Suchergebnisse

Este documento examina las críticas y soluciones formuladas en los últimos años con respecto a la gobernanza económica de Europa y formula algunas propuestas sobre el camino a seguir. En este ARI se estudian las críticas a la gobernanza económica de Europa en los últimos años, así como las soluciones planteadas al respecto, y se ofrece una breve reflexión sobre las ligeras mejoras introducidas en el Tratado de Lisboa (2007), aún por ratificar. El documento concluye con algunas reflexiones sobre las lecciones que podrían extraerse de la actual crisis financiera y formula algunas propuestas sobre el camino a seguir.

This article analyses the electoral consequences of fiscal adjustments for the governments that implement them. Using probit analysis on a panel of 15 EU member states between 1960 and 2000, this article tests whether an improving budgetary situation has any effect on the probability of prime minister re-election. Contrary to what previous influential studies concluded, results from this article confirm that governments are held accountable for their fiscal policy decisions. In Europe, the probability of the prime minister's re-election decreases when fiscal adjustments have taken place, especially if these consolidations relied on spending cuts. Nevertheless, the strong electoral costs associated with expenditure-based adjustments weakened during the post-Maastricht years. The reason for this was partly a change in voters' tolerance of fiscal discipline and partly because public opinion put the blame on 'Brussels' for the strongest budget cuts.

This article examines the political and economic determinants of the relative duration of fiscal consolidations in Europe. The study focuses on the fifteen Member States that formed the EU between 1960 and 2004, and applies survival analysis techniques to their fiscal data. We find evidence that the probability of ending a period of fiscal consolidation depends on the debt level, the magnitude of the adjustment, the relative contribution of spending cuts, and the degree of cabinet fragmentation. Most importantly we also find that under a stricter definition of fiscal consolidation, political variables, such as coalition size and election year, gain importance with respect to economic variables as predictors of the probability of ending an episode of fiscal consolidation. This relative importance of political variables weakened in the run-up to EMU, probably because countries had to consolidate irrespective of their political constraints. Adapted from the source document.

Cover -- Table of Contents -- A. Overview -- B. Brazil's Pension and Health Systems -- C. Challenges from Aging Population -- D. Reform Options -- E. Concluding Comments -- Boxes -- 1. Recent Changes in Retirement Incentives -- 2. Realism of Baseline Pension Expenditure Projections -- 3. Pension Reform Proposals Under Discussion -- Figures -- 1. Demographic Indicators, 1960-2014 -- 2. Pension Expenditure and Share of Elderly -- 3. Health Expenditure, 2013 -- 4. Projected Fertility and Mortality Rates -- 5. Population Projections -- 6. Decomposition of Pension Expenditure -- 7. Pension Expenditure Projections, 2015-21 -- 8. Pension and Health Spending Under the Baseline Scenario -- 9. Gains from Policies Raising Labor Force Participation -- 10. Reform Options to Stabilize Pension Spending, 2015-30 -- 11. Estimated Impact of Various Pension Reform Options -- 12. Impact of Health Reforms -- Tables -- 1. Key Parameters of the Brazilian Pension System, 2015 -- 2. Benchmarks of Key Indicators -- 3. Determinants of Health Spending -- References.

Cover -- Contents -- Foreword -- Acknowledgments -- Contributors -- INTRODUCTION -- 1 Fiscal Politics -- PART I: ELECTIONS, IDEOLOGY, AND POLITICAL FRAGMENTATION -- 2 Governments and Promised Fiscal Consolidations: Do They Mean What They Say? -- 3 Fiscal Policy over the Election Cycle in Low-Income Countries -- 4 Economic and Political Determinants of Tax Policies in OECD Countries -- 5 Now or Later? The Political Economy of Public Investment in Democracies -- 6 Do Elections Affect the Wage Bill? -- 7 Energy Subsidies and Public Social Spending: Theory and Evidence -- 8 It's Politics, Stupid! Political Constraints Determine Governments' Reactions to the Great Recession -- 9 Fragmented Politics and Public Debt -- PART II: INSTITUTIONS, RULES, AND FISCAL COUNCILS -- 10 Political Institutions, State Building, and Tax Capacity: Crossing the Tipping Point -- 11 Fiscal Discipline and Exchange Rates: Does Politics Matter? -- 12 Expenditure Rules: Effective Tools for Sound Fiscal Policy? -- 13 Fiscal Rules to Tame the Political Budget Cycle: Evidence from Italian Municipalities -- 14 On the Determinants of Fiscal Noncompliance: An Empirical Analysis of Spanish Regions -- 15 Budget Institutions in Low-Income Countries -- 16 Fiscal Watchdogs and Sound Fiscal Policy: Is the Barking Loud Enough to Tame Politicians? -- PART III: SUPRANATIONAL FISCAL POLITICS -- 17 The Making of a Continental Financial System: Lessons for Europe from Early American History -- 18 Fiscal Politics in the Euro Area -- 19 IMF Conditionality and Revenue Performance -- Index -- A -- B -- C -- D -- E -- F -- G -- H -- I -- J -- K -- L -- M -- N -- O -- P -- Q -- R -- S -- T -- U -- V -- W -- Y.

This paper analyzes the experience of 99 advanced and developing economies in restoring fiscal sustainability during 1980 - 2008 after banking crises, which led to large accumulation of public debt. It finds that successful debt reductions have relied chiefly on generation of large primary surpluses in post-crisis years through current expenditure cuts. These savings have been accompanied by growth-promoting measures and a supportive monetary policy stance. While these results are consistent with the existing literature, the paper finds that revenue-raising measures increased the likelihood of