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This paper considers the role of reputation and signaling in establishing deterrence. The cost-benefit calculations of rational deterrence are extended to allow for incomplete or imperfect information. The author uses requirements of a sequential equilibrium (and its refinements) to impose consistency restrictions on how strategic players signal a reputation for strength. This provides a way to interpret potentially misleading reputations and offers a resolution to the reputation paradox of Jervis.

This article develops a rational theory of minimal nuclear deterrence: What is the minimal amount of weapons needed to maintain a stable balance of power? By searching for the requirements of minimal nuclear deterrence, we hope to gain a better understanding of how to proceed with arms reduction without compromising the value of deterrence.

Minimal amount of weapons needed to maintain a stable balance of power.

Develops a stylized model of nuclear brinkmanship to study effects of threats that leave something to chance.

Using state-by-state voting data for U.S. presidential elections, we observe that voter turnout is a positive function of predicted closeness. To explain the strategic component of political participation, we develop a follow-the-leader model. Political leaders expend effort according to their chance of being pivotal, which depends on the expected closeness of the race (at both state and national levels) and how voters respond to their effort. Structural estimation supports this model. For example, a 1-percent increase in the predicted closeness at the state level stimulates leaders' efforts, which increases turnout by 0.34 percent. (JEL D72, C33, C72, H41)

We analyze a voting model in which a democratic monopoly labor union rationally shrinks towards zero over time. In our model, preferences are not single‐peaked so that this shrinkage may occur in spite of objections by the median voter. We characterize the wage‐employment path as a function of the time horizon and the discount rate. We show that the employment path is independent both of the labor demand curve and of the workers'utility functions.