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AbstractDemocratisation is hailed as a pathway to peace by some, yet, blamed for provoking renewed violence by others. Can democracy aid explain the effect of democratisation after civil war? Building upon findings that transitions to democracy are prone to violence, this article shows that external democracy aid can mitigate such negative effects. It is the first to disaggregate democracy aid and analyse its effect on peace after civil war. To this end, it uses a configurational approach and focuses on support for competition (for example, promoting free and fair elections), institutional constraints (for example, strengthening the judiciary), and cooperation (for example, facilitating reconciliation). Combining Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) with an illustrative case study on Liberia, it demonstrates that democracy aid can help to prevent recurrence during postconflict democratisation. Two pathways can explain peaceful democratisation: first, fostering 'cooperative democratisation' characterised by substantial support for cooperation in lower-risk contexts; and second, fostering 'controlled competition' by combining substantial support for institutional constraints and competition. Importantly, democracy support does not trigger renewed violence. These findings speak to the academic debate on the destabilising potential of democratisation processes after civil wars and inform policymakers designing postconflict support strategies.

Existing research suggests that democratization can run counter to building peace in post-conflict contexts. This article analyses the effect of two competing strategies that external actors use to address the conflict of objective between democracy and peace: prioritization and gradualism. The prioritization approach advises sequencing, which means postponing support for democratization and concentrating first on peace in terms of the absence of violent conflict. The gradualist approach promotes peace and democracy simultaneously. This article offers a systematic analysis of these two prominent donor strategies. To this end, it focuses on two critical junctures in two similar post-conflict settings (Burundi and Nepal). Drawing upon extensive field research, the analysis shows that a gradualist approach is not more risk-prone than a prioritization strategy. To the contrary, the analysis suggests that even in most fragile contexts, gradualism can help to foster peace. Prioritization, in turn, may also contribute to the instability it aimed to prevent. Two factors condition the effect of the selected strategy on peace: which dimensions of democracy are affected and to what degree, and whether the institutional context reinforces or counteracts this trend.

Evidence exists that democracies are particularly stable, yet also that processes of democratisation are highly susceptible to conflict, especially if democratisation occurs in the aftermath of violent conflict. New research from the German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) indicates that external democracy support can help mitigate the destabilising effects of post-conflict demo¬cratisation. Since the 1990s, democracy support has been integral to most peacebuilding efforts. Supporting free and fair elections or a vibrant media seems well-suited for fostering peace: Democratic institutions can actively deal with societal conflicts, in sharp contrast to authoritarian regimes, which often rely on repression. However, altering power relations through more political competition can also trigger power struggles, which newly emerging democratic institutions may have difficulty containing. Therefore, questions arise regarding countries that have embarked on a process of democratisation after civil war: Can democracy support help to mitigate destabilising effects, or does it reinforce them? If it can foster peace, how should it be designed in order to avoid renewed violence?The wisdom or folly of supporting democracy to build peace after civil war has caused controversy, yet has rarely been tested empirically. This briefing paper summarises findings from DIE research that addresses this gap. The results demonstrate that:External democracy support that accompanies post-conflict democratisation can help to foster peace after civil war. Importantly, it does not trigger renewed violence.Analysing the effects of two donor strategies to deal with trade-offs between stability (preventing renewed violence) and democracy shows that prioritising stability over democracy does not contain fewer risks than gradualist support, in contrast to widespread assumptions. In fact, the prioritising strategy can also fail, and even be counterproductive.The competitive elements of a democratic system explain both why it can help to avoid, or provoke, renewed violence. Democracy support facilitating "controlled competition" can mitigate the destabilizing effects: Support for political competition strengthens the peace-enhancing effects by promoting meaningful choice and enabling the peaceful allocation and withdrawal of political power. Fostering institutional constraints limits the discretionary power of the executive and enforces a commitment to democratic rules.These results can provide guidance to policy-makers when engaging in post-conflict situations:Donors should actively accompany post-conflict democratisation processes with substantial democracy support. They should not refrain from offering such support until stability has already proven to be sustain¬able, since it can make an important contribution towards strengthening peace and help in avoiding destabilising effects.When facing trade-offs between stability and democracy in post-conflict situations, donors should bear in mind that prioritising stability is not less risk-prone than a gradualist approach, which promotes both stability and democracy in an iterative way. Thus, prioritising stability should not be the obvious choice in post-conflict situations. Instead, donors should carefully scrutinise the political dynamics before applying either strategy and recall that a gradualist approach offers considerable potential for strengthening peace sustainably.Engaging in a context of post-conflict democratisation, donors should provide substantial support both for political competition and for institutional constraints.

