Suchergebnisse

The democratic transition in South Africa was accompanied by large-scale institutional re-engineering at all levels of government. This was an extremely complex process in local government, where a racially fragmented system of municipalities underwent extensive reorganisation. Despite this, historical patterns of settlement based on race have entrenched socio-economic inequalities and highly uneven experiences of local democracy. Against this backdrop, this paper investigates the differing roles of ward councillors. It examines a stratified sample of low-, mixed- and high-income wards in the City of Cape Town, and finds general yet qualified support for a view that ward councillor roles are conditioned by the socio-economic character of the areas they represent. In broad terms, councillors in low-income wards play a service broker and conflict mitigator role; councillors in mixed-income wards act as reconcilers and integrators; and councillors in high-income wards perform a placeholder and maintainer role.

The democratic transition in South Africa was accompanied by large-scale institutional re-engineering at all levels of government. This was an extremely complex process in local government, where a racially fragmented system of municipalities underwent extensive reorganisation. Despite this, historical patterns of settlement based on race have entrenched socio-economic inequalities and highly uneven experiences of local democracy. Against this backdrop, this paper investigates the differing roles of ward councillors. It examines a stratified sample of low-, mixed- and high-income wards in the City of Cape Town, and finds general yet qualified support for a view that ward councillor roles are conditioned by the socio-economic character of the areas they represent. In broad terms, councillors in low-income wards play a service broker and conflict mitigator role; councillors in mixed-income wards act as reconcilers and integrators; and councillors in high-income wards perform a placeholder and maintainer role.

Corruption features prominently in assessments of the governance, performance and capacity of South Africa's public service. However, accounts of corruption too often fail to offer systematic appraisals of its occurrence within the diverse institutional makeup of the public service. This article seeks to address this gap by investigating the relationship between the level and type of corruption, and the institutional characteristics of government departments. Based on an original dataset which assembles published data on nancial misconduct, staf ng and budgetary information, the article examines whether the institutional makeup of national departments render some more susceptible to corruption than others. The ndings highlight the multi- dimensional nature of corruption, indicating that departmental risk should not simply be judged on its cumulative or aggregate effect: how much corruption do departments sustain, but incorporate the proportional effect of corruption: how much does it matter? Indicators such as overall staff size, ratio of supervisory to non-supervisory staff and functional orientation are necessary but insuf cient indicators of corruption risk, whilst budget size appears to have little bearing on increased risk; although there is more, though not unequivocal, reason to be concerned about departments with a higher percentage of their budgets allocated to goods and services spending.

Corruption is a global phenomenon that is multi-layered and stubbornly resilient. As researchers we compartmentalise our study of corruption into dimensions that focus either on the drivers of corrupt activity within the intricate web of relationships forged between political, bureaucratic and private actors, or the design and efficacy of 'anti-corruption' measures intended to combat and control malfeasance. Although this distinction helps to give normative impetus to the need to stem the considerable damage wrought by corruption on the legitimacy and policy outcomes pursued by states, it risks minimising the entrenched institutionalised risk that corruption has always posed in the functioning of state institutions. In this regard, corruption is less a pathological defect in how institutions operate – something that can simply be 'combatted' by a range of 'anti-corruption' enforcement measures – and more an inherent risk in the functioning of these institutions, albeit a more acute risk depending on prevailing circumstances.

South Africa's political transition to democratic rule was the catalyst for ambitious public sector reform efforts, which sought to restructure the organisational and personnel profile of the state. A key aim of this process was to enhance the state's management capacity to steer a far-reaching socio-economic policy agenda, which drew on the principles and tools of comparative public management practice as it had evolved globally and intellectually. This article examines how South Africa's policy commitment to management reform can be characterised in comparative terms, and twenty years on, assess if and how this commitment has materialised in practice. I will argue that the South African case exhibits a confusing and directionless mix of traditional management control and unconsummated NPM advocacy. Although this is generally consistent with NPM practice in developing countries, I will propose that there are at least three specific elements that lend texture to the South African case, namely, capacity, commitment and capture.

