as a type of authoritarian political system. Fascism may be defined as a popular fully authoritarian political system with a personalistic dictator and a cult of the leader—a definition that makes sense conceptually as well as empirically, with respect to Putin's Russia and related fascist systems.
In: Communist and post-communist studies: an international interdisciplinary journal, Band 49, Heft 1, S. 25-36
ISSN: 0967-067X
World Affairs Online
In: World affairs: a journal of ideas and debate, Band 177, Heft 5, S. 75
ISSN: 0043-8200
In: Nationalities papers: the journal of nationalism and ethnicity, Band 39, Heft 1, S. 105-109
ISSN: 1465-3923
How is it possible for a Rusyn nation-builder to have contributed to the historiography of Ukraine to such a significant degree that one might suspect that Paul Robert Magocsi is really a Ukrainian nation-builder? Like all social-science puzzles, this one dissolves upon closer inspection. Magocsi resembles a Ukrainian nation-builder – or perhaps even is a Ukrainian nation-builder malgré soi – precisely because he is a Rusyn nation-builder. That is so because all nation-builders are always builders of at least two nations, their own and the others.
In: Problems of post-communism, Band 57, Heft 3, S. 55-61
ISSN: 1557-783X
In: Ukraine-Analysen, Heft 80, S. 20-21
ISSN: 1862-555X
World Affairs Online
In: Nationalities papers: the journal of nationalism and ethnicity, Band 38, Heft 1, S. 59-71
ISSN: 1465-3923
Although most contemporary theories of nationalism and identity formation rest on some form of social constructivism, few theorists of nationalism and identity formation interrogate social constructivism as a social construction – a social science concept "imposed" on the non-self-consciously constructivist behaviors of people, who generally do not believe they are engaging in construction. Since social constructivism – unless it is a metaphysics about what is real – is really about theconceptof social construction, the first task of constructivists is to ask not how various populations have engaged in social construction but how social construction should be defined. As this article shows, constructivism is at best a run-of-the-mill theoretical approach – perfectly respectable, but no different from any other theoretical approach in the social sciences. It is only when social constructivism makes outlandishly radical claims – that all of reality or all of social reality is constructed – that it is unusual, exciting, and wrong.
In: Nationalities papers: the journal of nationalism and ethnicity, Band 38, Heft 5, S. 671-687
ISSN: 1465-3923
This article asks why a popular bar named after a criminal Soviet secret police organization has not provoked the outrage of the developed world's intellectual and artistic elites, who would surely condemn an SS Bar. It attributes this moral blindness to the Holocaust's centrality in Israeli, German, and American national discourse and the resultant binary morality that ascribes collective innocence to all Jews at all times and in all places and collective guilt to all Germans – and potentially to all non-Jews – at all times and in all places. The moral logic of the Holocaust thus transforms Jews into victims and non-Jews into victimizers; the moral logic and reality of the Gulag transform everybody into both victim and victimizer. The binary morality of the Holocaust insists that all human beings be heroes; the fuzzy morality of the Gulag recognizes that all humans are just humans constantly confronted by moral ambiguity. But because the Gulag's moral ambiguity concerns non-JewsandJews, the Gulag undercuts binary morality. The Holocaust and the Gulag are not just incompatible moral tales; they are incompatibleandintersecting moral tales. As a result, they cannot co-exist. We therefore fail to respond to the KGB Bar because to recognize the Gulag as a mass murder worthy of categorical moral condemnation would be to challenge the sacred status of the Holocaust. Ironically, the KGB Bar is possibleprecisely becausean SS Bar is impossible.
In: Foreign affairs, Band 89, Heft 4, S. 125-136
ISSN: 0015-7120
World Affairs Online