In an interesting recent paper, Dari-Mattiacci and Parisi (2005) extended Tullock's (1980) rent-seeking game with an entry decision. The mixed strategies identified by Dari-Mattiacci and Parisi for the case of increasing returns in the contest success function (r > 2) do not constitute an equilibrium of the game they study. However, these strategies are an equilibrium if the strategy space of the game is restricted by a minimum expenditure requirement, and this minimum expenditure requirement is an element of a specific interval. Adapted from the source document.
This paper studies rent-seeking contests where the contestants do not know the number of actively competing contestants. Two models are compared. In the first, all players are risk neutral; in the second, all have constant absolute risk aversion. If the expected fraction of active contestants is low, an increase in the number of potential contestants increases individual rent-seeking efforts. This effect is in contrast to the complete information case where individual rent-seeking efforts decrease in the number of contestants. The effect is more likely under risk neutrality, but also possible under risk aversion. Equilibrium rent seeking efforts are lower under risk aversion if & only if the expected fraction of active contestants is low. Appendixes, References. Adapted from the source document.
Lobbyists choose what to lobby for. If they can precommit to certain policy proposals, their choice will have an influence on the behavior of opposing lobbyists. Hence lobbyists have an incentive to moderate their policy proposals in order to reduce the intensity of the lobbying contest. This logic has been explored in a number of recent papers. I reconsider the topic with a perfectly discriminating contest. With endogenous policy proposals, there is a subgame-perfect equilibrium where the proposals of the lobbyists coincide and maximize joint welfare; moreover, this equilibrium is the only one that survives repeated elimination of dominated strategies. Hence there is no rent dissipation at all. A politician trying to maximize lobbying expenditures would prefer an imperfectly discriminating contest. References. Adapted from the source document.
In: Kerkhof, Anna and Munster, Johannes (2019). Detecting coverage bias in user-generated content. J. Media Econ., 32 (3-4). S. 99 - 131. ABINGDON: ROUTLEDGE JOURNALS, TAYLOR & FRANCIS LTD. ISSN 1532-7736
The importance of user-generated content is growing as media consumption is moving online; yet, investigations of media bias on user-generated content platforms are rare. We develop a novel procedure to detect coverage bias - i.e., bias in the amount of coverage certain topics or issues receive - on user-generated content platforms. We proceed in two steps. First, we focus on a sample of homogeneous observations and control for observable differences. Second, we compare the coverage of our observations between different language versions of the same platform in a difference-in-differences framework, which allows us to disentangle coverage bias from unobserved heterogeneity between observations. We apply our procedure to Wikipedia and examine whether it has a coverage bias in its biographies of German (and French) Members of Parliament (MPs). Our analysis reveals a small to medium size coverage bias against MPs from the center-left parties in Germany and in France. A plausible explanation are partisan contributions to the Wikipedia biographies, as we show by analyzing patterns of authorship and Wikipedia's talk pages for the German case. Practical implications of our results include raising users' awareness of coverage bias when searching for and processing information obtained on user-generated content platforms.
In multi-tiered organizations, individuals can engage in unproductive rent-seeking activities both within and between the divisions of the organization. Nevertheless, a multi-tiered organizational structure can induce efficiency gains by decreasing rent-seeking. We present a model of production and simultaneous internal and external rent-seeking, assuming a logistic contest success function. In equilibrium, there is generically either internal or external rent-seeking, but not both. A multi-tiered organization leads to less rent-seeking and higher welfare, even though the production technology gives no reason for any specific organizational structure. Our findings constitute a new efficiency rationale for multi-tiered organizations. Adapted from the source document.
This article presents a new theoretical perspective on the diversionary use of force. Players are partitioned into groups and choose how to allocate their resources to production, fighting against other groups, and fighting internally. The model gives a rationalist explanation of the group cohesion effect: when there is a lot of fighting between groups, there is less internal fighting. In equilibrium, players choose sufficiently high external conflict in order to avoid internal conflict. In contrast with the existing literature, this diversionary use of force takes place even though there is no asymmetric or incomplete information. [Reprinted by permission; copyright Sage Publications Ltd.]
In: Freitag, Julian, Kerkhof, Anna and Munster, Johannes (2021). Selective sharing of news items and the political position of news outlets. Inf. Econ. Policy, 56. AMSTERDAM: ELSEVIER. ISSN 1873-5975
We present a new measure for the political position of news outlets based on politicians' selective sharing of news items. Politicians predominantly share news items that are in line with their political position, hence, one can infer the political position of news outlets from the politicians' revealed preferences over news items. We apply our measure to twelve major German media outlets by analyzing tweets of German Members of Parliament (MPs) on Twitter. For each news outlet under consideration, we compute the correlation between the political position of the seven parties in the 19th German Bundestag and their MPs' relative number of Twitter referrals to that outlet. We find that three outlets are positioned on the left, and two of them are positioned on the right. Several robustness checks support our results. We also apply our procedure to nine major media outlets from the USA and find that two outlets are positioned on the right, five are positioned on the left of the political spectrum. (c) 2021 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.