Suchergebnisse

Intro -- Acknowledgements -- Contents -- List of Figures -- List of Tables -- Chapter 1: Introduction -- Chapter 2: The Prevalence of Vote Buying in Indonesia: Building an Index -- 2.1 Dimensions and Measures -- 2.2 How Prevalent Is Vote Buying? -- 2.3 The Vote-Buying Index -- 2.4 International Comparability -- 2.5 Little Social Desirability Bias -- 2.6 Vote Buying in Local Executive Elections -- 2.7 Conclusion -- Bibliography -- Books, Journal Articles, and Unpublished Papers -- Articles and Reports -- Chapter 3: The Determinants of Vote Buying: The Profile of Typical Vote 'Sellers' -- 3.1 Perspectives on Electoral Clientelism -- 3.2 Hypotheses -- 3.2.1 Vote Buying and Modernisation Theory -- 3.2.2 Vote Buying and Civic Engagement -- 3.2.3 Vote Buying and Political Attitudes -- 3.3 Measures of Modernisation Theory, Civic Engagement, and Political Attitudes -- 3.3.1 Modernisation Theory -- 3.3.2 Civic Engagement -- 3.3.3 Political Attitudes -- 3.3.3.1 Party Identification -- 3.3.3.2 Political Efficacy -- 3.3.3.3 Political Information -- 3.3.3.4 Political Interest -- 3.3.3.5 Political Trust -- 3.3.3.6 Political Participation -- 3.3.3.7 Democratic Support -- 3.4 Results and Discussion: The Determinants of Vote Buying: Who Gets Targeted? -- 3.5 Conclusion -- Bibliography -- Books, Journal Articles, and Unpublished Papers -- Chapter 4: Do Candidates Target Loyalists or Swing Voters? Beyond the Core- Versus Swing-Voter Debate -- 4.1 Political Party Partisanship in Indonesia -- 4.2 Is Party Identification Endogenous to Benefits? -- 4.3 Variations in Party Identification by Party and Vote Buying -- 4.4 Testing the Models of Distributive Politics -- 4.4.1 Evidence from Surveys of Local Politicians and Brokers -- 4.4.2 Reasons Behind the Tendency to Favour Core Voters -- 4.4.2.1 Double-Layered Risk Aversion.

This book is open access under a CC BY 4.0 license. This book investigates the impact of vote buying on the accountability of democratic institutions and policy representation in newly democratic countries, with a focus on Indonesia. In doing so, the book presents a wide-ranging study of the dynamics of vote buying in Indonesia's young democracy, exploring the nature, extent, determinants, targeting and effectiveness of this practice. It addresses these central issues in the context of comparative studies of vote buying, arguing that although party loyalists are disproportionately targeted in vote buying efforts, in total numbers —given the relatively small number of party loyalists in Indonesia— vote buying hits more uncommitted voters. It also demonstrates that the effectiveness of vote buying on vote choice is in the 10 percent range, which is sufficient for many candidates to secure a seat and thus explains why they still engage in vote buying despite high levels of leakage.

Perilaku memilih merupakan gejala yang kompleks. Keputusan memilih ditentukan oleh banyak faktor. Seorang calon yang berasal dari kelompok identitas primordial tertentu belum tentu dapat menarik suara mayoritas di kelompoknya sendiri. Hal ini bisa terjadi karena, selain faktor identitas, pemilih juga mempertimbangkan faktor-faktor lain, terutama kualitas personal calon. Intinya, dinamika politik lokal seringkali membuka ruang mobilisasi politik identitas. Secara umum, penelitian ini telah menemukan bukti empiris bahwa agama dan etnis yang menjadi bahan bakar politik identitas merupakan faktor yang penting dalam pemilihan kepala daerah.

AbstractThis article describes the nature of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) in the post-Suharto era and its views on the resurrection of the global Islamic caliphate, its opposition to the notions of democracy and nation-state. In the aftermath of Suharto's fall in 1998, HTI has seized the opportunity to promise the establishment of a fair society under a global Islamic caliphate. The rapid rise of HTI has, more so than most other Islamist groups, been accentuated by the growing public dissatisfaction with the post-Suharto or reformasi period. There is an increasing perception in larger society that political, economic, and law reforms introduced in the reformasi era has had no significant impact to improve people's daily lives. This deteriorating condition under post-Suharto regimes has successfully justified the HTI's claims that Indonesia needs a radical and comprehensive system, or what HTI coined as al-khalifah al-Islamiyyah (Islamic caliphate). Looking at HTI's grand narrative of the global Islamic caliphate and its refutation of the ideas of democracy and nation-state, it is clear that HTI has taken a number of negative steps in the direction of democratic consolidation in Indonesia.

