Suchergebnisse

Malaysia has not invited International Election Monitoring Organisations (IEMOs) for any of its general elections (GEs) since 1990 and so is numbered among those states that defy this international norm. Although the elections under the Barisan Nasional (BN) regime displayed a wide variety of manipulative practices, the BN was able, due to its position as a semi-authoritarian nature, its strategic importance and its lack of dependence on foreign aid, to successfully resist demands for the presence of IEMOs. The prospects for IEMOs has been further reduced, since the GE 2013, by the Election Commission's "election visit programme" (EVP), adopted to compensate for the absence of IEMOs. Following Malaysia's historic GE 2018, a widespread consensus has developed that though Malaysia should not abandon its own EVP programme, it should readopt this international norm by inviting IEMOs. This is especially needed considering the amateurish state of domestic election monitoring in Malaysia. (JCSA/GIGA)

This exploratory article seeks to analyze the nature and impact of one of the main democracy promoters in Malaysia i.e. the United States (US). The US is a promoter that is often being alleged with interfering with Malaysian domestic affairs, especially since the sacking of former Deputy Prime Minister, Anwar Ibrahim in 1998. This article argues that the US democracy promotion in Malaysia can be conceptualized under the framework of a concurrent democracy assistance strategy. This is due to the fact that while the US is supporting the non-regime compatible program, it is also concurrently channeling bigger aid for regime-compatible program to Malaysia from 1999–2015. The improvement of diplomatic ties between both countries since post-Mahathir era and the prioritization of security issues have led to a more engaging conduct of democracy promotion. Despite the US continuous funding of non-regime-compatible programs through non-state actors, this approach was nevertheless balanced by cordial relations at the state level. Nevertheless, the effect of US democracy assistance and promotion on Malaysia's democratic development has been minimal, reinforcing the views on the difficulty to promote democracy in a semi-authoritarian regime. (Pac Rev/GIGA)

Malaysia has not invited International Election Monitoring Organisations (IEMOs) for any of its general elections (GEs) since 1990 and so is numbered among those states that defy this international norm. Although the elections under the Barisan Nasional (BN) regime displayed a wide variety of manipulative practices, the BN was able, due to its position as a semi-authoritarian nature, its strategic importance and its lack of dependence on foreign aid, to successfully resist demands for the presence of IEMOs. The prospects for IEMOs has been further reduced, since the GE 2013, by the Election Commission's "election visit programme" (EVP), adopted to compensate for the absence of IEMOs. Following Malaysia's historic GE 2018, a widespread consensus has developed that though Malaysia should not abandon its own EVP programme, it should readopt this international norm by inviting IEMOs. This is especially needed considering the amateurish state of domestic election monitoring in Malaysia.

Germany is one of the major democracy promoters in Malaysia. Contrary to popular opinion, most of Germany's democracy assistance is "regime-compatible." By focusing on the role played by Germany's political foundations, this article argues that the balancing principle is an integral feature of their activities in Malaysia.

This article argues that the strong relationship between Malaysia and Japan is also stimulated by symbiotic ties binding together both countries' respective major political parties, i.e., the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO) and the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). UMNO, especially under the leadership of Mahathir Mohamad (1981–2003), derived political lessons from developments affecting LDP in Japan. First, emulation of Japan's success in economic development became the basis for the Look East Policy launched in 1981. Second, which is the focus of this article, lessons were drawn from the failure of LDP to retain power twice, in 1993 and in 2009. Although LDP's reversal of fortunes served as a landmark for UMNO in situating changes to its trajectory since 1993, the analogical reasoning and political lessons applied by UMNO leaders were, to a large extent, flawed. Arguably, politicians frequently do misjudge in analogizing between different situations which at a glance seem to be comparable.

This article discusses the role played by neo-conservative intellectuals during the tenure of Malaysia's fifth prime minister, Abdullah Ahmad Badawi (2003-2009). Abdullah's leadership was distinguished by two qualities which arguably qualify it as "neo-conservative," in terms of revival of policies from a bygone era and the launching of political reforms within the framework of a conservative regime led by the ruling United Malays National Organization (UMNO) party. Using the theoretical experiences of dominant conservative regimes in the Soviet Union, Japan, China and Taiwan, the present authors are of the view that the policies and approach undertaken by Abdullah constitute a sharp departure from those of his predecessor, Mahathir Mohamad, for twenty-two years (1981-2003). Particularly eliciting controversy was the trust Abdullah put into a team of young advisors led by his son-in-law, Khairy Jamaluddin. In this article, we look at how these young neo-conservative intellectuals, together with several identifiable individuals, brought about reforms in Abdullah's leadership and impacted on UMNO politics. We discover that, notwithstanding their enthusiasm for progressive reforms, these intellectuals had underestimated the strength of reactionary and conservative elements existing within an UMNO-based interlocking system, hence reducing them to an anomaly amongst these forces. The perception deficit befalling these reformists was aggravated by their encroachment into the political economy of the UMNO rentiers and prevailing weaknesses in Abdullah's support system. The article seeks to contribute to the discourse on intra-elite conflicts in dominant conservatives regimes, such as have taken place in dominant parties like the UMNO. Adapted from the source document.

This article argues that calls for the reassertion of royal power in Malaysia pre-dated the historic twelfth general elections of 2008. The erosion of UMNO's hegemony accelerated the revival of the monarchy. Ironically, an institution strongly identified with the feudal order found itself reinvigorated in an age of new politics.

AbstractThis article proposes an analysis of changes implemented during Malaysia's Prime Minister Abdullah Ahmad Badawi's administration (2003–09), using the theoretical framework commonplace in studies on conservatism. Based on the premise that transformations in conservative polities are prone to producing conflict, the dynamics of conflict situations during Abdullah's checkered Premiership is foregrounded. As we apply the main criteria defining conservatism to regime behaviour in Malaysia, it becomes clear that such criteria are stoutly held by the regime's elites in their quest for social harmony and political stability. Regime maintenance then finds justifications in such seemingly sublime ends, thereby self-perpetuating Malaysian conservatism. Such despondency prevailed during Mahathir Mohamad's administration (1981–2003), which displayed bias against changes and introduced schemes to justify the systems it upheld. Transmutations wrought during Abdullah's tenure may have been neither substantial nor totalizing, but within the conservative paradigm which had long gripped national politics, Abdullah's deviations were significant nevertheless.