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In: Philosophica
These essays make a single central claim: that human beings can still make sense of their lives and still have a humane morality, even if their worldview is utterly secular and even if they have lost the last vestige of belief in God. "Even in a self-consciously Godless world life can be fully meaningful," Nielsen contends
It is not necessary to assume what may be 'the myth of political neutrality' to defend the value of free inquiry or the need for objective research, that is, research as free as possible from propagandistic demands. Such inquiry and research are quite compatible with a self-consciously politicized university as long as this politicized university is also a university which is committed to the ideals of a critical university in which there is an attempt to discover the truth (or at least truth) about politics and society. What needs to be feared is not a political university but a political university which would deliberately accept propaganda and deny the ideals of open and fairrninded inquiry. The important thing is not to fight against the politicization of the university but to fight for a politicization of the university which takes a humane and rational direction- a direction in which, among other things, the ideals of free and rational inquiry are defended and 'cooking of the evidence' to fit ideological preconceptions is not tolerated.
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In: Socialist studies: Etudes socialistes, Band 8, Heft 1
ISSN: 1918-2821
G. A. Cohen, in his Rescuing Justice and Equality, argues that fundamental moral principles do not rest on factual grounds. I contest that and argue instead that all fundamental moral principles (indeed, all moral principles) are fact-sensitive. They are the most deeply embedded principles in an interdependent web of beliefs—beliefs which include factual beliefs. Indeed, all functioning moral beliefs, moral principles and moral practices are in such interdependent webs. There are no fundamental moral principles which are fact-insensitive. What is fundamental are the most deeply embedded moral principles in interdependent webs of belief and practice. If you will, forms of life. G.A. Cohen, dans son livre Rescuing Justice and Equality, maintient que les principes moraux fondamentaux ne reposent pas sur des bases factuelles. Je conteste cette idée et argumente que tous les principes moraux fondamentaux (en fait tous les principes moraux) sont sensibles aux faits. Ce sont les principes les plus profondément enracinés dans des faisceaux de croyances interdépendantes – croyances qui comprennent des croyances factuelles. Toutes les croyances et pratiques, tous les principes moraux fonctionnels sont pris dans ce genre de faisceaux interdépendants. Il n'y a pas de principes moraux fondamentaux qui soient insensibles aux faits. Plus ils sont fondamentaux, plus les principes moraux sont profondément enracinés dans des faisceaux interdépendants de croyances et de pratiques. Ainsi en est-il des façons de vivre.
G. A. Cohen, in his Rescuing Justice and Equality, argues that fundamental moral principles do not rest on factual grounds. I contest that and argue instead that all fundamental moral principles (indeed, all moral principles) are fact-sensitive. They are the most deeply embedded principles in an interdependent web of beliefs—beliefs which include factual beliefs. Indeed, all functioning moral beliefs, moral principles and moral practices are in such interdependent webs. There are no fundamental moral principles which are fact-insensitive. What is fundamental are the most deeply embedded moral principles in interdependent webs of belief and practice. If you will, forms of life. G.A. Cohen, dans son livre Rescuing Justice and Equality, maintient que les principes moraux fondamentaux ne reposent pas sur des bases factuelles. Je conteste cette idée et argumente que tous les principes moraux fondamentaux (en fait tous les principes moraux) sont sensibles aux faits. Ce sont les principes les plus profondément enracinés dans des faisceaux de croyances interdépendantes – croyances qui comprennent des croyances factuelles. Toutes les croyances et pratiques, tous les principes moraux fonctionnels sont pris dans ce genre de faisceaux interdépendants. Il n'y a pas de principes moraux fondamentaux qui soient insensibles aux faits. Plus ils sont fondamentaux, plus les principes moraux sont profondément enracinés dans des faisceaux interdépendants de croyances et de pratiques. Ainsi en est-il des façons de vivre.
BASE
In: Socialist Studies: The Journal of the Society for Socialist Studies, Band 8, Heft 1, S. 216-245
In: Socialist Studies: The Journal of the Society for Socialist Studies, Band 8, Heft 1, S. 216-245
In: Windsor Yearbook of Access to Justice, Band 26, Heft 2, S. 219
SSRN
In: Bulletin d'histoire politique, Band 12, Heft 3, S. 61
ISSN: 1929-7653