South Africa's political transition to democratic rule was the catalyst for ambitious public sector reform efforts, which sought to restructure the organisational and personnel profile of the state. A key aim of this process was to enhance the state's management capacity to steer a far-reaching socio-economic policy agenda, which drew on the principles and tools of comparative public management practice as it had evolved globally and intellectually. This article examines how South Africa's policy commitment to management reform can be characterised in comparative terms, and twenty years on, assess if and how this commitment has materialised in practice. I will argue that the South African case exhibits a confusing and directionless mix of traditional management control and unconsummated NPM advocacy. Although this is generally consistent with NPM practice in developing countries, I will propose that there are at least three specific elements that lend texture to the South African case, namely, capacity, commitment and capture.

The criminalisation of corruption recognises that the misuse of official office for private gain exacts a detrimental and distorting effect on a country's social and economic development. This is especially acute in countries undergoing rapid political system transitions. In an effort to combat corruption, governments have come under increasing pressure to enhance the monitoring and oversight of public institutions through stringent intra and inter-institutional checks. In South Africa, the evidence clearly shows that concrete and incremental steps have been introduced since the country's democratic transition to regulate malfeasance in the public sector through heightened monitoring, prevention, investigation and prosecution measures. Despite these measures, intra and inter-institutional analysis of anti-corruption enforcement indicates that the integrity of this approach, informed by principle-agent accountability arrangements, can be compromised or side-lined by collective action efforts that undermine the effectiveness of anti-corruption mechanisms. This reflects a politicisation of anti-corruption enforcement.

This article examines obstacles to policy coordination to promote development at a programme level. Contemporary efforts to promote coordination or 'joined-up' working across government entities highlight attempts to promote policy synergy and resource maximisation for achieving objectives that straddle the sector-specific boundaries of multiple departments. This paper assessed efforts to coordinate the actions of multiple departments towards achieving a single cross-cutting policy objective. Programme-level analysis of the Expanded Public Works Programme in South Africa revealed various reasons why joining-up is difficult to negotiate in practice. This consisted of policy goal and operational incompatibility between specialised entities, which appears sensitive to the specificity and stringency of policy goals and implementation regimens; as well as a host of difficulties related to how coordination is formally defined and designated. This included role definition and confusion, as well as the nature and locus of coordination mandates across and within individual departments.

South Africa's provincial governments were the subject of vigorous debate during 2007. This culminated in an official policy review, that included potentially far-reaching questions about their status, role and future existence. The review was initiated during a period marked by serious concerns about the capacity of provincial governments to implement programmes and services through budgeted expenditure. It focused on the ability of provinces to spend allocated revenues on activities adequately with a direct bearing on social and economic development. This debate was revisited by this research in focusing specifically on the question of provincial under-spending. the purpose was to investigate provincial expenditure preceding the 2007 policy review, with the objective to empirically observe the general shape, extent and pattern of provincial incapacity to spend revenues. Based on this, the idea was to consider how expenditure performance might rationally influence subsequent and continuing policy debate pertaining to the future configuration of provincial government. The research presents an analysis of provincial expenditure for a four-year timeframe (2002–2006), indicating that under-spending seems to be secondary to the more significant problem of spending volatility, or rapid shifts between under- and over-spending. the complexity of expenditure performance suggests that past and continuing debate about the wholesale or even partial restructuring of the provincial system of government needs to be moderated by a more incremental and escalatory series of responses.

This paper reviews government responses intended to assist the street homeless in South Africa. The paper demonstrates that in South Africa the legislation and policy responses to the problem of street homelessness have been to a great extent shaped by the broader circumstances of a larger population living in informal housing, with whom the street homeless share intimate ties through social instability and economic poverty. This context has resulted in an intersectoral legislative and policy framework shaped mainly by two sectors – Social Welfare and Housing – that has prioritised various preventive measures to reduce the structural, social and economic risks and vulnerability of becoming homeless on the street. Given its nature, this framework has been and continues to be highly dependent on effective collaboration and coordination between government departments.