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In: For and against
In: Analyse & Kritik: journal of philosophy and social theory, Band 39, Heft 2, S. 393-404
ISSN: 2365-9858
Abstract
Justin Holt argues that the Rawlsian requirements for justice are, contrary to Rawls' own pronouncements, better met by socialism than 'property owning democracy', both of them preferring both to just plain capitalism, even with a welfare state tacked on. I suggest that Rawls's 'requirements' are far less clear than most think, and that the only clarified version prefers the capitalist welfare state.
In: Journal of Practical Ethics, Band 5, Heft 2
SSRN
In: Analyse & Kritik: journal of philosophy and social theory, Band 37, Heft 1-2, S. 203-222
ISSN: 2365-9858
Abstract
James Sterba advances several arguments designed to show that libertarianism, contrary to what this author and other libertarians think, actually implies support for welfarism and even egalitarianism. This discussion shows why his arguments do not work. There is preliminary discussion of our parameters: how much is Sterba claiming we have a minimum right to in the way of welfare? It is argued that if this is set very low, a libertarian society would easily eliminate the poverty he is concerned about, and if it is set very high, then the standard could be unmeetable and certainly could not have been met until very recently at the least. More abstractly, it is argue that Sterba is in error about the normative assumptions required for libertarianism's strong distinction between nonharm and outright help. Once these are cleared up, it is seen that his case depends on equivocation. The duty not to harm simply does not imply a duty to help. In the closing pages, a contractarian framework is advanced to explain the libertarian's disaffection for the kind of 'strong' rights Sterba wants to uphold.
In: Canadian journal of political science: CJPS = Revue canadienne de science politique, Band 47, Heft 4, S. 864-865
ISSN: 1744-9324
In: Do All Persons Have Equal Moral Worth?, S. 96-123
In: Analyse & Kritik: journal of philosophy and social theory, Band 35, Heft 1, S. 113-120
ISSN: 2365-9858
Abstract
Abstract: The gist of Welsclie's argument seems to be to pick up on an idea he attributes to Rawls, that in a true property-owning democracy, productive wealth would be distributed more broadly 'ex ante' rather than, as now, 'ex post.', the point of demarcation being the use of capital to generate wealth and income. As against this, I argue that ex ante distribution of capital is impossible, because business activity creates wealth, and thus we don't know what there is to distribute ex ante. Moreover, the prospect of greater wealth for the producers ex post is what especially motivates them to produce, and without production we are poor. It is also noted that Rawls's 'difference principle' does not in fact have the egalitarian implications he supposes, nor really any distributive implications, despite Rawls's intentions.
In: Socialist studies: Etudes socialistes, Band 8, Heft 1
ISSN: 1918-2821
In: Socialist Studies: The Journal of the Society for Socialist Studies, Band 8, Heft 1, S. 35-56
In: Socialist Studies: The Journal of the Society for Socialist Studies, Band 8, Heft 1, S. 35-56
In: APSA 2012 Annual Meeting Paper
SSRN
Working paper
In: Journal of social philosophy, Band 42, Heft 4, S. 428-440
ISSN: 1467-9833
In: Social philosophy & policy, Band 27, Heft 1, S. 101-134
ISSN: 1471-6437
AbstractI present what I take to be the "classical" approach to property rights, in which property is basically a unitary concept: owners are the ones with the right to do, and prohibit others from doing, whatever there is to do with the thing owned, within the limits imposed by the rights of others totheirthings. I expound and defend the idea of "first acquisition" in more or less Lockean mode. I also point to the many difficulties of application of the general idea, leading to the need to negotiate at many points. For example, the vagueness of land ownership as we consider what goes on in the earth below or the sky above; to consideration of not just possible physical damages to others by virtue of ownership, but also aesthetic ones; and to the increasingly important area of intellectual property. I argue that the original idea continues to hold, though it underdetermines any number of specific issues.