Beyond Reason: Essays on the Philosophy of Paul Feyerabend
In: Boston Studies in the Philosophy and History of Science volume 132
6 Ergebnisse
Sortierung:
In: Boston Studies in the Philosophy and History of Science volume 132
In: Studia humana: quarterly journal ; SH, Band 8, Heft 1, S. 93-98
ISSN: 2299-0518
Abstract
Gettier's Paradox is considered a most critical problem for the presumably obvious philosophical view that knowledge is justified true belief. Such a view of knowledge, however, exposes the poverty of analytic philosophy. It wrongly assumes, for example, that knowledge must be conscious and explicit, and, to make matters worse, linguistic, as illustrated in Donald Davidson's writings. To show why this philosophical view is wrong I will point to arguments by Ruth Barcan Marcus and, principally, Paul Churchland, as well as to work by the neuroscientist Paul Reber on intuitive knowledge. We will see, then, that much of our knowledge is neither explicit nor conscious, let alone linguistic. I will suggest that an approach that pays attention to biology is more likely to succeed in developing a proper account of our cognitive abilities. Thus, Gettier's paradox becomes a mere curiosity.
In: Social epistemology: a journal of knowledge, culture and policy, Band 17, Heft 2-3, S. 241-246
ISSN: 1464-5297
Paul Feyerabend's radical epistemological claims, and his argument that there is no such thing as scientific method, were influential during his life and have gained in attention since his death in 1994. These essays cover the diverse themes in his extensive body of work
In: Metascience: an international review journal for the history, philosophy and social studies of science, Band 8, Heft 2, S. 206-233
ISSN: 1467-9981
In: Futures, Band 133, S. 102819