Suchergebnisse

Why Girard? why dialogue? -- Dramatis personae: the characters of the dialogues -- Living water: a parable -- Why do we read literature: a symposium -- Mimetic desire: a conversation with William James -- A crowd of theories -- Scapegoating sacrifice -- Concluding reflections on violence

In The Philosophy of Customary Law, James Bernard Murphy brings greater theoretical clarity to the often murky topic of custom by showing that custom must be analyzed into two more logically basic concepts: convention and habit. With a clearer understanding of custom, one can better grasp the many roles that custom plays in a legal system. In this book James Bernard Murphy explores the nature and significance of custom and customary law, and how conventions relate to habits in the four classic theories of Aristotle, Francisco Suarez, Jeremy Bentham, and James C. Carter.

This book attempts to bring greater theoretical clarity to the often murky topic of custom by showing that custom must be analysed into two more logically basic concepts: convention and habit. Customs are conventional habits and habitual conventions. Once we have a clearer understanding of custom we can better grasp the many roles that custom plays in a legal system.

In this first book-length study of positive law, James Bernard Murphy rewrites central chapters in the history of jurisprudence by uncovering a fundamental continuity among four great legal philosophers: Plato, Thomas Aquinas, Thomas Hobbes, and John Austin. In their theories of positive law, Murphy argues, these thinkers represent successive chapters in a single fascinating story. That story revolves around a fundamental ambiguity: is law positive because it is deliberately imposed (as opposed to customary law) or because it lacks moral necessity (as opposed to natural law)? These two senses of positive law are not coextensive yet the discourse of positive law oscillates unstably between them. What, then, is the relation between being deliberately imposed and lacking moral necessity? Murphy demonstrates how the discourse of positive law incorporates both normative and descriptive dimensions of law, and he discusses the relation of positive law not only to jurisprudence but also to the philosophy of language, ethics, theories of social order, and biblical law

Philosophers and lawyers have long argued about the relation of law to politics: "does the king make law" or "does law make the king"? This persistent debate stems from two different perspectives on the nature of law. Professors of law have long noted that laypersons tend to speak of "a law" and the "laws" while lawyers tend to speak more holistically of "the law." After discussing how rival perspectives in legal theory can be compared and evaluated, several dimensions of this contrast between the lay and the lawyerly conceptions of law: the individuation of laws, the sources of law, the ethical and imperative aspects of law, and the nature of the rule of law are analyzed. The distinction between a lawyerly and a lay perspective on law is reflected in the traditional linguistic and conceptual distinction between ius and lex. Many of the classic philosophers of law, from Plato to Hobbes, are rank laymen when it comes to their descriptions of law since the lawyerly understanding of law has only very recently achieved philosophical articulation.