The European Commission: appointment, preferences and institutional relations
In: Discussion paper series 5478
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In: Discussion paper series 5478
In: CESifo working paper series 1347
In: Public choice
This paper analyzes the a priori influence of the European Parliament (EP) and the Council of Ministers (CM) on legislation of the European Union adopted under its codecision procedure. In contrast to studies which use conventional power indices, both institutions are assumed to act strategically. Predicted bargaining outcomes of the crucial Conciliation stage of codecision are shown to be strongly biased towards the legislative status quo. Making symmetric preference assumptions for members of CM and EP, CM is on average much more conservative because of its internal qualified majority rule. This makes CM by an order of magnitude more influential than EP, in contrast to a seeming formal parity between the two 'co-legislators'.
In: Working paper series Center for Economic Studies ; Ifo Institute ; 736
In: Category 2, Public choice
In: Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems 518
The book investigates bargaining between two agents. It presents the history of bargaining analysis from Francis Y. Edgeworth's first formal study, followed by cooperative and noncooperative game-theoretic models, to recent stochastic evolutionary investigations. Connections between the results obtained by different methodology are highlighted. The established theory is generalized with respect to its underlying rationality assumptions. Links between usually neglected psychological factors - e.g. the persistence and capriciousness of an agent - and average bargaining success are identified. Applications of bargaining models contribute to the measurement of decision power and to the discussion of distributive justice
In: Lecture notes in economics and mathematical systems 518
In: Journal of institutional and theoretical economics: JITE, Band 178, Heft 3, S. 231
ISSN: 1614-0559
In: Journal of development economics, Band 151, S. 102657
ISSN: 0304-3878
Individual contributions by infringing firms to the compensation of cartel victims must reflect their 'relative responsibility for the harm caused' according to EU legislation. Several studies have argued that the theoretically best way to operationalize this norm is to apply the Shapley value to an equilibrium model of cartel prices. Because calibrating such a model is demanding, legal practitioners prefer workarounds based on market shares. Relative sales, revenues, and profits however fail to reflect causal links between individual behavior and prices. We develop a pragmatic alternative: use simple voting games to describe which cartel configurations can(not) cause significant price increases in an approximate, dichotomous way; then compute the Shapley-Shubik index. Simulations for a variety of market scenarios document that this captures relative responsibility better than market share heuristics can.
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In: Annals of Operation Research, Forthcoming
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In: Power, Voting, and Voting Power: 30 Years After, S. 265-281
In: Mathematical social sciences, Band 63, Heft 2, S. 174-180
In: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Band 71, Heft 2, S. 502-514
"The paper investigates price formation in a decentralized market with random matching. Agents are assumed to have subdued social preferences: buyers, for example, prefer a lower price to a higher one but experience reduced utility increases below a reference price that serves as a common fairness benchmark. The strategic equilibrium reflects market fundamentals, but it is markedly less sensitive to the buyer-seller ratio near the fair price benchmark. Prices may be sticky around very different reference levels in markets with otherwise identical fundamentals. The implied history dependence turns out to be mitigated rather than exacerbated by friction." [auhtor's abstract]
In: Public choice, Band 137, Heft 1-2, S. 21-41
ISSN: 1573-7101
In: Public choice, Band 137, Heft 1, S. 21-42
ISSN: 0048-5829