Suchergebnisse

This book explores the impact of political parties on income redistribution policy in liberal democracies. Rosa Mulé illustrates how public policy on inequality is influenced by strategic interactions among party leaders, rather than responses to social constituencies. Using game theory in detailed case studies of intraparty conflicts, Mulé evaluates her findings against a broad range of theories - political business cycle, median convergence, 'shrinking middle class' and demographic movements. She analyses trends in income inequality in selected OECD countries since the 1970s and provides in-depth examinations of Canada, Australia, Britain and the United States. Her methodology effectively blends sophisticated quantitative techniques with qualitative, analytic narratives. In evaluating both the impact of intraparty cohesion and ideology on redistributive policy, and trends in income inequality, this book brings a unique perspective to those interested in the study of public policy and political parties

In explaining why party leaders may alter social security policy, the globalization literature highlights the limits governments face in implementing programmes supportive of social protection. This article calls for greater attention to the role of agency and political leadership in manufacturing social policy changes. Although international competition may set new and complex parameters within which party leaders interact, agency choice is crucial for explaining policy changes. The aim in this article is to introduce the strategic element to analysis of the redistributive impact of ruling parties. To this end, Australia is focused on as a case study and two factors are explored. First, the Australian Labor Party (ALP) is analysed as a multidimensional variable, particularly in terms of ideological coherence, the structure of competition and party organization. The argument rests on the assumption that party leaders enjoy a degree of freedom to act according to their own criteria. Second, the evolution of the bargaining power of trade union leaders and party leaders is examined. The article indicates that discretionary changes to social policy may also be the outcome of strategic considerations.

The efflorescence of work on new institutionalism has encouraged scholars to build bridges between various schools of thought. Such cross-fertilisation enlivens the debate but runs the risk of erecting bridges on shaky foundations. My article seeks to minimise this risk by going back to basics. It narrows the field of inquiry to the economic and the sociological institutionalist tradition represented by Williamson on one side, and the collaborative work of March and Olsen on the other. It explores and assesses their contribution on three interrelated issues fundamental to any analysis of political institutions: the goals attributed to institutions, the theory of action and the commitment to methodological individualism versus methodological holism. I conclude by noting that in the transition from the old to the new institutionalism - as represented in the works of these authors - the role of power conflicts, negotiations and bargaining between individuals seems to have lost its central position.

Digitised version produced by the EUI Library and made available online in 2020.