Suchergebnisse

Abstract
On the tenth anniversary of the Iraq War of 2003, most scholars agree that the war had serious consequences for the Middle East and the United States. Some journalists now believe that the war coverage constituted a 'mini-Alamo' for American journalism. Deficient war coverage damaged the reputation of the American media as a source of reliable news about the United States because of the way it covered the Bush administration's case for going to war, and the way it reported war's devastating effect on the Iraqi population. This study analyses how the Bush administration managed to get media compliance for its verbal and visual narrative of the war, thus co-opting American journalism (and by extension, that of other countries that relied on it). The study also illustrates how Arab historical master narratives disseminated by the frames introduced by Al Jazeera through its reporting from the scene challenged and sometimes foiled CENTCOM's narrative and its psychological operations. Finally, the study illustrates the role of cartoonists in culture-jamming the official narrative by publishing on the Internet, thus undermining the Bush administration's main Orwellian message that 'war is peace'. This study suggests that the examination of what went wrong for the media in Iraq provides a cautionary tale about the dangers of acting as government stenographers during wartime.

Monroe Price has observed that Iraq represents a pathology of media intervention, and, as with any pathology, its study helps in dealing with more healthy organisms (Price 2007). This study analyzes US attempts to remake the Iraqi mediascape, its law and content between 2003 and 2008.
It concludes that post-invasion media development was so poorly structured and implemented that it was doomed from the start. This is true despite and because of the millions of dollars spent by and on private US contractors, and despite the involvement of several countries, international
human rights agencies, and private publications from across the US political spectrum. The main culprits remain the lack of oversight regarding the millions the United States has spent attempting to privatize Iraqi media development, and the failure of the Bush administration to include independent-minded
Iraqi and Arab professionals in its post-invasion media reconstruction project, or to learn from the long struggles of Arab journalists with their respective governments.

This study examines how the Palestinian Communist Party, renamed the People's Party in 1991, conceptualized its new role in Palestinian politics in its documents and its press based on its perceptions of its own strengths and weaknesses after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the weakening of Arab unity, the rise of the Islamic Movement, the entry of the Palestine Liberation Organization into the West Bank and Gaza in 1994, and the success of Hamas at the expense of Fateh in the 2006 Legislative Council elections. The study concludes that the party fares better when it does not deny its Marxist roots, and describes how the party is in the process of reclaiming its Marxist heritage, even after Palestinians elected Hamas to the Palestinian Legislative Council. Adapted from the source document.

This study examines press liberalization in Jordan. It argues that Jordan's evolving relations with Palestinians, its peace agreement with Israel, and media globalization have changed the context within which the Jordanian media operate and have given the government some flexibility to liberalize the press starting in 1989. However, some of the same issues that have led to press restrictions in the past have precipitated the introduction of "The Temporary Law for the Year 1997" while the parliament was not in session. The study concludes that the presence of a a loose coalition of forces working for press freedom coupled with the January 1998 High Court decision declaring the temporary law unconstitutional suggest it is premature to read a eulogy for Jordanian press freedom.