Suchergebnisse

This monograph, based on newly declassified sources from Western and Russian archives as well as on communist texts about international law and neutrality, is the first English-language account of Soviet policy towards neutral yet capitalist Austria during the Cold War. In order to make neutrality a model for the West, the Kremlin presented the unique Soviet-Austrian relationship as "a good example of peaceful coexistence" and a showcase for the benefits a Western state might reap by declaring neutrality.

Book review of Samuel Charap and Timothy J. Colton. Everyone Loses: The Ukraine Crisis and the Ruinous Contest for Post-Soviet Eurasia. The International Institute for Strategic Studies / Routledge, 2017. Adelphi 56, no. 460. 212 pp. Maps. Notes. Index. $23.95, paper.

The Soviet view of neutrality was shaped by political rather than legal considerations. Whether neutrality was rejected or promoted by the USSR and how it was defined depended on the concept's usefulness for Soviet foreign policy. To advance Soviet interests, a special doctrine of neutrality was created with obligations that Soviet leaders apparently believed would draw the permanently neutral states nearer to the Soviet bloc. This article, which relies on Russian and Western historical literature as well as archival documents, delineates the changing Soviet attitude during the Cold War toward permanent neutrality as well as toward four European neutrals (Austria, Finland, Sweden, Switzerland).

This article draws on Soviet archival documents as well as Western and Russian publications to analyze the background of Leonid Brezhnev's announcements of 1972 regarding the Soviet Union's possible recognition of the European Economic Community (EEC). The analysis takes into account various factors including the integration process, détente, and Soviet relations with West European states. The article shows that Brezhnev's first initiative toward the EEC in March 1972 was designed to facilitate ratification of the Moscow Treaty with West Germany and did not reflect a genuine desire to establish relations with Brussels. The new Soviet approach toward the EEC became manifest only in Brezhnev's second speech on the topic, in December 1972. This strategy, which included mutual recognition and negotiations between the EEC and the Council on Mutual Economic Assistance, was intended to foster détente in Europe and to pave the way toward the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.

This article draws on Soviet archival documents as well as Western and Russian publications to analyze the background of Leonid Brezhnev's announcements of 1972 regarding the Soviet Union's possible recognition of the European Economic Community (EEC). The analysis takes into account various factors including the integration process, detente, and Soviet relations with West European states. The article shows that Brezhnev's first initiative toward the EEC in March 1972 was designed to facilitate ratification of the Moscow Treaty with West Germany and did not reflect a genuine desire to establish relations with Brussels. The new Soviet approach toward the EEC became manifest only in Brezhnev's second speech on the topic, in December 1972. This strategy which included mutual recognition and negotiations between the EEC and the Council on Mutual Economic Assistance, was intended to foster detente in Europe and to pave the way toward the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Adapted from the source document.