Suchergebnisse

This research investigates the public's trust in risk‐managing organizations after suffering serious damage from a major disaster. It is natural for public trust to decrease in organizations responsible for mitigating the damage. However, what about trust in organizations that address hazards not directly related to the disaster? Based on the results of surveys conducted by a national institute, the Japanese government concluded, in a White Paper on Science and Technology, that the public's trust in scientists declined overall after the 2011 Tohoku Earthquake. Because scientists play a key role in risk assessment and risk management in most areas, one could predict that trust in risk‐managing organizations overall would decrease after a major disaster. The methodology of that survey, however, had limitations that prevented such conclusions. For this research, two surveys were conducted to measure the public's trust in risk‐managing organizations regarding various hazards, before and after the Tohoku Earthquake (n = 1,192 in 2008 and n = 1,138 in 2012). The results showed that trust decreased in risk‐managing organizations that deal with earthquakes and nuclear accidents, whereas trust levels related to many other hazards, especially in areas not touched by the Tohoku Earthquake, remained steady or even increased. These results reject the assertion that distrust rippled through all risk‐managing organizations. The implications of this research are discussed, with the observation that this result is not necessarily gratifying for risk managers because high trust sometimes reduces public preparedness for disasters.

Researchers in the field of risk perception have been asking why people are more worried about risk today than in years past. This article explores one possible answer to this question, associative anxiety. The affect heuristic and the mental network models suggest that anxiety triggered by information regarding a particular risk can spread to other risks of the same category. Research to date, however, has not examined how information refuting the particular risk can also be generalized across other risks. The article presents two experimental studies addressing this issue. Study 1 showed that when participants were presented with information based on a real train collision, they experienced increased anxiety not only about train collisions but also about public transportation in general. In contrast, those who were informed about the train collision case as well as the preventative measures implemented after the accident experienced decreased anxiety about train collisions but not about public transportation more generally. Study 2 measured the changes in participant anxiety about a genetically modified organism (GMO) and compared the influence of information about either the existence or nonexistence of its risk. Similar to Study 1, associative anxiety rippled through the risk category. The results also suggest that the follow‐up information refuting the GMO risk reduced the anxiety toward the hazard drastically, but did not fully alleviate the anxiety toward other hazards in the category. The implications and the limitations of these studies are also discussed.

This study examines whether people pursue the total elimination of environmental risks even if the risk reduction occurs incrementally and requires steadily increasing amounts of money to achieve. Participants' willingness to pay (WTP) was measured for various levels of reduction in the risk of cancer caused by dioxin. Results showed that: (1) people were willing to pay more for an initial reduction in risk than for subsequent reductions, (2) the WTP for the final risk decrement—which achieved total risk elimination—was higher than the WTP for either of the two previous decrements but barely half of that for the first reduction, and (3) the manner in which the questions were framed did not affect participants' responses. These results suggest that the public will not always try to pursue perfect safety at the cost of a large sum of money, but rather may seek a decreasing expenditure as the risk level is reduced.

Two studies examined how people evaluate risk reduction when they believe zero risk to be impossible. Measures collected were willingness to pay (WTP) for risk reduction, and degree of trust in the risk management agency. The findings from the combined studies are: (1) participants were more willing to pay a higher amount for the same reduction in risk in the "zero risk possible" than in the "zero risk impossible" condition; and (2) people's trust in the risk management agency did not differ between the "zero risk impossible" and "zero risk possible" conditions. These results suggest that it might be viable for agencies to accurately communicate the unattainability of zero risk without suffering a loss in public faith or trust, and thus that excessive expenditure for risk reduction might be prevented.

Objective Autonomous cars (ACs) controlled by artificial intelligence are expected to play a significant role in transportation in the near future. This study investigated determinants of trust in ACs. Background Trust in ACs influences different variables, including the intention to adopt AC technology. Several studies on risk perception have verified that shared value determines trust in risk managers. Previous research has confirmed the effect of value similarity on trust in artificial intelligence. We focused on moral beliefs, specifically utilitarianism (belief in promoting a greater good) and deontology (belief in condemning deliberate harm), and tested the effects of shared moral beliefs on trust in ACs. Method We conducted three experiments ( N = 128, 71, and 196, for each), adopting a thought experiment similar to the well-known trolley problem. We manipulated shared moral beliefs (shared vs. unshared) and driver (AC vs. human), providing participants with different moral dilemma scenarios. Trust in ACs was measured through a questionnaire. Results The results of Experiment 1 showed that shared utilitarian belief strongly influenced trust in ACs. In Experiment 2 and Experiment 3, however, we did not find statistical evidence that shared deontological belief had an effect on trust in ACs. Conclusion The results of the three experiments suggest that the effect of shared moral beliefs on trust varies depending on the values that ACs share with humans. Application To promote AC implementation, policymakers and developers need to understand which values are shared between ACs and humans to enhance trust in ACs.

