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Social contract theory for a diverse world: beyond tolerance
David Estlund: Utopophobia: On the Limits (If Any) of Political Philosophy. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2019. Pp. xvii, 379.)
In: The review of politics, Band 83, Heft 4, S. 593-596
ISSN: 1748-6858
UNDERSTANDING NORMS AND CHANGING THEM
In: Social philosophy & policy, Band 35, Heft 1, S. 128-148
ISSN: 1471-6437
Abstract:It is crucial for policymakers to focus their attention on social norms if they want to improve policy outcomes, but doing so brings in new normative questions about the appropriate role of the state. Indeed, I argue that efforts to reduce coercion at the state level can create potentially pernicious and difficult to eliminate forms of coercion at the informal level. This creates a new normative challenge for thinking about the broader regulatory apparatus, and complicates our approach in utilizing social norms for democratic policy ends. I will distinguish between two forms of social norms orientations in policy: a diagnostic approach and a design approach. We will see that the diagnostic approach better models a Humean approach to supporting social norms, and a design approach has a more Millian character. While it is easier to justify a design approach in the abstract, as it has very little room for abuses of state authority, if Mill is right that social norms can be a source of coercive power that runs afoul of the harm principle, then a design approach will sometimes be necessary to counter this form of tyranny. However, this latter approach is complex, and as such we may want to take a recommendation from Mockus to focus on deliberative approaches to norm change.
Reflections on game theory: S. M. Amadae: Prisoners of reason: Game theory and neoliberal political economy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016, 364pp, £23.99 PB
In: Metascience: an international review journal for the history, philosophy and social studies of science, Band 27, Heft 2, S. 227-230
ISSN: 1467-9981
PERSPECTIVES, NORMS, AND AGENCY
In: Social philosophy & policy, Band 34, Heft 1, S. 260-276
ISSN: 1471-6437
Abstract:A core set of assumptions in economic modeling is that rational agents, who have a defined preference set, assess their options and determine which best satisfies their preferences. The rational actor model supposes that the world provides us with a menu of options, and we simply choose what's best for us. Agents are independent of one another, and they can rationally assess which of their options they wish to pursue. This gives special authority to the choices that people make, since they are understood to be the outcomes of the agent's considered judgments. However, we have come to see that the independence assumption does not always hold in the way that we may have initially thought. Social norms can govern our choices even when we disagree with them. Here we can begin to see how the standard model of choice and agency begins to weaken: no longer are my choices wholly mine, but instead there is a subset of choices that are governed by the broader culture that I live in. Social norms constrain my behavior with informal coercion — my desire to remain a community member in good standing requires me to behave in accordance with the community's social norms. What I wish to challenge more substantively is the claim that the menu of choices agents "see" is in fact the objective set of options that is transparently provided by the world. Instead, I argue that the options that people perceive and the evidence they use to make choices are mediated by perspectives. Perspectives can importantly interact with social norms to make some norms more resilient to change, and others harder to adopt. This further shapes both our descriptive and normative understanding of agency. Our choices are not over all of the objectively available options, but over the options that we can see. The evidence we marshal to support our choices is not the full set of evidence, but the evidence that we recognize as salient. This is not to deny that individuals have agency, but rather we need a more nuanced understanding of the nature of this agency.
Decision-making made simple: Paul Weirich: Models of decision-making: simplifying choices. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 276 pp, $95.00 HB
In: Metascience: an international review journal for the history, philosophy and social studies of science, Band 25, Heft 2, S. 327-329
ISSN: 1467-9981
SSRN
Working paper
SSRN
Working paper
In Public Reason, Diversity Trumps Coherence*
In: The journal of political philosophy, Band 29, Heft 2, S. 211-230
ISSN: 1467-9760
Gender Norms in Flux : Bride Kidnapping and Women's Civic Participation in the Kyrgyz Republic
This exploratory small-scale, qualitative study examines the apparent backsliding on gender norms as evidenced in the Kyrgyz Republic by two observable behaviors: the rise of bride kidnapping and low women's civic participation. Each a reflection of women's agency, in both their private and public lives. Each has also been impacted by legal changes including a reservation system in national politics and a criminal ban on bride kidnapping. The study developed a social norms-oriented survey instrument to obtain a more detailed understanding of individual and community behaviors to gain a nuanced understanding of the forces that sustain harmful practices, and helps identify opportunities for intervention. A total of 180 in-depth individual interviews were conducted (equal number of men and women, stratified by age group), in addition to two sets of focus group discussions were held with community participants and key informants in seven communities in three geographic regions – Chui, Osh, and Naryn – covering a mix of urban and rural locations.
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Robustness and idealization in models of cognitive labor
In: Synthese: an international journal for epistemology, methodology and philosophy of science, Band 183, Heft 2, S. 161-174
ISSN: 1573-0964
The meta-wisdom of crowds
In: Synthese: an international journal for epistemology, methodology and philosophy of science, Band 199, Heft 3-4, S. 11051-11074
ISSN: 1573-0964
Why are there descriptive norms? Because we looked for them
In: Synthese: an international journal for epistemology, methodology and philosophy of science, Band 191, Heft 18, S. 4409-4429
ISSN: 1573-0964
The conditions of tolerance
In: Politics, philosophy & economics, Band 11, Heft 3, S. 322-344
ISSN: 1741-3060
The philosophical tradition of liberal political thought has come to see tolerance as a crucial element of a liberal political order. However, while much has been made of the value of toleration, little work has been done on individual-level motivations for tolerant behavior. In this article, we seek to develop an account of the rational motivations for toleration and of where the limits of toleration lie. We first present a very simple model of rational motivations for toleration. Key to this model is an application of David Ricardo's model of trade to thinking about toleration. This model supports the claim that we always have reasons to be as tolerant as possible. We then explore why we do not always see tolerant attitudes in the actual world, and point to some potential preconditions for toleration that the initial model does not capture. Subsequently, we examine a more detailed model that allows us to investigate more carefully the conditions under which tolerant behavior can be rewarded. We conclude by arguing that a consideration of self-interested motivations for toleration is essential to the success of a robust theory of toleration for a diverse society, but that even this approach has its limitations. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Ltd., copyright holder.]