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Land conflicts in eastern DRC are frequently presented as stemming from a negative perception that 'autochthonous' might have of 'non natives', who are mostly former migrants from Rwanda. Seen from this perspective, the conflict is based on an anti-Rwandan (and especially anti-Tutsi) sentiment within the collective consciousness of the 'autochthonous' communities in the Kivus. However, this article demonstrates that similar dynamics of conflict can be identified within 'autochthonous' communities or in areas where there does not appear to be a 'rwandophone' presence. Without denying the political and economic competition that exists between the various ethnic groups in DRC, the alternative hypothesis advanced by this article links land disputes to three factors. Firstly, while they may pit 'autochthonous' and 'allochthonous' groups in the DRC against each other or indeed the 'autochthonous' among themselves, the land conflicts in the Kivus appear to consist primarily of a contestation of the existing institutional order. The disputes reflect the concerns of parties searching both for autonomy and for the establishment of a new form of governance and power distribution. Secondly, the current land disputes between autochthonous and 'rwandophones' are first and foremost a matter of local land control rather than a political problem. Finally, local land disputes have been politicized by elites and exacerbated by national policies. This politicisation and the role played by ethnic groups has contributed to the undermining of the relationships between the people of Kivu to such an extent that by taking over the kinds of discourse propagated by elites, communities have become involved in a conflict situation whose dimensions reach beyond the local context and which weakens both society and the Congolese state itself.

Land conflicts in eastern DRC are frequently presented as stemming from a negative perception that 'autochthonous' might have of 'non natives', who are mostly former migrants from Rwanda. Seen from this perspective, the conflict is based on an anti-Rwandan (and especially anti-Tutsi) sentiment within the collective consciousness of the 'autochthonous' communities in the Kivus. However, this article demonstrates that similar dynamics of conflict can be identified within 'autochthonous' communities or in areas where there does not appear to be a 'rwandophone' presence. Without denying the political and economic competition that exists between the various ethnic groups in DRC, the alternative hypothesis advanced by this article links land disputes to three factors. Firstly, while they may pit 'autochthonous' and 'allochthonous' groups in the DRC against each other or indeed the 'autochthonous' among themselves, the land conflicts in the Kivus appear to consist primarily of a contestation of the existing institutional order. The disputes reflect the concerns of parties searching both for autonomy and for the establishment of a new form of governance and power distribution. Secondly, the current land disputes between autochthonous and 'rwandophones' are first and foremost a matter of local land control rather than a political problem. Finally, local land disputes have been politicized by elites and exacerbated by national policies. This politicisation and the role played by ethnic groups has contributed to the undermining of the relationships between the people of Kivu to such an extent that by taking over the kinds of discourse propagated by elites, communities have become involved in a conflict situation whose dimensions reach beyond the local context and which weakens both society and the Congolese state itself.

AbstractThis article discusses the social mobility of combatants and introduces the notion of circular return to explain their pendular state of movement between civilian and combatant life. This phenomenon is widely observed in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), where Congolese youth have been going in and out of armed groups for several decades now. While the notion of circular return has its origins in migration and refugee studies, we show that it also serves as a useful lens to understand the navigation capacity between different social spaces of combatants and to describe and understand processes of incessant armed mobilization and demobilization. In conceptualizing these processes as forms of circular return, we want to move beyond the remobilization discourse, which is too often connected to an assumed failure of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration processes. We argue that this discourse tends to ignore combatants' agency and larger processes of socialization and social rupture as part of armed mobilization.

This article analyses the production and reproduction of traditional chieftaincy in war-torn eastern DR Congo, through the case of a succession dispute in Kalima (South Kivu). Kalima has gone through two decades of political instability and violent conflict involving a plethora of local, national and regional actors. During this period of uncertainty and upheaval, the institution of traditional chieftaincy has remained politically salient. We argue, that this salience is conditioned by a widespread belief in the authenticity and sacredness of the institution of traditional chieftaincy and by the ethno-territorial imaginary of the Congolese political order. Both of these are historically produced through rituals, ceremonies and narratives of origin. They imbue the institution of traditional chieftaincy with charisma and enable customary chiefs to accumulate resources and exercise authority in a wide range of domains of public life in rural eastern Congo. Drawing on Pierre Bourdieu, we call this ability to rule through the notion of 'custom', customary capital. However, we also show that 'customary capital' does not automatically accrue to chiefs as a variety of internal and external actors vie for customary capital. As such it fluctuates over time as different actors move in and out of the capacity to legitimately wield customary capital.