Während Demokratien besonders stabil sind, weisen Demokratisierungsprozesse ein erhöhtes Konfliktpotential auf, vor allem in Post-Konflikt-Kontexten. Jüngste Forschungsergebnisse des Deutschen Instituts für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) zeigen, dass externe Demokratieförderung die destabilisierenden Auswirkungen von Post-Konflikt-Demokratisierung abmildern kann. Seit den 1990er Jahren ist Demokratieförderung fester Bestandteil von Friedensförderung. Freie und faire Wahlen oder eine dynamische Medienlandschaft zu fördern scheint positiv für Frieden: Demokratische Institutionen können aktiv mit gesellschaftlichen Konflikten umgehen, im Gegensatz zu autoritären Regimen, die oft auf Repression setzen. Aber die Veränderung von Machtverhältnissen durch mehr politischen Wettbewerb kann auch Machtkämpfe auslösen, die für gerade entstehende demokratische Institutionen schwer zu bewältigen sind. Für Länder, die sich nach Ende eines Bürgerkrieges demokratisieren, stellen sich daher folgende Fragen: Kann Demokratieförderung die destabilisierenden Auswirkungen abmildern, oder werden diese eher noch verstärkt? Wie sollte Demokratieförderung gestaltet werden, um einen Wiederausbruch von Gewalt zu vermeiden?Die Frage, ob Demokratieförderung nach Bürgerkriegen ratsam ist, wurde kontrovers diskutiert, aber kaum empirisch untersucht. Das vorliegende Papier fasst die Ergebnisse jüngster DIE-Forschung zusammen, die diese Lücke schließt. Die Ergebnisse zeigen:Demokratieförderung, die Demokratisierung in Post-Konflikt-Gesellschaften begleitet, kann Frieden maßgeblich stärken. Sie löst nicht erneute Gewalt aus.Die Analyse zweier Geberstrategien um mit Zielkonflikten zwischen Stabilität (Vermeidung neuer Gewalt) und Demokratisierung umzugehen zeigt, dass es, anders als weithin angenommen, nicht weniger Risiken birgt, Stabilität gegenüber Demokratie zu priorisieren. Tatsächlich kann die Priorisierungsstrategie auch scheitern und sogar kontraproduktiv sein.Demokratieförderung, die einen "kontrollierten Wettbewerb" fördert, kann destabilisierende Effekte abmildern. Die Förderung des politischen Wettbewerbs stärkt die friedensstiftende Wirkung demokratischer Institutionen, politische Macht friedlich zuzuweisen, aber auch wieder zu entziehen. Die Förderung institutioneller Machtkontrolle hilft, die Willkür der Exekutive zu beschränken und demokratische Regeln durchzusetzen.Diese Ergebnisse können Geberengagement in Post-Konflikt-Situationen informieren:Geber sollten Demokratisierungsprozesse aktiv mit Demokratieförderung begleiten. Sie sollten diese Unterstützung nicht erst anbieten, wenn sich die Situation nachhaltig stabilisiert hat, da sie einen wichtigen Beitrag für Frieden leisten und destabilisierende Auswirkungen verhindern kann.Bei Zielkonflikten zwischen Stabilität und Demokratie ist zu berücksichtigen, dass es nicht unbedingt erfolgversprechender ist, Stabilität zu priorisieren, als einen graduellen Ansatz zu verfolgen, der schrittweise sowohl Stabilität als auch Demokratie fördert. Daher sollten Geber politische Dynamiken vor der Entscheidung für eine Strategie sorgfältig analysieren und berücksichtigen, dass ein gradueller Ansatz über erhebliches Potenzial verfügt, Frieden nachhaltig zu stärken.Im Kontext von Post-Konflikt-Demokratisierung sollten Geber substantiell politischen Wettbewerbs sowie die Schaffung institutioneller Machtkontrolle fördern.

