Suchergebnisse

Minimum income schemes (MIS) have become key social protection institutions for European citizens, but we know little regarding the logic and dynamics of institutional change in this policy field. This book provides an analytical model that will facilitate an understanding of the scope and direction of recent reforms, offering insight into the conditions under which minimum income schemes are introduced, expanded or retrenched. Natili presents a comparative analysis of policy trajectories of minimum income schemes in Italy and Spain between the mid-1980s and 2015. Although these two countries had similar points of departure, and faced comparable functional pressures and institutional constraints, they experienced remarkably different developments in this policy field in the last two decades. This comparative analysis provides empirical evidence of the impacts of different types of credit-claiming dynamics resulting from the interaction of socio-political demand with political supply. The Politics of Minimum Income also assesses the reform processes both in countries that have introduced MIS in the age of austerity (such as Portugal) and in countries that have retrenched them (Austria and Denmark)

Minimum income schemes (MIS) have become key social protection institutions for European citizens, but we know little regarding the logic and dynamics of institutional change in this policy field. This book provides an analytical model that will facilitate an understanding of the scope and direction of recent reforms, offering insight into the conditions under which minimum income schemes are introduced, expanded or retrenched. Natili presents a comparative analysis of policy trajectories of minimum income schemes in Italy and Spain between the mid-1980s and 2015. Although these two countries had similar points of departure, and faced comparable functional pressures and institutional constraints, they experienced remarkably different developments in this policy field in the last two decades. This comparative analysis provides empirical evidence of the impacts of different types of credit-claiming dynamics resulting from the interaction of socio-political demand with political supply. The Politics of Minimum Income also assesses the reform processes both in countries that have introduced MIS in the age of austerity (such as Portugal) and in countries that have retrenched them (Austria and Denmark).

AbstractUntil recently, the idea of a European minimum wage (EMW) policy had never taken concrete shape, due to the heterogeneity of national wage‐setting and collective bargaining institutions, uncertain EU competence on the matter, and widespread scepticism amongst political actors. In 2022, however, the EU adopted a directive on adequate minimum wages. How did this make it to the EU agenda, despite the many political, territorial and institutional tensions? What coalitions supported and opposed it? Based on a reconstruction of the policy process substantiated by an analysis of news media data and 14 interviews, this article investigates the multi‐level politics of the EMW. It shows that, despite enduring 'euro‐social scepticism' in northern Europe, the emergence of pro‐minimum wage coalitions in key member states and the increase of party‐competition dynamics at the EU level were crucial in overcoming the lines of conflict that had long hindered EU initiatives on minimum wage co‐ordination.

In post-industrial and globalized economies, socio-economic risks have become ubiquitous for workers. Two segments of the labour force seem particularly exposed: namely, outsiders (atypical workers and unemployed individuals) and globalization losers (unskilled workers in offshorable employment sectors), with relevant consequences for party competition in Europe. The coexistence of these two segments of vulnerable workers has brought conceptual ambiguity. Using the original 2019 REScEU Mass Survey on ten European countries, we firstly clarify that outsiders and globalization losers do not constitute the same socio-economic group. Secondly, we look into the micro-foundations of outsiders' and globalization losers' redistributive preferences and political behaviours by showing that outsiderness, rather than exposure to international competition, constitutes a significant driver of income and employment insecurities, and of dependency on social protection and family financial aid. SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1007/s11135-022-01414-9.

AbstractTraditionally at the margins of the political debate, minimum income protection has recently become a key issue in Italian politics. After decades of social and political "neglect" letting Italy the only European country (with Greece) still lacking an anti‐poverty minimum income safety net in the 2010s, finally a national programme called Inclusion Income was introduced in 2018, then replaced by a more robustly financed scheme, the Citizenship Income in 2019. The introduction of these new programmes was the object of an intense political debate, which raises two main puzzles. Why a policy field characterized by the low political resources of would be beneficiaries and low incidence on the overall welfare budget has become so important in the political debate? How did it occur in Italy, where minimum income protection had been absent in political discourses for at least five decades after World War II? To answer these questions, this article first elaborates a novel theoretical framework which combines the main properties of socio‐political demand and political supply in order to explain the scope and direction of minimum income reforms. Second, it provides an analytically oriented reconstruction of MIS policy trajectory in Italy in the three different phases: the phase of MIS "neglect" (1948–1992) characterized by inertia; the period of political "contentiousness" (1993–2012), marked by attempts of path departure followed by policy reversals; the more recent phase leading to the introduction and institutionalization of a MIS. Third, the article provides a theoretically framed interpretation of the overall MIS trajectory in Italy.

