Suchergebnisse

To cope with losses from extreme hydro-meteorological events, governments typically implement disaster relief programs and offer debt relief to affected parties. Governments in developing countries have made extensive use of total and partial debt coverage as a way to encourage investment in key sectors and in agriculture in particular. In the context of climate change, such practices are not viable because risk is systemic and losses can easily surpass most governments' debt relief budgets. Insurance is an obvious alternative, but insurance uptake in developing countries is typically low, and little is known about the interaction between investment, insurance, and debt relief programs, which effectively reduce borrowers' liability. This paper examines the effect of farmers' liability on demand for credit with and without insurance. We test predictions of a theoretical model in a lab in the field experiment with coffee farmers in Costa Rica. Farmers choose how much to invest in six different settings, described on the one hand by whether the loan is insured or not, and on the other by the probability that the government provides full debt relief. As expected, uptake of loans with insurance is significantly higher than without insurance when farmers are fully liable, and insurance is not relevant for investments if debt relief is guaranteed. Interestingly, uncertainty about liability is enough to trigger the uptake of insured debt. Our results suggest that well-defined rules for disaster relief are needed to support development of insurance markets.

To cope with losses from extreme hydro-meteorological events, governments typically implement disaster relief programs and offer debt relief to affected parties. Governments in developing countries have made extensive use of total and partial debt coverage as a way to encourage investment in key sectors and in agriculture in particular. In the context of climate change, such practices are not viable because risk is systemic and losses can easily surpass most governments' debt relief budgets. Insurance is an obvious alternative, but insurance uptake in developing countries is typically low, and little is known about the interaction between investment, insurance, and debt relief programs, which effectively reduce borrowers' liability. This paper examines the effect of farmers' liability on demand for credit with and without insurance. We test predictions of a theoretical model in a lab in the field experiment with coffee farmers in Costa Rica. Farmers choose how much to invest in six different settings, described on the one hand by whether the loan is insured or not, and on the other by the probability that the government provides full debt relief. As expected, uptake of loans with insurance is significantly higher than without insurance when farmers are fully liable, and insurance is not relevant for investments if debt relief is guaranteed. Interestingly, uncertainty about liability is enough to trigger the uptake of insured debt. Our results suggest that well-defined rules for disaster relief are needed to support development of insurance markets.

AbstractThis article examines how basic socioeconomic and political factors are associated with higher levels of cooperation to garner a local community's shared green reputation. We analyze panel data on participation efforts in a collective voluntary environmental program, the Ecological Blue Flag Program, by the entire population of beach communities in Costa Rica between 2001 and 2009. Collective voluntary environmental programs are relatively new and aim to improve environmental performance and shared "green" reputation through joint participation and certification of multisector groups comprising businesses, governmental institutions, and nongovernmental organizations. Our results indicate that higher levels of within‐community cooperation for shared green reputation are more likely in seashore localities with lower income inequality and/or a higher number of businesses. These findings run counter to research suggesting these same characteristics are associated with lower levels of cooperation in the management of common pool natural resources such as fisheries and forests. We also find that within‐community cooperation is positively correlated with a greater proportion of expatriates from industrialized countries and/or with higher levels of democratic political participation.

This article examines how basic socioeconomic and political factors are associated with higher levels of cooperation to garner a local community's shared green reputation. We analyze panel data on participation efforts in a collective voluntary environmental program, the Ecological Blue Flag Program, by the entire population of beach communities in Costa Rica between 2001 and 2009. Collective voluntary environmental programs are relatively new and aim to improve environmental performance and shared "green" reputation through joint participation and certification of multisector groups comprising businesses, governmental institutions, and nongovernmental organizations. Our results indicate that higher levels of within-community cooperation for shared green reputation are more likely in seashore localities with lower income inequality and/or a higher number of businesses. These findings run counter to research suggesting these same characteristics are associated with lower levels of cooperation in the management of common pool natural resources such as fisheries and forests. We also find that within-community cooperation is positively correlated with a greater proportion of expatriates from industrialized countries and/or with higher levels of democratic political participation.

This article examines how basic socioeconomic and political factors are associated with higher levels of cooperation to garner a local community's shared green reputation. We analyze panel data on participation efforts in a collective voluntary environmental program, the Ecological Blue Flag Program, by the entire population of beach communities in Costa Rica between 2001 and 2009. Collective voluntary environmental programs are relatively new and aim to improve environmental performance and shared "green" reputation through joint participation and certification of multisector groups comprising businesses, governmental institutions, and nongovernmental organizations. Our results indicate that higher levels of within-community cooperation for shared green reputation are more likely in seashore localities with lower income inequality and/or a higher number of businesses. These findings run counter to research suggesting these same characteristics are associated with lower levels of cooperation in the management of common pool natural resources such as fisheries and forests. We also find that within-community cooperation is positively correlated with a greater proportion of expatriates from industrialized countries and/or with higher levels of democratic political participation.