Evidence exists that democracies are particularly stable, yet also that processes of democratisation are highly susceptible to conflict, especially if democratisation occurs in the aftermath of violent conflict. New research from the German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) indicates that external democracy support can help mitigate the destabilising effects of post-conflict democratisation. Since the 1990s, democracy support has been integral to most peacebuilding efforts. Supporting free and fair elections or a vibrant media seems well-suited for fostering peace: Democratic institutions can actively deal with societal conflicts, in sharp contrast to authoritarian regimes, which often rely on repression. However, altering power relations through more political competition can also trigger power struggles, which newly emerging democratic institutions may have difficulty containing. Therefore, questions arise regarding countries that have embarked on a process of democratisation after civil war: Can democracy support help to mitigate destabilising effects, or does it reinforce them? If it can foster peace, how should it be designed in order to avoid renewed violence?The wisdom or folly of supporting democracy to build peace after civil war has caused controversy, yet has rarely been tested empirically. This briefing paper summarises findings from DIE research that addresses this gap. The results demonstrate that:External democracy support that accompanies post-conflict democratisation can help to foster peace after civil war. Importantly, it does not trigger renewed violence.Analysing the effects of two donor strategies to deal with trade-offs between stability (preventing renewed violence) and democracy shows that prioritising stability over democracy does not contain fewer risks than gradualist support, in contrast to widespread assumptions. In fact, the prioritising strategy can also fail, and even be counterproductive.The competitive elements of a democratic system explain both why it can help to avoid, or provoke, renewed violence. Democracy support facilitating "controlled competition" can mitigate the destabilizing effects: Support for political competition strengthens the peace-enhancing effects by promoting meaningful choice and enabling the peaceful allocation and withdrawal of political power. Fostering institutional constraints limits the discretionary power of the executive and enforces a commitment to democratic rules.These results can provide guidance to policy-makers when engaging in post-conflict situations:Donors should actively accompany post-conflict democratisation processes with substantial democracy support. They should not refrain from offering such support until stability has already proven to be sustain¬able, since it can make an important contribution towards strengthening peace and help in avoiding destabilising effects.When facing trade-offs between stability and democracy in post-conflict situations, donors should bear in mind that prioritising stability is not less risk-prone than a gradualist approach, which promotes both stability and democracy in an iterative way. Thus, prioritising stability should not be the obvious choice in post-conflict situations. Instead, donors should carefully scrutinise the political dynamics before applying either strategy and recall that a gradualist approach offers considerable potential for strengthening peace sustainably.Engaging in a context of post-conflict democratisation, donors should provide substantial support both for political competition and for institutional constraints.

Während Demokratien besonders stabil sind, weisen Demokratisierungsprozesse ein erhöhtes Konfliktpotential auf, vor allem in Post-Konflikt-Kontexten. Jüngste Forschungsergebnisse des Deutschen Instituts für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) zeigen, dass externe Demokratieförderung die destabilisierenden Auswirkungen von Post-Konflikt-Demokratisierung abmildern kann. Seit den 1990er Jahren ist Demokratieförderung fester Bestandteil von Friedensförderung. Freie und faire Wahlen oder eine dynamische Medienlandschaft zu fördern scheint positiv für Frieden: Demokratische Institutionen können aktiv mit gesellschaftlichen Konflikten umgehen, im Gegensatz zu autoritären Regimen, die oft auf Repression setzen. Aber die Veränderung von Machtverhältnissen durch mehr politischen Wettbewerb kann auch Machtkämpfe auslösen, die für gerade entstehende demokratische Institutionen schwer zu bewältigen sind. Für Länder, die sich nach Ende eines Bürgerkrieges demokratisieren, stellen sich daher folgende Fragen: Kann Demokratieförderung die destabilisierenden Auswirkungen abmildern, oder werden diese eher noch verstärkt? Wie sollte Demokratieförderung gestaltet werden, um einen Wiederausbruch von Gewalt zu vermeiden? Die Frage, ob Demokratieförderung nach Bürgerkriegen ratsam ist, wurde kontrovers diskutiert, aber kaum empirisch untersucht. Das vorliegende Papier fasst die Ergebnisse jüngster DIE-Forschung zusammen, die diese Lücke schließt. Die Ergebnisse zeigen: Demokratieförderung, die Demokratisierung in Post-Konflikt-Gesellschaften begleitet, kann Frieden maßgeblich stärken. Sie löst nicht erneute Gewalt aus. Die Analyse zweier Geberstrategien um mit Zielkonflikten zwischen Stabilität (Vermeidung neuer Gewalt) und Demokratisierung umzugehen zeigt, dass es, anders als weithin angenommen, nicht weniger Risiken birgt, Stabilität gegenüber Demokratie zu priorisieren. Tatsächlich kann die Priorisierungsstrategie auch scheitern und sogar kontraproduktiv sein. Demokratieförderung, die einen "kontrollierten Wettbewerb" fördert, kann destabilisierende Effekte