Suchergebnisse

Foreword-- Pitman Potter Introduction-- Masao Nakamura PART I. NEW CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PRACTICES: INSTITUTIONAL AND ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS The Two Models Of Corporate Governance And The Institutional Reform Of Chinese Enterprises-- Peng Fei Yang How To Prevent China's Listed Companies From Making Misstatement-- Xiaorong Gu Issues In The Protection Of Minority Shareholders' Rights And Interests Under China's Company Law-- Shuliang Wang An Economic Perspective On Recent Corporate Governance Developments In China, With Comments On The Chapters by Peng Fei Yang, Xiaorong Gu and Shuliang Wang-- Andrew Yuen and Anming Zhang Grabbing Hand And Corporate Governance In China-- Wei Chi and Yijiang Wang Corporate Governance Practices In Post-Bubble Japan: Implications Of Institutional And Legal Reforms In The 1990s And Early 2000s-- Masao Nakamura Understanding M&A Wave In Japan-- Yasuhiro Arikawa And Hideaki Miyajima PART II. EVOLVING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PRACTICES: SELECTIVE ADAPTATIONS The Strange Role Of Independent Directors In A Two-Tier Board Structure Of China's Listed Companies-- Jiangyu Wang Low Structure, High Ambiguity: Selective Adaptation Of International Norms Of Corporate Governance Mechanisms In China-- S. H. Goo And Anne Carver Selective Adaptation Of Anglo-American Corporate Governance Practices In Japan-- Masao Nakamura INDEX

Both inward and outward foreign direct investment (FDI) have implications for the wage rates of home-country workers. Such implications have been particularly noteworthy in Japan where the traditional internal labor-market practices, which value long-term sustainability of employment and wages, collide with the pressure for change in the globalizing Japanese economy on many fronts. In this paper we estimate the impacts of FDI on workers' wages in Japanese manufacturing industries. We find that Japanese employees benefit, in the form of wage gains, from their employers' association with both inward and outward FDI operations. These wage effects differ systematically depending on gender and worker ranks within their employer firms and are likely to weaken the mechanisms underlying the sustainability of Japanese firms' traditional internal labor markets. The presence of FDI effects on worker wages also implies an increasing disparity between the incomes of workers who work for successfully globalizing firms and workers who do not, jeopardizing Japan's traditional policy objective to sustain harmonious economic growth across all economic sectors. This would also deepen the structural divide including the wage gap of the Japanese economy that exists between large firms and small- and medium-size enterprises (SMEs) since firms which get involved in FDIs are mostly large firms.

Nakamura reviews COMPARING ECONOMIC SYSTEMS: Italy and Japan edited by Andrea Boltho, Alessandro Vercelli, and Hiroshi Yoshikawa.

AbstractFirms choose to seek environmental management system (EMS) certifications such as ISO 14001 for a variety of reasons. In this paper we put forward a hypothesis that firms seek ISO 14001 certifications for their establishments when their operations involve low degrees of complexity. Another hypothesis we consider is that firms facing more uncertainty in their operations (and hence more risk) seek ISO 14001 certifications. These hypotheses have not been yet addressed in the literature and are of particular interest to business managers and policymakers.We empirically test these hypotheses using probit and duration models using matched establishment–firm–industry data for large Japanese manufacturers. Our findings support the first as well as the second hypotheses. This suggests that firms tend to certify more routine and less complex operations first, and that firms use ISO 14001 certifications as an insurance scheme. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd and ERP Environment.

Paul Rosenstein-Rodan argues that economic development requires coordinated investment in many interdependent industries, and prescribes a flood of state-controlled investment across all sectors—a so-called big push. Widespread government failure defeated twentieth-century 'big push' schemes. But spillovers across firms and industries, and from public goods, hold-up problems, and capital market limitations are real, and justify coordinated growth across sectors if it can be done without government failures. Large, extensively diversified pyramidal business groups of listed firms dominate the histories of developed economies and the economies of developing economies. Arguing that such groups provided this coordination in prewar Japan after a state-run big push failed, we propose that pyramidal business groups are private-sector mechanisms for coordinating big push growth, and that competition between rival groups induces efficiency unattainable in a state-run big push. We postulate that a successful business-group led big push requires economic openness, basic public goods, rule of law, separation of the state from business, and a timely demise of business groups when the big push phase is complete.Where these criteria are not met, growth stalls and oligarchic families become too powerful to dislodge.