Suchergebnisse

AbstractThis study investigates how governments' spending on public goods affects the onset of ethnic violence. Do governments make particularistic or public goods spending? And, how do governments' spending behaviour affect the escalation of ethnic violence? This study links the literatures on ethnic competition, rent‐seeking and government impartiality and examines the effect of level of impartiality in the provision of public goods on ethnic violence. It is expected that particularistic policymaking and spending can increase the risk of ethnic violence because it can contribute to horizontal group grievances and rent‐seeking over state resources. Analyses of 152 countries from 1946 to 2010 show that a one‐standard deviation increase in impartial governance of public goods lowers the risk of ethnic violence a substantial 25% to 28% even with consideration of a battery of control variables. To facilitate peace in ethnically divided countries, international policymakers and states should promote impartial policies targeted at the provision of public goods for all communities and groups.

AbstractThe objective of this study is to show how contract-intensive economic institutions can promote diversity and inclusion of social and political groups in economic and business opportunities provided by governments. Building on the interdisciplinary political economy and governance literatures, two types of economic institutions are identified: rent-seeking and contract-intensive. It is argued that rent-seeking economic activities can reinforce in-group norms, gift-giving practices, and governments' discrimination of groups. However, when contract-intensive activities increase in an economy, they can enhance diversity and inclusion of groups in the marketplace creating opportunity structures outside the state and as businesses press governments toward greater impartiality. Analyses of 165 countries from 1961 to 2011 show that a one standard deviation increase in contract-intensive economic activity is associated with a substantial 18 percent increase in the equality of access to state business opportunities for both social and political groups in the long run.

Can foreign aid trigger ethnic war? The quantitative conflict literature has produced mixed findings on the effect of foreign aid on civil war in developing states. One reason for the mixed results is that a subset of civil wars, ethnic wars, are more likely than other kinds of civil wars to be triggered by foreign aid. This is because large amounts of foreign aid can cause the state to become a prize worth fighting over, mobilizing ethnic identity and group-related rebellion. This article investigates this question by testing the separate impacts of total, bilateral, and multilateral aid given by state and nonstate actors on the onset of ethnic war, using a cross-national time-series dataset of 147 countries from 1961 to 2008. The findings show a very strong association of foreign aid with ethnic war, whether measured as total aid, bilateral aid, or multilateral aid.

Can foreign aid trigger ethnic war? The quantitative conflict literature has produced mixed findings on the effect of foreign aid on civil war in developing states. One reason for the mixed results is that a subset of civil wars, ethnic wars, are more likely than other kinds of civil wars to be triggered by foreign aid. This is because large amounts of foreign aid can cause the state to become a prize worth fighting over, mobilizing ethnic identity and group-related rebellion. This article investigates this question by testing the separate impacts of total, bilateral, and multilateral aid given by state and nonstate actors on the onset of ethnic war, using a cross-national time-series dataset of 147 countries from 1961 to 2008. The findings show a very strong association of foreign aid with ethnic war, whether measured as total aid, bilateral aid, or multilateral aid.

This article analyzes the effects of nationalizing policies of the state, processes of democratization, and uneven socio-economic development on the rise of Kurdish ethno-mobilization led by the PKK terrorist organization since the 1980s in Turkey. Three features of the Turkish modernization context are identified as conducive for the rise and continuation of Kurdish ethno-mobilization: a) a nation-building autocratic state that resisted granting cultural rights and recognition for the Kurds; b) democratization with the exclusion of ethnic politics and rights; c) economic regional inequality that coincided with the regional distribution of the Kurdish population. It is argued that autocratic policies of the state during nation-building accompanied the development of an illiberal democracy and intolerance for cultural pluralism. These aspects of Turkish democracy seem to be incompatible with both the liberal and consociational models of democracy that accommodate ethnicity within multiculturalism.

This article analyzes the effects of nationalizing policies of the state, processes of democratization, and uneven socio-economic development on the rise of Kurdish ethno-mobilization led by the PKK terrorist organization since the 1980s in Turkey. Three features of the Turkish modernization context are identified as conducive for the rise and continuation of Kurdish ethno-mobilization: a) a nation-building autocratic state that resisted granting cultural rights and recognition for the Kurds; b) democratization with the exclusion of ethnic politics and rights; c) economic-regional inequality that coincided with the regional distribution of the Kurdish population. It is argued that autocratic policies of the state during nation-building accompanied the development of an illiberal democracy and intolerance for cultural pluralism. These aspects of Turkish democracy seem to be incompatible with both the liberal and consociational models of democracy that accommodate ethnicity within multiculturalism. (Nationalities Papers)

The institutionalisation of a market-oriented economy under the rule of law can be an effective factor for the stability and consolidation of democracy. Turkey has had a weak market economy with weak rule of law, caused in part by an unplanned and irrational state allocation of rents. Just as the European Union promoted democratic consolidation and the rule of law in the Spain, Portugal and Greece, it can accelerate the transformation of Turkey's economy and facilitate the consolidation of Turkey's democratic institutions. The postponement or interruption of Turkey's accession process risks increasing political instability in Turkey and the region. Integration is in the interests of both the EU and Turkey. (Survival / SWP)

AbstractSome studies suggest that market-based economic development with state policies based on the rule of law are essential in stabilizing democracy and protecting civil and political rights. This article explores a possible association between weak civil and political rights, democratic instability and the delay in a state-regulated market development under the rule of law in Turkey. Despite its experience with democratic institutions since the 1950s, Turkey can be characterized as an 'illiberal' democracy because of its poor record on human rights. The lack of a relatively autonomous and competitive market economy may be explained by clientelist and inegalitarian forms of state intervention. These in turn contribute to the perpetuation of low income levels, a clientelist rent-seeking political and economic culture and unstable and illiberal democracy.

This article investigates the conditions that are conducive to extreme political violence in ethnically heterogeneous nations. Theories of resource mobilization, ethnic competition, and split labor market propose that democratization and economic modernization encourage ethnic competition, increasing the likelihood of extreme political violence within nations experiencing political and economic change. In the light of these theories, the conditions that possibly foster conflict in multi-ethnic nations are identified with respect to levels of democracy, political change (or democratization), and levels of economic development. The effects of these variables on extreme political violence are examined with several logit regression analyses on a pooled time-series sample of 126 nations from 1948 to 1982. The findings show that ethnic heterogeneity is not associated with higher levels of violence within nations, except under certain political conditions. Both democracy and economic development relate to political violence in a curvilinear inverted U-shape form. For ethnically heterogeneous societies, however, the inverted U-curve for democracy is asymmetric, with democracy's pacifying impact relative to semidemocracies only about half as potent as in ethnically homogeneous societies and less than that of strict autocracy.