African wildlife conservation has been transformed, shifting from a traditional, state-managed government approach to a broader governance approach with a wide range of actors designing and implementing wildlife policy. The most widely popularized approach has been that of community-managed nature conservancies. The knowledge of how institutions function in relation to humans and their use of the environment is critical to the design and implementation of effective conservation. This paper seeks to review the institutional and governance challenges faced in wildlife conservation in southern and eastern Africa. We discuss two different sets of challenges related to the shift in conservation practices: the practical implementation of wildlife governance, and the capacity of current governance structures to capture and distribute economic benefits from wildlife. To some extent, the issues raised by the new policies must be resolved through theoretical and empirical research addressed at wildlife conservation per se. However, many of these issues apply more broadly to a wide range of policy arenas and countries where similar policy shifts have taken place.
This paper investigates whether households and small businesses can voluntarily take advantage of the South Africa's substantial wind resources to produce their own power from small-scale wind turbines in a viable way. The viability of small-scale wind turbines used to displace electricity consumption from the grid is assessed by means of a financial analysis based on the internal rate of return method. The benefits of small-scale wind turbines output is valued at the grid power tariff which is saved rather than at the wind feed-in tariff rate. The analysis found the small-scale wind turbines to be robustly viable in locations with a mean annual wind speed of at least 8m/s, which is only a few of the windiest locations in South Africa. The competiveness of the wind turbines is seriously challenged by the relatively low coal-based electricity tariffs in South Africa. As such, the financial analysis also considers alternative scenarios where the turbines are supported by financial mechanisms, namely: a tariff subsidy; a capital subsidy and revenue from carbon credits. The analysis reveals that a tariff subsidy of between R1.00 and R1.60/kWh or a capital subsidy of between R25.95 and R32.330/kW or a carbon credit price of between R2.135 and R3.200 will be needed to boost the viability of consumer-based small-scale wind turbines in areas with a mean annual wind speed of at least 5m/s, which is considered to be above average. Thus, there is a need for subsidizing all producers of renewable energy including those who produce it for their own consumption as they equally contribute to renewable energy expansion in the country. A tariff subsidy is however likely to be met with both political and public resistance if it means that consumers have to cross-subsidize the tariff, while the significant funds required for capital subsidies might not be freely available. Carbon credit prices have yet to mature to the required high levels. Thus, the removal of distortionary support to coal-based electricity generation might be the only currently available alternative of enhancing viability of consumer-based small-scale wind turbines.
ABSTRACTThe mopane worm, which is the caterpillar form of the Saturnid moth Imbrasia belina Westwood, is – like other edible insects and caterpillars – a vital source of protein in southern African countries. The worms live and graze on mopane trees, which have alternative uses. With increasing commercialization of the worm, its management, which was hitherto organized as a common property resource, has been degraded to almost open access. This paper uses a bioeconomic modelling approach to show that for some optimal allocation of the mopane forest stock, the restrictive harvest period policy advocated by community leaders may not lead to sustainable harvesting of the worm.
AbstractWe investigate the behavioural responses of natural common-pool resource users to three policy interventions—sanctioned quotas, information provisioning, and a combination of both. We focus on situations in which users find utility in multiple resources (pastures and wild animal stocks) that all stem from the same ecosystem with complex dynamics, and management could trigger a regime shift, drastically altering resource regrowth. We performed a framed field experiment with 384 villagers from communities managing common-pool wildlife in Zimbabwe. We find that user groups are likely to manage these natural resources more efficiently when facing a policy intervention (either a sanctioned quota, receiving information about a drastic drop in the stocks' regrowth below a threshold, or a combination of both), compared to groups facing no intervention. A sanctioned quota is likely to perform better than providing information about the existence of a threshold. However, having information about the threshold also leads to higher efficiency and fewer depletion cases, compared to a situation without any intervention. The main contribution of this study is to provide insights that can inform policymakers and development practitioners about the performance of concrete and feasible policy interventions for community wildlife conservation in Southern Africa.
Presently, the mountain gorilla in Rwanda, Uganda, and the Democratic Republic of Congo is endangered mainly by poaching and habitat loss. This paper sets out to investigate the possible resolution of poaching involving the local community by using benefit sharing schemes with local communities. Using a bioeconomic model, the paper demonstrates that the current revenue sharing scheme yields suboptimal conservation outcomes. It is, however, shown that a performance-linked benefit sharing scheme in which the Park Agency makes payment to the local community based on the growth of the gorilla stock can achieve socially optimal conservation. This scheme renders poaching effort by the local community, and therefore poaching fines and antipoaching enforcement toward the local community unnecessary. Given the huge financial outlay requirements for the ideal benefit sharing scheme, the Park Agencies in central Africa could reap more financial benefits for use in conservation if they employ an oligopolistic pricing strategy for gorilla tourism.