Der 7. Oktober als Wendepunkt?: Neue Impulse für eine Friedenslösung
In: Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte: APuZ
ISSN: 2194-3621
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In: Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte: APuZ
ISSN: 2194-3621
World Affairs Online
In the last two decades, international delegitimization of Israel has become a new mode of operation for those denying Israel's right to exist. It encompasses a wide range of civil-society and grassroots organizations.The campaign attempts to imitate the logic of the struggle against the South African apartheid regime - hence to undermine Israel's international legitimacy in a manner that would lead to its isolation and eventually cause it to collapse. In its current phase, the campaign functions as a long-term effort to gradually change the discourse and mindset of Israel's critics in the West. Its main goal is to mainstream delegitimization - hence to reposition anti-Zionism from the radical margins into the mainstream of Western liberal-progressive circles, with specific emphasis on critics of Israel's policies. A key strategy to mainstream delegitimization is to blur the differences between criticism of Israeli policy and challenges to Israel's basic legitimacy. This includes efforts to turn items of the delegitimization agenda into an integral part of the political debate about Israel. As a result, many critics of Israel's policies end up supporting efforts that are led by the delegitimization campaign. The discussion in the West on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is gradually developing into a dichotomous encounter between supporting Israel and its policies unquestioningly or supporting anti-Zionism. The international delegitimization campaign negates two core principles of European foreign policy. First, it stands in direct contradiction to Europe's core commitment to Israel's right to exist. Second, it promotes rejectionism in Palestinian society as an alternative paradigm to the long-standing European approach of negotiated solution with Israel. The key to confronting delegitimization while providing latitude for criticism is the application of constructive differentiation between criticism of Israel and delegitimization. Critics of Israel should apply responsibility in discourse and action by ...
BASE
Israel's first response to the Covid-19 crisis demonstrated a security-based approach to a non-military national crisis. Faced with a first-of-its-kind non-military crisis of national magnitude, the government reactivated a pre-established, well-rehearsed policy protocol. It assigned the security community with the operational management of the crisis and responsibility over key strategic roles. Israel's reliance on this community is an outcome of both the health system's weakness as well as an overarching mindset - shared by both the leadership and the public - that perceives the security community as the optimal manager of national crises. This approach curtails the development of civilian crisis capacities and enhances future dependency on the security community in national crises. It bears consequences on Israel's performance in future civilian crises: first, on its ability to devise an optimal response, second on its level of readiness to confront security threats during such crises, and third on public transparency.
BASE
Israel's containment policy vis-à-vis Iran in Syria has entered a new phase of direct confrontation aimed at achieving a decisive outcome on the ground. Israeli decision-makers now see a window of opportunity to remove Iran's long-term military presence in Syria through a combination of military and diplomatic means. Israel's approach is based on the assessment that this goal can be achieved while containing the fighting to the Syrian arena. Nevertheless, this new strategic attitude increases the likelihood of a spillover beyond the Syrian arena and into a regional conflict. Iran's military actions in Syria have demonstrated that its goals exceed the logic of defensive deterrence and are driven by an ambition to increase its offensive potential vis-à-vis Israel. Germany should take an active role in a coordinated effort by the E3 countries (Germany, France, and the United Kingdom) and Russia to pressure Iran to scale-down its military presence while providing it with a face-saving framework to protect its core political interests.
BASE
Die Neuordnung Syriens stellt eine Herausforderung für Israels bisherige Politik der begrenzten Intervention dar. Denn Israel sieht sich durch den wachsenden Einfluss Irans in Syrien und die Bemühungen Teherans, die strategischen Kapazitäten der Hisbollah zu erhöhen, akut unter Druck gesetzt. Es will vermeiden, an seiner nördlichen Grenze einem iranischen Bollwerk gegenüberzustehen. Dieser Druck verschärft sich durch die Wahrnehmung, dass sich weder Russland noch die USA zuverlässig für Israels nationale Sicherheitsbedürfnisse einsetzen. In den letzten Monaten ließen sich erste Veränderungen im strategischen Vorgehen Israels und eine neue Bereitschaft zur aktiven Eindämmung der iranischen Bemühungen beobachten. Die Kombination aus einer neuen proaktiven israelischen Politik und einem fehlenden Sicherheitsregime erhöht allerdings die Wahrscheinlichkeit einer unbeabsichtigten Eskalation. Deutschland sollte seinen Einfluss nutzen, um sich für ein neues Sicherheitsregime zwischen Israel und Iran einzusetzen und eine Eskalation zu verhindern.
BASE
The perceived shift from chaos to an evolving order in Syria presents a challenge to Israel's policy of limited intervention. Iran's growing influence in Syria and its efforts to improve Hezbollah's strategic capacities presents Israeli decision-makers with a sense of urgency to act now while the future settlement in Syria is still being shaped in order to avoid a fait accompli of an Iranian stronghold on Israel's northern border. This notion is further enhanced by a perceived lack of a serious commitment from the main extra-regional powerbroker, Russia, as well as the US to Israel's national security needs. During the last few months, the first signs of a change became apparent in Israel's strategic approach as well as a new willingness to take active measures to contain Iran's strategic efforts in Syria. The combination of a new proactive Israeli policy and the lack of a security regime to regulate the situation increases the likelihood of an unintended escalation between the parties. Germany should use its relations and leverage vis-à-vis the two parties to promote a new security regime between Israel and Iran and help prevent a destructive escalation.