In much of the scholarly literature, Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), the largest Muslim organization in Indonesia, is recognized as a defender of religious tolerance and pluralism. This is to no small extent the result of how NU has portrayed itself and its actions-including during the 2019 presidential elections, when it professed to have aligned with incumbent president Joko Widodo in order to keep Islamist groups from power. In this article, we analyse the attitudes of NU followers towards religious tolerance and pluralism, and find a significant mismatch between the self-perception of the NU leadership and the actual views held by the NU grassroots. Based on original survey data we show that NU followers are generally as intolerant of religious minorities as the rest of the Indonesian Muslim population, and in some cases, even more intolerant. We argue that this is the result of NU's long-standing prioritization of battling rival Muslim organizations (which it views as threats to its interests) over advancing substantive tolerance campaigns that could change the religio-political attitudes of its constituency

Indonesia is a country of significant inequalities, but we know little about how Indonesians feel about the gap between rich and poor. Comparative research suggests that negative perceptions of inequality can erode public support for democratic institutions. Using survey data, we explore the relationship between inequality and support for democracy in Indonesia. We find Indonesians are divided in their beliefs about income distribution. But this variation is not determined by actual levels of inequality around the country, nor by people's own economic situation; instead, political preferences and partisan biases are what matter most. Beliefs about inequality in Indonesia have become increasingly partisan over the course of the Jokowi presidency: supporters of the political opposition are far more likely to view the income gap as unfair, while supporters of the incumbent president tend to disagree—but they disagree much more when prompted by partisan cues. We also find that Indonesians who believe socio-economic inequality is unjust are more likely to hold negative attitudes toward democracy. We trace both trends back to populist campaigns and the increasingly polarized ideological competition that marked the country's recent elections. The shift toward more partisan politics in contemporary Indonesia has, we argue, consequences for how voters perceive inequality and how they feel about the democratic status quo. (Pac Aff/GIGA)

In much of the scholarly literature, Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), the largest Muslim organization in Indonesia, is recognized as a defender of religious tolerance and pluralism. This is to no small extent the result of how NU has portrayed itself and its actions—including during the 2019 presidential elections, when it professed to have aligned with incumbent president Joko Widodo in order to keep Islamist groups from power. In this article, we analyse the attitudes of NU followers towards religious tolerance and pluralism, and find a significant mismatch between the self-perception of the NU leadership and the actual views held by the NU grassroots. Based on original survey data, we show that NU followers are generally as intolerant of religious minorities as the rest of the Indonesian Muslim population, and in some cases, even more intolerant. We argue that this is the result of NU's long-standing prioritization of battling rival Muslim organizations (which it views as threats to its interests) over advancing substantive tolerance campaigns that could change the religio-political attitudes of its constituency. (Contemp Southeast Asia/GIGA)

Abstract
Do China's foreign policies and actions as a state directly influence public opinion toward Chinese diaspora? Notwithstanding the multitude of studies and commentaries on the rise of China and its consequences on the regional and global orders, evidence, and insights on the topic have been lacking. We answer this question through two original, nationally representative survey experiments in Indonesia and by leveraging both contemporary dynamics related to China's growing influence in Southeast Asia and historical discrimination against ethnic Chinese minorities in the country. We examine whether information about a positive (negative) international issue related to China as a state leads to more positive (negative) attitudes toward Chinese Indonesians. Our findings, consistently replicated in the two surveys, show that information about positive or negative international issues concerning China has only little impacts on attitudes toward ethnic Chinese. To the extent that these issues matter, they mostly affect perceptions toward China itself, not toward ethnic Chinese.

Abstract
Does endorsing an Islamist agenda protect a candidate involved in corruption from negative voter evaluations? The corruption literature suggests that voter reactions to corruption are not unbiased and as such Islamist agendas could potentially mitigate the negative effects of a corruption scandal, especially in religious societies. The political Islam literature suggests that endorsing an Islamist agenda would not shield corrupt politicians from negative reactions of the voters. We directly answer this question through 2 nationally representative survey experiments in the world's most populous Muslim democracy Indonesia. Our findings are 2-fold. First, Islamist agendas, in general, have only little effects on voter support for a candidate. Second, voters punish corrupt candidates equally, regardless whether or not they endorse an Islamist agenda.

The use of disinformation in political campaigns is not a new phenomenon, but the issue has acquired renewed attention because digital media makes it relatively easier to spread disinformation. Through a cross-sectional survey (N = 1,820) on the 2019 Indonesian national elections, we analyze the relationship among belief in misinformation, social media use, and partisanship. The analysis shows that although the political use of social media is not associated with belief in misinformation, partisanship is strongly associated with belief in various types of misinformation, depending on whether their own candidate or the opposing candidate is targeted. The findings are interpreted through the concept of selective belief. This study contributes to theoretical debates on the association among belief in misinformation, social media use, and partisanship, and addresses the role of disinformation in electoral politics in Indonesia.