abmildern. Die Förderung des politischen Wettbewerbs stärkt die friedensstiftende Wirkung demokratischer Institutionen, politische Macht friedlich zuzuweisen, aber auch wieder zu entziehen. Die Förderung institutioneller Machtkontrolle hilft, die Willkür der Exekutive zu beschränken und demokratische Regeln durchzusetzen. Diese Ergebnisse können Geberengagement in Post-Konflikt-Situationen informieren: Geber sollten Demokratisierungsprozesse aktiv mit Demokratieförderung begleiten. Sie sollten diese Unterstützung nicht erst anbieten, wenn sich die Situation nachhaltig stabilisiert hat, da sie einen wichtigen Beitrag für Frieden leisten und destabilisierende Auswirkungen verhindern kann. Bei Zielkonflikten zwischen Stabilität und Demokratie ist zu berücksichtigen, dass es nicht unbedingt erfolgversprechender ist, Stabilität zu priorisieren, als einen graduellen Ansatz zu verfolgen, der schrittweise sowohl Stabilität als auch Demokratie fördert. Daher sollten Geber politische Dynamiken vor der Entscheidung für eine Strategie sorgfältig analysieren und berücksichtigen, dass ein gradueller Ansatz über erhebliches Potenzial verfügt, Frieden nachhaltig zu stärken. Im Kontext von Post-Konflikt-Demokratisierung sollten Geber substantiell politischen Wettbewerbs sowie die Schaffung institutioneller Machtkontrolle fördern.

Evidence exists that democracies are particularly stable, yet also that processes of democratisation are highly susceptible to conflict, especially if democratisation occurs in the aftermath of violent conflict. New research from the German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) indicates that external democracy support can help mitigate the destabilising effects of post-conflict democratisation. Since the 1990s, democracy support has been integral to most peacebuilding efforts. Supporting free and fair elections or a vibrant media seems well-suited for fostering peace: Democratic institutions can actively deal with societal conflicts, in sharp contrast to authoritarian regimes, which often rely on repression. However, altering power relations through more political competition can also trigger power struggles, which newly emerging democratic institutions may have difficulty containing. Therefore, questions arise regarding countries that have embarked on a process of democratisation after civil war: Can democracy support help to mitigate destabilising effects, or does it reinforce them? If it can foster peace, how should it be designed in order to avoid renewed violence? The wisdom or folly of supporting democracy to build peace after civil war has caused controversy, yet has rarely been tested empirically. This briefing paper summarises findings from DIE research that addresses this gap. The results demonstrate that: * External democracy support that accompanies postconflict democratisation can help to foster peace after civil war. Importantly, it does not trigger renewed violence. * Analysing the effects of two donor strategies to deal with trade-offs between stability (preventing renewed violence) and democracy shows that prioritising stability over democracy does not contain fewer risks than gradualist support, in contrast to widespread assumptions. In fact, the prioritising strategy can also fail, and even be counterproductive. * The competitive elements of a democratic system explain both why it can help to avoid, or provoke, renewed violence. Democracy support facilitating "controlled competition" can mitigate the destabilizing effects: Support for political competition strengthens the peaceenhancing effects by promoting meaningful choice and enabling the peaceful allocation and withdrawal of political power. Fostering institutional constraints limits the discretionary power of the executive and enforces a commitment to democratic rules. These results can provide guidance to policy-makers when engaging in post-conflict situations: 1. Donors should actively accompany post-conflict democratisation processes with substantial democracy support. They should not refrain from offering such support until stability has already proven to be sustainable, since it can make an important contribution towards strengthening peace and help in avoiding destabilising effects. 2. When facing trade-offs between stability and democracy in post-conflict situations, donors should bear in mind that prioritising stability is not less risk-prone than a gradualist approach, which promotes both stability and democracy in an iterative way. Thus, prioritising stability should not be the obvious choice in post-conflict situations. Instead, donors should carefully scrutinise the political dynamics before applying either strategy and recall that a gradualist approach offers considerable potential for strengthening peace sustainably. 3. Engaging in a context of post-conflict democratisation, donors should provide substantial support both for political competition and for institutional constraints. ; 2nd revised edition