BASE
In the last two decades, international delegitimization of Israel has become a new mode of operation for those denying Israel's right to exist. It encompasses a wide range of civil-society and grassroots organizations. The campaign attempts to imitate the logic of the struggle against the South African apartheid regime - hence to undermine Israel's international legitimacy in a manner that would lead to its isolation and eventually cause it to collapse. In its current phase, the campaign functions as a long-term effort to gradually change the discourse and mindset of Israel's critics in the West. Its main goal is to mainstream delegitimization - hence to reposition anti-Zionism from the radical margins into the mainstream of Western liberal-progressive circles, with specific emphasis on critics of Israel's policies. A key strategy to mainstream delegitimization is to blur the differences between criticism of Israeli policy and challenges to Israel's basic legitimacy. This includes efforts to turn items of the delegitimization agenda into an integral part of the political debate about Israel. As a result, many critics of Israel's policies end up supporting efforts that are led by the delegitimization campaign. The discussion in the West on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is gradually developing into a dichotomous encounter between supporting Israel and its policies unquestioningly or supporting anti-Zionism. The international delegitimization campaign negates two core principles of European foreign policy. First, it stands in direct contradiction to Europe's core commitment to Israel's right to exist. Second, it promotes rejectionism in Palestinian society as an alternative paradigm to the long-standing European approach of negotiated solution with Israel. The key to confronting delegitimization while providing latitude for criticism is the application of constructive differentiation between criticism of Israel and delegitimization. Critics of Israel should apply responsibility in discourse and action by addressing both their associative context and organizational affiliations with these campaigns of criticism. European civil-society and political actors should differentiate between different types of critics and adjust their engagement policy accordingly. (author's abstract)
Israel's first response to the Covid-19 crisis demonstrated a security-based approach to a non-military national crisis. Faced with a first-of-its-kind non-military crisis of national magnitude, the government reactivated a pre-established, well-rehearsed policy protocol. It assigned the security community with the operational management of the crisis and responsibility over key strategic roles. Israel's reliance on this community is an outcome of both the health system's weakness as well as an overarching mindset - shared by both the leadership and the public - that perceives the security community as the optimal manager of national crises. This approach curtails the development of civilian crisis capacities and enhances future dependency on the security community in national crises. It bears consequences on Israel's performance in future civilian crises: first, on its ability to devise an optimal response, second on its level of readiness to confront security threats during such crises, and third on public transparency. (author's abstract)
In: SWP Comment, Band 27/2018
Israel's containment policy vis-à-vis Iran in Syria has entered a new phase of direct confrontation aimed at achieving a decisive outcome on the ground. Israeli decision-makers now see a window of opportunity to remove Iran's long-term military presence in Syria through a combination of military and diplomatic means. Israel's approach is based on the assessment that this goal can be achieved while containing the fighting to the Syrian arena. Nevertheless, this new strategic attitude increases the likelihood of a spillover beyond the Syrian arena and into a regional conflict. Iran's military actions in Syria have demonstrated that its goals exceed the logic of defensive deterrence and are driven by an ambition to increase its offensive potential vis-à-vis Israel. Germany should take an active role in a coordinated effort by the E3 countries (Germany, France, and the United Kingdom) and Russia to pressure Iran to scale-down its military presence while providing it with a face-saving framework to protect its core political interests. (Autorenreferat)
In: SWP-Aktuell, Band 3/2018
Die Neuordnung Syriens stellt eine Herausforderung für Israels bisherige Politik der
begrenzten Intervention dar. Denn Israel sieht sich durch den wachsenden Einfluss
Irans in Syrien und die Bemühungen Teherans, die strategischen Kapazitäten der Hisbollah
zu erhöhen, akut unter Druck gesetzt. Es will vermeiden, an seiner nördlichen
Grenze einem iranischen Bollwerk gegenüberzustehen. Dieser Druck verschärft sich
durch die Wahrnehmung, dass sich weder Russland noch die USA zuverlässig für Israels
nationale Sicherheitsbedürfnisse einsetzen. In den letzten Monaten ließen sich erste
Veränderungen im strategischen Vorgehen Israels und eine neue Bereitschaft zur
aktiven Eindämmung der iranischen Bemühungen beobachten. Die Kombination aus
einer neuen proaktiven israelischen Politik und einem fehlenden Sicherheitsregime
erhöht allerdings die Wahrscheinlichkeit einer unbeabsichtigten Eskalation. Deutschland
sollte seinen Einfluss nutzen, um sich für ein neues Sicherheitsregime zwischen
Israel und Iran einzusetzen und eine Eskalation zu verhindern. (Autorenreferat)
In: SWP Comment, Band 41/2017
The perceived shift from chaos to an evolving order in Syria presents a challenge to Israel's policy of limited intervention. Iran's growing influence in Syria and its efforts to improve Hezbollah's strategic capacities presents Israeli decision-makers with a sense of urgency to act now while the future settlement in Syria is still being shaped in order to avoid a fait accompli of an Iranian stronghold on Israel's northern border. This notion is further enhanced by a perceived lack of a serious commitment from the main extra-regional powerbroker, Russia, as well as the US to Israel's national security needs. During the last few months, the first signs of a change became apparent in Israel's strategic approach as well as a new willingness to take active measures to con-tain Iran's strategic efforts in Syria. The combination of a new proactive Israeli policy and the lack of a security regime to regulate the situation increases the likelihood of an unintended escalation between the parties. Germany should use its relations and leverage vis-à-vis the two parties to promote a new security regime between Israel and Iran and help prevent a destructive escalation. (Autorenreferat)