Suchergebnisse

Organizational economics attempts to resolve the problem of cooperation through appropriate design of governance structure. The paper argues that this represents a largely static approach, which does not take into consideration the dynamic aspects of design choice, such as the history, the external context and the continuous feedback loop between behavior and choice. Furthermore, organizational economics systematically draws upon sociological concepts, such as trust or social conventions which are variables exogenous to its own framework, and which consequently remain unexplored and unresearched.

This article is based on a research project on new
employee‐relations practices in engine plants of European mass producers
across four countries. Identifies two approaches towards a new
organization of work: The German model relies on the production
worker with apprenticeship, while the Honda model relies on continuous
training‐on‐the‐job for production workers. One of the main results is
that Honda′s production system may be a better model for British
manufacturing companies – given the labour market situation
– rather than the attempt to copy the German system of dual
training. The German system seems to be built on a virtuous circle of
company long‐termism, government and public support, and manufacturing
success, which may be difficult to enter from outside. The Honda plant
is in its early stages and it is not completely clear whether the
principle can also work in a fully fledged capital‐intensive, high‐tech
manufacturing plant, where high machine utilization is crucial.