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AbstractThis article studies the conditions that lead peripheral minorities to identify with the state, their ethnic group, or neighboring countries. We contribute to research on separatism and irredentism by examining how violence, psychological distance, and national status determine identification. The analysis uses data from a novel experiment that randomized videos of actual violence in a large, representative survey of the Kashmir Valley region in the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir, an enduring site of separatist and irredentist conflict. We find that a strong regional identity is a counterweight to irredentism, but violent repression by the state can push members of the minority to identify with an irredentist neighbor. Violence increases perceived distance from the nation and reduces national identification. There is suggestive evidence that these effects are concentrated among individuals with attributes that otherwise predict higher levels of identification with the state. Information about integrative institutions and increased national status brought about by economic growth is insufficient to induce national identification in a context where psychological distance from the nation is large.

From Aristotle to Acemoglu and Robinson, scholars have argued that democracy possesses powerful redistributive impulses, and imperils itself accordingly. We challenge the validity of the redistributive model of democratic breakdown in the postcolonial world—the only cases where democracies have collapsed since World War II—because its assumptions regarding state power are questionable or even inapplicable in postcolonial settings. Our correlative analysis of cross-sectional time series data from 139 countries between 1972 and 2007 indicates that, contrary to the expectations of the redistributive model, redistributive taxation is negatively associated with the incidence of military coups and the likelihood of democratic breakdown. Furthermore, authoritarian takeovers do not appear systematically to result in reduced redistribution from the rich. More fine-grained historical evidence from Southeast Asia—a region where the redistributive model should be especially likely to hold true—further affirms that authoritarian seizures of power are neither inspired by successful redistributive policies nor followed by their reversal. Taken together, these quantitative and qualitative data offer significant support for our central theoretical claim: contemporary democratic breakdowns have political origins in weak states, not economic origins in class conflict.

Abstract
Containing the COVID-19 pandemic will confer global benefits that greatly exceed the costs but effective solutions require the redistribution of vaccines, technology, and other scarce resources from high-income to low-income countries. The United States has played a central role in coordinating responses to previous global health challenges, and its policy choices in the current pandemic will have a far-reaching impact on the rest of the world. Yet little is known about domestic support for international recovery efforts. We use a series of conjoint and persuasive messaging experiments, fielded on two national surveys of the US adult population (N = 5,965), to study mass support for international redistribution. We find clear evidence that the general population strongly supports allocating vaccines to own-country recipients before others. But despite this "vaccine nationalism," Americans are also willing to support the US government playing a major role in global pandemic recovery efforts, provided policymakers forge international agreements that ensure moderate domestic costs, burden-sharing with other countries, and priority for certain types of resources, such as domestically manufactured vaccines and patent buyouts. Finally, we test five different persuasive messaging strategies and find that emphasizing the relatively low costs and large economic benefits of global vaccination is the most promising means of increasing domestic support for international redistribution. Overall, our results demonstrate that policymakers can secure broad public support for costly international cooperation by crafting responses aligned with the economic interests of the United States.