Suchergebnisse

The choice of centralizing tourism policies at the national level or, on the contrary, of decentralizing them at the local level is widely discussed in the literature, which highlights the related pros and cons. In fact, the simultaneous role of originator and attractor of tourism of each spatial unit may imply a range of complex and competing interests at various geographical scales. At any one time, organizations at the national, regional and local level are actively engaged in promoting tourism destinations in order to attract tourists. Nevertheless, potential competition/complementarity between regions in terms of their attractivity factors may imply a range of complex and competing interests at various geographical scales. In particular, in a framework of regional competition, a central (national) policy may be necessary to offset or coordinate the clashing regional interests. An increasingly important force of attraction for tourists (both domestic and international) is cultural tourism. For this reason, national and regional governments make great efforts to implement effective cultural tourism policies, for example to obtain an official certification for their historical/cultural attractions, like UNESCO?s World Heritage Sites (WHS) list. The WHS endowment of the regions surrounding a tourism destination may have a negative effect on its inflows of tourists (Patuelli et al. in J Geogr Syst 15:369?402, 2013). Indeed, tourists consider, in forming their travelling choices, the WHS endowment of alternative destinations, generating a phenomenon of spatial substitution (competition). This paper focuses on the choice between implementing tourism governance and policymaking at the central (national) or at the local (regional) level. The issue is raised by the following problem: (1) regional endowment (i.e., attractivity factors) may positively influence arrivals to tourism destinations, providing a justification for local policies (e.g., lobbying towards the national government for obtaining UNESCO?s WHS designations); (2) however, regional competition may reduce the positive direct effect, so that it may be necessary the intervention of the central (national) policy maker, to ?compensate? or ?correct? the local (regional) policies. The issue concerns the choice of how managing regional spillovers: regions could use their attractivity factors to gain a competitive advantage over other regions, but at the same time they risk damaging the national interest to attract tourists and increase the international market share. It is therefore critical to correctly balance and coordinate the tourism policies between the national and regional levels in order to effectively manage the regional endowment to cater to the cultural tourism demand. We stress that more profound insights into the problems and challenges of (de)centralized tourism policies can be gained by examining the national-regional choice, and in particular by using as a modelling framework, the ?normative? spatial interaction model.

In the framework of a vertically differentiated mixed duopoly, with uncovered market and costless quality choice, we study the existence of a price equilibrium when a welfare-maximizing public firm producing low quality goods competes against a profit-maximizing private firm producing high quality goods. We show that a price equilibrium exists if the quality spectrum is wide enough vis à vis a measure of the convexity of the distribution of the consumers' willingness to pay, and that such equilibrium is unique if this sufficient condition is tightened. Log-concavity of the income distribution is inconsistent with the existence of equilibrium.

Culture is more and more considered as an important driver of tourism. However, it is critical, for policymakers, to evaluate the potential returns from investments in culture and generally cultural offer, in particular in multiregion settings with a potentially inefficient distribution of cultural offer. Our paper focuses on the role of distance (between the tourist's origin and destination regions) in mediating the tourism impact of cultural offer. This research question is investigated by means of a spatial interaction model, applied to the case of Italian domestic tourism. We find that distance indeed matters: a destination's endowment in culture appears to be more attractive for long-distance tourists, while an origin region's endowment seems to dinsincentivate long-distance trips to a greater extent.

The authors solve a linear problem where a potential conflict between two agents (Destination manager and Firm) arises in a tourism destination. Destination manager has to choose how to allocate limited resources (capital and land) between either second homes or hotels. This conflict stems from the assumption of agents who have different linear preferences with respect to the allocation of limited resources. As a solution to this policy problem the authors consider three different policies: no intervention (laissez faire), taxation and temporary de-taxation policy. Comparing these different policies, the authors show that a compromise solution (internal solution), which results from the de-taxation policy, may be preferred by both agents over the clash of interests outcomes (corner solutions). Thus, the authors show that in a framework of conflict between agents a compromise solution may be preferable to both the absence of public intervention and the imposition of a tax by a public policy maker who has the discretionary power to regulate conflicts.

The authors solve a linear problem where a potential conflict between two agents (Destination manager and Firm) arises in a tourism destination. The Destination manager has to choose how to allocate limited resources (capital and land) between either second homes or hotels. This conflict stems from the assumption of agents who have different linear preferences with respect to the allocation of limited resources. As a solution to this policy problem the authors consider three different policies: no intervention (laissez faire), taxation and temporary de-taxation policy. Comparing these different policies, they show that a compromise solution (internal solution), which results from the de-taxation policy, may be preferred by both agents over the clash of interests outcomes (corner solutions). Thus, the authors show that in a framework of "conflict" between agents a compromise solution may be preferable to both the absence of public intervention and the imposition of a tax by a public policy maker who has the discretionary power to regulate conflicts.

Culture is gaining increasing importance in the modern tourism industry, and represents a significant force of attraction for tourists (both domestic and international). Cultural tourism allows destinations and regions to expand their customer base, diversify their offer, extend the stay of the tourist, and reduce seasonality. Great efforts are made, by national governments and regions, in order to obtain official designation regarding the relevance of their historical/cultural attractions, for example through UNESCO's World Heritage Sites (WHS) list. Such an aspect seems particularly relevant for a country like Italy, which has a high number of entries in the WHS list, and where regions take an active role in promoting tourism. Using an 11-year panel of domestic tourism flows, we investigate the importance of the regional endowment in terms of WHS from two perspectives: (a) by separately estimating the effects, on tourism flows, of WHS located in the residence region of tourists and in the destination region; and (b) by taking into account potential spatial substitution/complementarity effects between regions due to their WHS endowment. Finally, a sensitivity analysis is offered to evaluate the spatial extent of the latter.

Culture is gaining increasing importance in the modern tourism industry, and represents a significant force of attraction for tourists (both domestic and international). Cultural tourism allows destinations and regions to expand their customer base, diversify their offer, extend the stay of the tourist, and reduce seasonality. Great efforts are made, by national governments and regions, in order to obtain official designation regarding the relevance of their historical/cultural attractions, for example through UNESCO's World Heritage Sites (WHS) list. Such an aspect seems particularly relevant for a country like Italy, which has a high number of entries in the WHS list, and where regions take an active role in promoting tourism. Using an 11-year panel of domestic tourism flows, we investigate the importance of the regional endowment in terms of WHS from two perspectives: (a) by separately estimating the effects, on tourism flows, of WHS located in the residence region of tourists and in the destination region; and (b) by taking into account potential spatial substitution/complementarity effects between regions due to their WHS endowment. Finally, a sensitivity analysis is offered to evaluate the spatial extent of the latter.