AbstractTransnational capitalist class (TCC) theory is rooted in the claim that the globalization of the economy has led to a globalization of economic interests and of class formation. However, systematic evidence linking the indicators of transnational class formation with political behaviour is largely missing. In this article, I combine data on board of director interlocks among the 500 largest business firms in the world between 2000 and 2006 with data on the political donations to US elections of foreign corporations via the corporate political action committees (PACs) of their subsidiaries, divisions or affiliates. Controlling for the various interests of individual firms, I find that foreign firms that are highly central in the transnational intercorporate network contribute more money to US elections than do the less central foreign firms. Given prior research on board of director interlocks, this finding suggests that a segment of the transnational business community has emerged as a class‐for‐itself.
- The pharmaceutical industry is a transnational industry with a global influence and interests in expanding their markets to include as much of the world's population as possible. Direct-to-consumer (DTC) prescription drug advertising is a potential tool for the global spread of industry conceptions of health and illness, and can be seen as both a cause and a result of globalization. Among developed countries, DTC advertising is currently only legal in New Zealand and the United States, but debates are taking place worldwide as the pharmaceutical industry uses its global influence to lobby for the lifting of bans. As individual countries with distinct cultures and local histories try to decide whether or not they should continue banning this form of advertising, it is important to understand the character and effects of DTC advertising in a global context. A comparison between the United States and New Zealand showed that despite differences in the process of regulation and the conditions and mechanisms through which DTC advertising came to be legal in the two countries, the resulting character and effects of the advertising were remarkably similar. Advertisements in both contexts turned out to be misleading, unbalanced with regard to risks and benefits, make appeals to emotions, and focus on "lifestyle" problems over serious conditions. The effects of the ads were also very similar, as both countries' DTC advertisements drove patients to request specific drugs and were correlated to rising prescription drug prices and health costs. This suggests that while glocalization may cause a divergence in the exact methods used in the ads to get the message across, the message and its effect will likely still reflect the pharmaceutical industry's grobal interests.Keywords: drugs advertising, pharmaceutical industry, drugs prescription, globalization, glocalization, grobalization.Parole chiave: pubblicitÀ sui farmaci, industria farmaceutica, prescrizioni di farmaci, globalizzazione, glocalizzazione, grobalizzazione.
Introduction -- The Japanese advantage: flexible production and innovation -- Flexible production in the early U.S. auto industry -- Class conflict and the impetus to abandon flexible production -- The dire consequences of abandoning flexible production -- The Japanese counterfactual: maintaining flexible production -- Conclusion.
How do we make sense of the policy implications of the numerous corporate elites appointed to positions in government? The board interlock network served as a reliable map of power for most of the 20th century. With the decline of the interlock network over the last few decades, we are left without a reliable map of corporate power, leading to a theory of a fractured corporate elite that is ineffectual in its collective policy influence. In this article, we argue that the fractured elite thesis overlooks two factors that counteract the decline of the domestic interlock network- a stable inner circle of highly connected individuals and a growing policy planning network (PPN). Using network data from 2010-11 on both board of director and corporate-policy planning org interlocks, along with a plethora of data on corporate political behavior, we demonstrate that the inner circle is still the primary organizing group of the capitalist class, and that the PPN is its current organizational vehicle. We demonstrate that the PPN is a primary source of political mobilization and cohesion, and is thus a source of continued corporate dominance. Ultimately we argue that the PPN can be used as a map to guide our understanding of the relationship between business and politics.