AbstractThis study aimed to examine the adverse effects of descriptive norms in the context of disaster preparation, although the cumulative evidence has demonstrated that descriptive norms desirably promote social behavior. Descriptive norms inevitably inform that some people do not prepare; therefore, the secondary meaning can be utilized to confirm the receiver's already possessed attitudes, and it results in a backfire. We conducted two preregistered experiments examining preparation behaviors for natural disasters while manipulating descriptive norms. In Study 1 (N = 262), the only promotive effect of descriptive norms was obtained among U.S. participants. In Study 2 (N = 329), when replicated with a sample of Japanese participants, participants' attitudes moderated the effects of descriptive norms. The patterns of moderation were consistent with our prediction and suggested that descriptive norms suppressed the desirable behavior when participants held negative attitudes. The pitfalls of descriptive normative approaches are also practically important.

This study examined the determinants of trust in artificial intelligence (AI) in the area of asset management. Many studies of risk perception have found that value similarity determines trust in risk managers. Some studies have demonstrated that value similarity also influences trust in AI. AI is currently employed in a diverse range of domains, including asset management. However, little is known about the factors that influence trust in asset management-related AI. We developed an investment game and examined whether shared investing strategy with an AI advisor increased the participants' trust in the AI. In this study, questionnaire data were analyzed (n=101), and it was revealed that shared investing strategy had no significant effect on the participants' trust in AI. In addition, it had no effect on behavioral trust. Perceived ability had significantly positive effects on both subjective and behavioral trust. This paper also discusses the empirical implications of the findings.

This study investigated public trust and its determinants concerning the government's control of tobacco in Japan. We focused on the two issues of government policies to ban smoking by minors and increase taxes on tobacco. We conducted a questionnaire survey in which respondents were asked to assess their trust in the government, the government's fairness and competency, and their value similarity with the government. One thousand three hundred and ninety‐four respondents agreed to participate in the survey out of 2,600 randomly sampled adults over 20 years old from all over Japan. The results of multiple regression analysis confirmed that value similarity is the strongest predictor of public trust in the government. On the affirmatively supported issue of prohibiting smoking among minors, the results further indicated that assessment of competency is a stronger predictor than assessment of fairness. In contrast, assessment of fairness is a stronger predictor than assessment of competency for the still divided issue of increasing tobacco tax. Respondents who had low concern and had not formed clear opinions on the issues showed a weak link between assessment of value similarity and trust. Based on these findings, we considered the implications for the government's implementation of tobacco controls.

AbstractWe test here the risk communication proposition that explicit expert acknowledgment of uncertainty in risk estimates can enhance trust and other reactions. We manipulated such a scientific uncertainty message, accompanied by probabilities (20%, 70%, implicit ["will occur"] 100%) and time periods (10 or 30 years) in major (≥magnitude 8) earthquake risk estimates to test potential effects on residents potentially affected by seismic activity on the San Andreas fault in the San Francisco Bay Area (n = 750). The uncertainty acknowledgment increased belief that these specific experts were more honest and open, and led to statistically (but not substantively) significant increases in trust in seismic experts generally only for the 20% probability (vs. certainty) and shorter versus longer time period. The acknowledgment did not change judged risk, preparedness intentions, or mitigation policy support. Probability effects independent of the explicit admission of expert uncertainty were also insignificant except for judged risk, which rose or fell slightly depending upon the measure of judged risk used. Overall, both qualitative expressions of uncertainty and quantitative probabilities had limited effects on public reaction. These results imply that both theoretical arguments for positive effects, and practitioners' potential concerns for negative effects, of uncertainty expression may have been overblown. There may be good reasons to still acknowledge experts' uncertainties, but those merit separate justification and their own empirical tests.