Suchergebnisse

Abstract: In Indonesia's third national elections since democratization in 1999, incumbent President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono easily won reelection, while his Democratic Party tripled its vote from the previous 2004 election. Voters in the parliamentary and presidential contests, held in April and July 2009, were motivated, according to two author-conducted nationwide opinion surveys, by support for individual leaders and candidates, the influence of media campaigns, perceptions of the state of the economy, evaluations of governmental performance, and (though declining) identification with political parties. Effects include a strengthened and more responsive presidency at the cost of a more fragmented and volatile party system.

After a decade of democracy, secular political parties dominate Muslim-majority Indonesia. Explanations include a historical pattern of religious pluralism, policies of President Suharto's New Order, creative Muslim responses to those policies, a large majority of moderate Muslim voters, and ineffective voter mobilization by Islamist parties today.

This case study tests the significance of leadership, party identification, religious orientation, political economy, and sociological and demographic factors in the legislative and presidential choices of voters in the new Indonesian democracy. Data were obtained from four national opinion surveys conducted by the authors following parliamentary elections in 1999 and 2004 and the two-round presidential election in 2004. Bivariate and multivariate analyses of our data confirm the significance of leadership and party ID and the nonsignificance for the most part of other variables tested, including religious orientation, long the most popular explanation for the Indonesian case.

Newly elected President Yudhoyono and Vice President Kalla scored successes despite initial lack of parliamentary support. Kalla took control of Golkar, the largest party, and a tentative peace was achieved in Aceh. Economic policy was entrusted to a strong team of technocrats. Military relations with the United States were fully restored.

Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, a retired army officer, became Indonesia's first directly elected president, defeating incumbent Megawati Sukarnoputri in a landslide. Key positions in economic ministries were awarded both to pro-market and protectionist groups. A suicide bomb killed nine people and wounded nearly 200, intensifying the nation's search for al-Qaeda-linked terrorists.

Abstract: While many Muslims in Indonesia-the world's most populous Muslim-majority country-believe that laws should be broadly in accord with Islam, relatively few support policies advocated by Islamist activists. At the mass level, Islamism is a rural rather than an urban phenomenon. Islamist leaders may be alienated urbanites, but their followers are disproportionately rural and subscribe to a particularly rural-Indonesian understanding of religion and society. Indonesia's largest Muslim social organizations are significant obstacles to the further growth of Islamism. Not only are their leaders tolerant and pluralistic, but their broader memeberships seem immune to Islamism's allure

Finds that most Indonesian Muslims are politically moderate; based on 2002 survey conducted by the Research Center for the Study of Islam and Society (PPIM).

AbstractDespite the introduction of social restrictions designed to stem the spread of COVID-19, many Indonesians have continued to attend places of worship. This poses a major public health threat, as congregational prayer involves large numbers of worshippers gathering under conditions known to enable the spread of the virus. Using a nationally representative survey, we evaluated the efficacy of messages delivered from different authorities in encouraging Indonesians to worship at home. We find no consistent evidence that public health messages change Indonesians' attitudes toward communal prayer or their willingness to forgo communal prayer during the COVID-19 pandemic. Importantly, however, looking at well-defined subpopulations – non-Muslims and supporters of the president – we find suggestive evidence that messages were effective in increasing the likelihood of individuals to indicate a willingness to forgo communal prayer in the forthcoming week. Our results suggest that public health officials should eschew blanket messaging strategies in favor of more targeted approaches.