Aiming to gain deeper knowledge of the impact that external engagement can have in fragile contexts, this paper analyses international support given to foster stability and democracy in Timor-Leste. Two main questions guided the research. First, have international actors contributed to the consolidation of peace and democracy in Timor-Leste? Second, which factors explain successful support, and which ones explain failure? After having achieved independence, the young nation faced a new task: establishing a stable state and a functioning democratic system. Four years after formal independence had been established, a major violent crisis forced the government to invite an international stabilisation force. The crisis revealed not only that stability was still fragile, it also disclosed the many persistent challenges. Since then, considerable achievements have been made: solving the crisis of massive internal displacement caused by the 2006 events, and conducting two elections without major incidents, in 2007 and in 2012. However, problems in the security sector, which were closely linked to the outbreak of the 2006 crisis, still have not been comprehensively addressed. The international community provided substantial support to all of these processes, helping to facilitate important accomplishments, yet failing to prevent – or even reinforcing – some weaknesses as well. The research uses selected "critical junctures" in the peace and democratisation process to assess the impact of donor engagement. The analysis focuses on these critical junctures in order to establish what impact they had and to infer the causality of donors' support. International engagement claiming to have made a crucial contribution to the overall process should be visible in these critical junctures, while significant contributions to such critical junctures will, by definition, also have had an impact on the larger peace and democratisation processes. The critical junctures analysed are: 1) the 2007 electoral process, 2) the crisis of internal displacement (2006-2010) and 3) Security Sector Reform (2006-2014). In order to analyse which factors influenced the effectiveness of external support, the research was guided by academic literature, which suggests that both choosing cooperative over coercive forms of cooperation as well as high levels of coordination increase the effectiveness of international support given to advance peace and democracy. Both of these expectations were generally confirmed by this research: high levels of coordination indeed helped to render external support effective, whereas low levels significantly hampered its success, as diverging approaches in the security sector show, in particular. Cooperative forms of support have been more successful, as illustrated by the very successful international facilitation of the government-led resolution of the internal displacement crisis. More coercive measures in the Security Sector Reform process provoked resistance and reduced the effectiveness of international support. Yet, the analysis also shows the limits of cooperative forms of support when framework conditions are unfavourable.

Societies that have experienced violent conflict face considerable challenges in building sustainable peace. One crucial question they need to address is how to deal with their violent past and atrocities that were committed – for example, whether perpetrators should be held accountable by judicial means, or whether the focus should be laid on truth telling and the compensation of victims. Transitional justice (TJ) offers a range of instruments that aim to help societies come to terms with their history of violent conflict. Systematic, empirical analyses of TJ instruments have been emerging over the last years. This Briefing Paper summarises the policy-relevant insights they provide regarding the main TJ instruments: trials; truth commissions; reparations for victims; and amnesties. Reviewing academic literature on the effects of transitional justice in post-conflict contexts, three main messages emerge: Initial evidence suggests that transitional justice can help to foster peace. Contrary to concerns that actively dealing with the past may deepen societal divisions and cause renewed conflict, most statistical studies find either positive effects or no effects of the various instruments on peace. Research indicates that amnesties can help to build peace, though not as a response to severe war crimes. Contrary to strong reservations against amnesties at the international level (especially on normative grounds), several academic studies find that amnesties can statistically significantly reduce the risk of conflict recurrence. However, the most extensive and recent study also shows that this effect varies depending on the context: amnesties can contribute to peace when they are included in peace agreements, but have no effect after episodes of very severe violence. To effectively foster peace, trials should target all perpetrators involved in the conflict, not only the defeated party. A likely explanation for this finding from a recent study is that otherwise domestic trials can be used by the victorious party to punish and repress the defeated side. More generally, donors should be aware that if a political regime is able to instrumentalise a transitional justice process, for instance after a one-sided victory or in an undemocratic environment, the process is often not conducive to peace. Reviewing the literature also makes clear that important, open questions remain: Can transitional justice contribute to a deeper quality of peace that goes beyond the absence of violence? TJ should be able to foster reconciliation and mend broken societal relationships. However, if and how TJ can affect social cohesion after conflict needs to be better understood. How do various transitional justice instruments need to be combined? Both the academic literature and policy documents suggest that it is important to find the right mix of instruments, but more systematic analyses of successful combinations of TJ instruments are necessary. What role does donor support play in processes of transitional justice? Although transitional justice can be strongly domestically driven, such as in Colombia, donor funding often facilitates these processes. However, we still know too little about the effectiveness of such support.