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Reducing the Burden of Manuscript Reviewing
In: PS: political science & politics, Band 39, Heft 4, S. 887-889
ISSN: 1537-5935
Reducing the Burden of Manuscript Reviewing
In: PS: political science & politics, Band 39, Heft 4, S. 887-890
ISSN: 0030-8269, 1049-0965
Editor's Introduction
In: Political psychology: journal of the International Society of Political Psychology, Band 20, Heft 3, S. 471-476
ISSN: 1467-9221
SPECIAL ISSUE ARTICLES - Editor's Introduction
In: Political psychology: journal of the International Society of Political Psychology, Band 20, Heft 3, S. 471-476
ISSN: 0162-895X
State economies and state taxes: do voters hold governors accountable?
In: American journal of political science: AJPS, Band 39, S. 936-957
ISSN: 0092-5853
Based on ABC/Washington Post exit polls of voters in 34 of the 1986 gubernatorial races; US.
Reply to Brams and Fishburn
In: American political science review, Band 79, Heft 3, S. 818-819
ISSN: 1537-5943
The Problem of Strategic Behavior under Approval Voting
In: American political science review, Band 78, Heft 4, S. 952-958
ISSN: 1537-5943
Approval voting is being promoted as "the election reform of the 20th century" (Brams, 1980, p. 105), and indeed if voters' preferences are dichotomous, approval voting has some remarkable qualities: it is uniquely strategy-proof, a candidate wins if and only if he is a Condorcet winner, and voters have simple strategies that are at once sincere and sophisticated. However, all of these results depend on the existence of dichotomous preferences, a contrived and empirically unlikely assumption. Here I show that these virtues of approval voting are replaced by some rather undesirable features under more plausible assumptions. More fundamentally, rather than promoting "honest" behavior, as is sometimes implied, the existence of multiple sincere strategies almost begs voters to behave strategically. I also examine sophisticated approval voting and show that in the general case it need not pick a Condorcet alternative. Ironically, there is a condition under which Condorcet winners may always be picked, but for this to occur, voters sometimes have to vote for candidates of whom they disapprove.
The Problem of Strategic Behavior under Approval Voting
In: American political science review, Band 78, Heft 4, S. 952
ISSN: 0003-0554
Why So Much Stability? Another Opinion
In: Public choice, Band 41, Heft 2, S. 261
ISSN: 0048-5829
An Exegesis of Farquharson's Theory of Voting
In: Public choice, Band 40, Heft 3, S. 323
ISSN: 0048-5829
An exegesis of Farquharson's Theory of Voting
In: Public choice, Band 40, Heft 3, S. 323-328
ISSN: 1573-7101
Costs of voting and nonvoting
In: Public choice, Band 27, Heft 1, S. 115-119
ISSN: 1573-7101