The Free Society
In: The independent review: journal of political economy, Band 1, Heft 3, S. 423-427
ISSN: 1086-1653
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In: The independent review: journal of political economy, Band 1, Heft 3, S. 423-427
ISSN: 1086-1653
In: American political science review, Band 87, Heft 2, S. 478-478
ISSN: 1537-5943
In: Critical review: a journal of politics and society, Band 6, Heft 1, S. 45-82
ISSN: 1933-8007
In: Social philosophy & policy, Band 9, Heft 1, S. 29-61
ISSN: 1471-6437
We have long been accustomed to thinking of democracy as a major selling point of Western institutions. That a set of political institutions should be democratic is widely regarded as thesine qua nonof their legitimacy. So widespread is this belief that even those whose institutions do not look very democratic to us nevertheless insist on proclaiming them to be such (though the number taking this gambit dropped dramatically around the end of 1989). Meanwhile, an adulatory attitude toward democracy has arisen in many quarters, and many theorists have taken up anew the idea that if democracy is the way to go in political institutions, then it must also be the way to go in "other" areas, notably in economic and social institutions. So there has arisen a call for "economic democracy" — which is taken to mean, especially, that the "means of production" should be managed by their constituent workers in concert rather than by some few who own, or act for the owners of, those enterprises. Robert Dahl, in his influentialPreface to Economic Democracy, sums it up nicely when he proclaims a "stronger justification" for worker participation: "Ifdemocracy is justified in governing the state, then it mustalsobe justified in governing economic enterprises; and to say that it isnotjustified in governing economic enterprises is to imply that it is not justified in governing the state."
In: Critical review: a journal of politics and society, Band 5, Heft 4, S. 573-582
ISSN: 1933-8007
In: Critical review: a journal of politics and society, Band 5, Heft 1, S. 129-134
ISSN: 1933-8007
In: Analyse & Kritik: journal of philosophy and social theory, Band 10, Heft 2, S. 206-232
ISSN: 2365-9858
Abstract
The argument in this paper is that although rationality and morality are distinguishable concepts, there is nevertheless a rational morality, a set of principles, namely, which it is rational of all to require of all. The argument of this paper is that such a morality would certainly issue in a general condemnation of aggressive war. (Whether this also makes it irrational for States to engage in such activities is another, and not entirely settled, matter). Correlatively, it would issue in a strong right of defense. Would this right be sufficient to include resort to nuclear deterrence, if need be? It is argued that the answer must be in the affirmative - although the question of 'need' is by no means settled in current circumstances.
In: Journal of social philosophy, Band 17, Heft 3, S. 20-27
ISSN: 1467-9833
Down through the past decade and more, no philosophical writer has taken a greater interest in the issues of how we ought to act in relation to animals, nor pressed more strongly the case for according them rights, than has Tom Regan, in many articles, reviews, and exchanges at scholarly conferences and in print. It is a pleasure to join him on this symposium, to explore this interesting and important set of issues. I shall begin by outlining, as fairly as I can, Regan's view of the matter, and then sketch my alternative. Regan has in fact criticized certain aspects of my position at some length in his book. My replies to those criticisms will be largely implicit here, and I will not dwell on them when outlining his view.
BASE
In: Peace & change: PC ; a journal of peace research, Band 10, Heft 3-4, S. 139-142
ISSN: 1468-0130
In: Social philosophy & policy, Band 2, Heft 1, S. 33-60
ISSN: 1471-6437
The subject of this essay is political, and therefore social, philosophy; and therefore, ethics. We want to know whether the right thing for a society to do is to incorporate in its structure requirements that we bring about equality, or liberty, or both if they are compatible, and if incompatible then which if either, or what sort of mix if they can to some degree be mixed. But this fairly succinct statement of the issue before us requires considerable clarification, even as a statment of the issue. For it is widely, and in my view correctly, held thatsomesort of equality is utterly fundamental in these matters. We seek a principle, or principles, that apply to all, are the same for all. In that sense, certainly, equality is fundamental and inescapable. But this is a very thin sort of "equality."It will almost equally widely be agreed that the principles in question should in some more interesting sense "treat" people equally, e.g., by allotting to all the same set of rights, and moreover, rights that are – again we have to say "in some sense" – nonarbitrary, so that whatever they are, persons of all races, sexes, and so on will have the same fundamental rights assigned to them. Taking this to be, again, essentially uncontroversial, though not without potentially worrisome points of unclarity, it needs, now, to be pointed out that this characterization does not settle the issue that this essay is concerned with. That issue is abouteconomicmatters in particular.
In: Social philosophy & policy, Band 1, Heft 1, S. 41-44
ISSN: 1471-6437
My main complaint about Dworkin's papers on equality was that he had not said much by way of arguing for it. His intriguing response to this request provides a good start, and I shall confine this brief, further comment to what he says on that basic subject. Space considerations, alas, require me to ignore the other parts of his discussion (most of them well-taken, I should say in passing).Dworkin distinguishes what he calls the "abstract egalitarian thesis" from his particular version of equalitarianism, equality of resources. His strategy is to argue, first, that the latter is the best realization or version of the former, and then to argue for the general thesis itself. In my comments, I shall reverse this order, however, for reasons that will be clear as we proceed.1. The Abstract Egalitarian ThesisDworkin states this as follows: "From the standpoint of politics, the interests of the members of the community matter, and matter equally." (24) The statement is intended to be abstract in the sense that it would "embrace various competing conceptions of equality," so that in principle we can divide the discussion the way Dworkin has done into the two questions, "Should we accept equality as a principle at all?" and "What is the best version of equality, at what we might call the constitutional level?" But can we really do this? I am not entirely clear that we can. In order to appreciate the difficulty here, at any rate, consider Dworkin's suggestion that "in order to sharpen the question" – the question whether to accept equality as a principle at all, that is –"I ask you to suppose that the abstract egalitarian principle does provide a good argument for subsidized medicine…" Now, some might think that such a program is paradigm case of what ought to be rejected at the public level, and yet his reasons for such rejection might very well be based on a principle that its proponent would regard as abstractly egalitarian.
In: Social philosophy & policy, Band 1, Heft 1, S. 1-23
ISSN: 1471-6437
1. INTRODUCTIONProfessor Dworkin's writings on moral and political subjects have never failed to interest me in the past, and the two-part article "What is Equality" which is the subject of this paper, is no exception. Its wealth of relevant distinctions is bound to be useful to every serious student of the subject, whatever – or, in view of the range of opinions on these matters now current, perhaps I should sayalmostwhatever – his (or, of course, her) ideological proclivities, and whether or not he is sympathetic to Dworkin's position. The present treatment will be devoted, needless to say, primarily to disagreements, criticisms, and the raising of further questions, most of them designed to call in question either the general idea that equality should be regarded as a legitimate and important goal of social institutions or Dworkin's particular formulations of that equality. This largely negative-seeming consideration, I need scarcely add, is not intended to discount or detract from the positive contributions of Dworkin's work, which are very substantial indeed. It's just that having been ably set forth by Dworkin himself, they scarcely need seconding from this source.
In: Philosophy of the social sciences: an international journal = Philosophie des sciences sociales, Band 10, Heft 3, S. 325-328
ISSN: 1552-7441
In: Political theory: an international journal of political philosophy, Band 7, Heft 3, S. 428-431
ISSN: 1552-7476