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Abstract
How might international institutions matter? To consider this central question of International Relations, we analyze a most-likely case for the importance of materially driven enforcement: the Financial Action Task Force's (FATF) use of blacklisting in the global regime targeting money laundering and terrorism financing. Scholars and practitioners often argue that fear of financial harm caused by FATF's lists explains the near-global commitment to FATF's standards, even if compliance lags. We search for statistical evidence of this impact across four different measures of financial flows and find that listing is not correlated with financial harm. To explain these null results, we examine bank decision-making and find that the lists' impact is likely diminished by two overlooked factors: the existence of multiple, competing lists and banks' access to more fine-grained, client-specific information provided by third-party companies. We interpret this contradiction—a commitment to compliance generated in part by a fear of enforcement, despite a lack of evidence for enforcement's impact—as a "rational myth." The results challenge a common understanding of a major global governance regime, confirm ideas about the limited ability of states or International Organizations to control governance outcomes, and advance a new research agenda on the impact of bank decision-making on global governance.

Conventional understandings of security cooperation are rooted in the state-centric and materialist assumptions dominant in the Cold War and subscribe to the dictum of the Reagan years, 'trust but verify'. In today's more complex setting, however, governance arrangements with the most potential to address constantly mutating security threats, such as the concern over nuclear terrorism, may not be those solely designed to ensure compliance, but rather those that are better equipped to identify and solve new problems. This article draws on a burgeoning literature on 'new' or 'experimental' governance and advances an analytical framework to consider the extent to which states and other actors might be turning toward an alternative set of mechanisms that rely more heavily on non-binding standards and recommendations, peer review, increased participation, and experimentation to generate new knowledge about the challenges they face, even in the 'hard' case of security cooperation. It then explores this potential reorientation in two separate, but complementary cases that have emerged as key tools in preventing illicit nuclear proliferation: the Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering (FATF), which seeks to bolster states' counter-financing of terrorism systems, and the UNSC Resolution 1540 Committee, which guides efforts to fill the governance gaps in the nuclear non-proliferation regime. Although both cases on paper contain more traditional enforcement components, in practice they rely increasingly on experimental governance. The article concludes with an evaluation of the promise and limits of an experimentalist framework in understanding the evolution of governance arrangements in response to a more complex security environment and suggests potential avenues for future research. Adapted from the source document.

AbstractConventional understandings of security cooperation are rooted in the state-centric and materialist assumptions dominant in the Cold War and subscribe to the dictum of the Reagan years, 'trust but verify'. In today's more complex setting, however, governance arrangements with the most potential to address constantly mutating security threats, such as the concern over nuclear terrorism, may not be those solely designed to ensure compliance, but rather those that are better equipped to identify and solve new problems. This article draws on a burgeoning literature on 'new' or 'experimental' governance and advances an analytical framework to consider the extent to which states and other actors might be turning toward an alternative set of mechanisms that rely more heavily on non-binding standards and recommendations, peer review, increased participation, and experimentation to generate new knowledge about the challenges they face, even in the 'hard' case of security cooperation. It then explores this potential reorientation in two separate, but complementary cases that have emerged as key tools in preventing illicit nuclear proliferation: the Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering (FATF), which seeks to bolster states' counter-financing of terrorism systems, and the UNSC Resolution 1540 Committee, which guides efforts to fill the governance gaps in the nuclear non-proliferation regime. Although both cases on paper contain more traditional enforcement components, in practice they rely increasingly on experimental governance. The article concludes with an evaluation of the promise and limits of an experimentalist framework in understanding the evolution of governance arrangements in response to a more complex security environment and suggests potential avenues for future research.

ABSTRACTThis article analyzes the effectiveness of an international, interdisciplinary simulation of an ongoing trade negotiation. It thoroughly describes the simulation, provides links to background information for public use, and offers suggestions on ways to further strengthen the learning outcomes achieved.

Piratical attacks have become more frequent, violent, costly and increasingly threaten to undermine order in the international system. Much attention has focused on Somalia, but piracy is a problem worldwide. Recent coordination efforts among states in South East Asia appear to have helped in the area, but elsewhere piracy has expanded. Interestingly, international law has long recognized piracy as a crime and provided tools for universal suppression, yet piracy persists. In this book, a handpicked group of leading experts in the field of International Relations use maritime p.

1. Introduction: Unpacking the Mobilization of Shame; H. Richard Friman 1. - PART I: REVISITING HUMAN RIGHTS NAMING AND SHAMING . - 2. Caught at the Keyhole: The Power and Limits of Shame; William F. Schulz 33. - 3. Human Rights Naming and Shaming: International and Domestic Processes; James C. Franklin 43. - 4. Mobilizing 'Third-Party Influence': The Impact of Amnesty International's Naming and Shaming; Dongwook Kim 61. - 5. Promoting Accountability, Undermining Peace? Naming and Shaming in Transitional Justice Processes; Eric Wiebelhaus-Brahm 86. - PART II: NAMING AND SHAMING BEYOND HUMAN RIGHTS . - 6. Ain't That a Shame? Hypocrisy, Punishment and Weak Actor Influence in International Politics; Joshua W. Busby and Kelly M. Greenhill 105. - 7. Naming and Shaming in Financial Regulation: Explaining Variation in the Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering; Mark T. Nance 123. - 8 Behind the Curtain: Naming and Shaming in International Drug Control; H. Richard Friman 143. - 9. UN Targeted Sanctions as Signals: Naming and Shaming or Naming and Stigmatizing?; Thomas Biersteker 165. - 10. Shaming the Shameless? Campaigning against Corporations; Virginia Haufler 185. - 11. Conclusion: Exploring the Politics of Leverage; H. Richard Friman 201