This article analyses the production and reproduction of traditional chieftaincy in war-torn eastern DR Congo, through the case of a succession dispute in Kalima (South Kivu). Kalima has gone through two decades of political instability and violent conflict involving a plethora of local, national and regional actors. During this period of uncertainty and upheaval, the institution of traditional chieftaincy has remained politically salient. We argue, that this salience is conditioned by a widespread belief in the authenticity and sacredness of the institution of traditional chieftaincy and by the ethno-territorial imaginary of the Congolese political order. Both of these are historically produced through rituals, ceremonies and narratives of origin. They imbue the institution of traditional chieftaincy with charisma and enable customary chiefs to accumulate resources and exercise authority in a wide range of domains of public life in rural eastern Congo. Drawing on Pierre Bourdieu, we call this ability to rule through the notion of 'custom', customary capital. However, we also show that 'customary capital' does not automatically accrue to chiefs as a variety of internal and external actors vie for customary capital. As such it fluctuates over time as different actors move in and out of the capacity to legitimately wield customary capital.

This chapter analyses land conflicts and cases of land grabbing in Kalehe (Eastern DRC), a context in which competition for land is rooted in an atmosphere of violence and ethnic cleavages. By using three case-studies, we illustrate how, in a context of plurality of norms and rules in the land arena, the rights of the 'strongest' often prevail. Success or failure in acquiring land rights depends upon actors' capacity to efficiently instrumentalise the legitimacy of the Congolese army, of official state agents, and/or of local customary authorities. In its conclusion, the chapter puts into perspective the dominant conception of land grabbing, currently highly debated on the international agenda, by analysing how land conflicts are anchored in a broader context of political competition.

This chapter analyses land conflicts and cases of land grabbing in Kalehe (Eastern DRC), a context in which competition for land is rooted in an atmosphere of violence and ethnic cleavages. By using three case-studies, we illustrate how, in a context of plurality of norms and rules in the land arena, the rights of the 'strongest' often prevail. Success or failure in acquiring land rights depends upon actors' capacity to efficiently instrumentalise the legitimacy of the Congolese army, of official state agents, and/or of local customary authorities. In its conclusion, the chapter puts into perspective the dominant conception of land grabbing, currently highly debated on the international agenda, by analysing how land conflicts are anchored in a broader context of political competition.

D'aucun considèrent la guerre comme la cause majeure de la destruction Parc National de Kahuzi-Biega (Est de la République Démocratique du Congo) et que l'échec de sa cogestion serait lié aux conséquences de celle-ci. Sans récuser cette hypothèse, le présent article démontre le caractère incomplet et trop simpliste d'un tel argument en remontant en surface la place des facteurs structurels, politiques, techniques, démographiques et conjoncturels dans l'échec de la cogestion dudit parc.

D'aucun considèrent la guerre comme la cause majeure de la destruction Parc National de Kahuzi-Biega (Est de la République Démocratique du Congo) et que l'échec de sa cogestion serait lié aux conséquences de celle-ci. Sans récuser cette hypothèse, le présent article démontre le caractère incomplet et trop simpliste d'un tel argument en remontant en surface la place des facteurs structurels, politiques, techniques, démographiques et conjoncturels dans l'échec de la cogestion dudit parc.

This chapter analyses land conflicts and cases of land grabbing in Kalehe (Eastern DRC), a context in which competition for land is rooted in an atmosphere of violence and ethnic cleavages. By using three case-studies, we illustrate how, in a context of plurality of norms and rules in the land arena, the rights of the 'strongest' often prevail. Success or failure in acquiring land rights depends upon actors' capacity to efficiently instrumentalise the legitimacy of the Congolese army, of official state agents, and/or of local customary authorities. In its conclusion, the chapter puts into perspective the dominant conception of land grabbing, currently highly debated on the international agenda, by analysing how land conflicts are anchored in a broader context of political competition.

This chapter analyses land conflicts and cases of land grabbing in Kalehe (Eastern DRC), a context in which competition for land is rooted in an atmosphere of violence and ethnic cleavages. By using three case-studies, we illustrate how, in a context of plurality of norms and rules in the land arena, the rights of the 'strongest' often prevail. Success or failure in acquiring land rights depends upon actors' capacity to efficiently instrumentalise the legitimacy of the Congolese army, of official state agents, and/or of local customary authorities. In its conclusion, the chapter puts into perspective the dominant conception of land grabbing, currently highly debated on the international agenda, by analysing how land conflicts are anchored in a broader context of political competition.

This article discusses the social mobility of combatants and introduces the notion of circular return to explain their pendular state of movement between civilian and combatant life. This phenomenon is widely observed in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), where Congolese youth have been going in and out of armed groups for several decades now. While the notion of circular return has its origins in migration and refugee studies, we show that it also serves as a useful lens to understand the navigation capacity between different social spaces of combatants and to describe and understand processes of incessant armed mobilization and demobilization. In conceptualizing these processes as forms of circular return, we want to move beyond the remobilization discourse, which is too often connected to an assumed failure of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration processes. We argue that this discourse tends to ignore combatants' agency and larger processes of socialization and social rupture as part of armed mobilization.