AbstractTraditionally, Southern European countries displayed remarkably elderly biased social policy arrangements. This article introduces the notion of intergenerational recalibration to capture reforms aimed at rebalancing the generational profile of Southern European welfare states via the expansion of family policy and social assistance schemes—both monetary benefits and care services—and retrenchment in the field of pensions. Then, it elaborates theoretically on the political dimension of this policy strategy, focusing on the implications of the peculiar combination of expansionary and retrenchment reforms, to advance the hypotheses that domestic politics would prevent the realization of such an agenda, whereas the latter would be favored by a major role of supranational actors, especially the European Union. To test these hypotheses, we systematically analyze policy trajectories in the field of pensions and social assistance in Italy and Spain between the mid‐1990s and 2016. This allows, first, to argue that investment in "pro‐children" measures has not adequately balanced the reduction of pro‐parents expenditure and, second, to question the idea that domestic political incentives to expand "pro‐children" policies are necessarily too weak as well as the "enabling" role of external pressures in pursuing intergenerational recalibration.

This article examines the programmatic evolution of social democratic parties in Italy, Portugal, and Spain, three countries in which the center-left has governed in the last decade. To do so, the article develops an analytical framework for mapping social and labor market policy reforms and assessing their liberalizing, regularizing, or recalibrating character. In explanatory terms, the article studies the coalitional politics behind social democratic reforms as being conditional upon the relationships between organized interests, electoral social blocs, and party system dynamics. The comparative analysis shows both commonalities and differences: the cases range from postindustrial recalibration (Italy) to inclusive egalitarianism (Spain), with Portugal taking a middling path, closer to that of Spain. Overall, in these countries a move away from both traditional "social protectionism" and crisis-era internal devaluation has taken place, but it has taken different forms depending on country-specific coalitional dynamics within the left and trade union camps.

AbstractThe Next Generation EU (NGEU) package transformed European economic governance. This article examines the implications of this change in terms of EU polity formation and in terms of social policy content. It asks whether the temporary availability of large funds increases the leverage of the Commission in the European Semester and how this innovation affects sensitive policies. In the tradition of Stein Rokkan, the article advances a conception of the EU as a compound polity that needs to reconcile dispersed authority with second‐order loyalty. We then contrast our theoretical expectations with traditional reform surveillance and experimentalist governance theories. The drafting of Recovery and Resilience Plans for Italy and Spain provides the empirical basis for assessing these expectations. The analysis shows a dual effect: adding fiscal capacity to the European Semester enhances the Commission's hierarchical power whilst the need to ensure member states' loyalty leaves room for national executives to insist on their priorities.

In the twentieth century national social policies stabilized the European state systems, favouring domestic concordance and citizens' support to the nation-building process. Welfare institutions have historically served this key political function also in federal systems, where social citizenship has been used as a tool to foster unity. In contrast, even though the EU devotes a consistent part of its (however limited) budget to social cohesion and inclusion programmes, it takes little credit for such efforts. Building on original survey data on public opinion collected in 2019 across ten EU countries, this article shows that, indeed, only a limited number of citizens are aware of the social role played by the EU in their local community. On the other hand, it demonstrates that citizens' awareness of EU programmes strengthens the individual perception of power resources stemming from euro-social initiatives, the feeling of 'being heard' by the EU and, ultimately, the support for the European integration project as a whole. By implication, increasing the relevance and visibility of euro-social programmes could possibly reinforce the very foundations of the EU.

AbstractEurope is witnessing a 'double dualisation' process, whereby inequalities have increased both between labour market insiders and outsiders, and between core and peripheral countries. We test the double dualisation hypothesis in the context of the first wave of the COVID‐19 pandemic. Did the COVID crisis exacerbate income inequalities between insiders and outsiders? Did cross‐country territorial divides also increase? Did national governments' emergency measures contribute to containing or widening double dualisation? We deploy a multi‐method research design that combines original survey data on seven old EU member states with three case studies on Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands. Results show that, in the short term, the COVID‐19 pandemic has been a catalyst of double dualisation: outsiders bore the greatest burden, especially in southern European countries. National emergency measures largely depended on the fiscal leeway available to governments and followed pre‐existing welfare trajectories, thus worsening cross‐country inequalities, with potentially severe consequences for the European integration process.

In multi-tiered states, subnational policymakers face a dilemma: on one hand, they must ensure the social legitimacy of their subnational unit by owning relevant policies including their potentially negative consequences; on the other, they have to manage their budget responsibly, which limits the scope of policy development. We study this dilemma in relation to social policies, by examining how the constituent units and municipalities in Germany, Italy, Spain and Switzerland deal with it, taking social assistance as an empirical example. Our analysis suggests that the combination of the federation's history and a multinational political context affects the incentives and the choices made by the policymakers regarding ownership and disownership of policy competencies in the field of social assistance. By analysing mechanisms that are likely to play out in multi-tiered welfare states, our article contributes to both the social policy and the political science literatures.

AbstractThe EU has traditionally influenced the social and employment policies of Member States through regulation, leaving redistribution to national welfare states. The latter have, however, been gradually weakened by global socioeconomic change and by the expansion of EU market integration. A series of crises over the last 15 years made a bad situation worse: the longue durée erosion of the capacity of European welfare states has morphed into acute social aftershocks, especially in peripheral countries. After the austerity reflex in the early 2010s, the EU introduced new policy instruments with market‐correcting rationales that go beyond the regulatory approach. This article revisits the creation and functioning of four of these instruments that represent EU‐level capacity‐building in the social policy domain: the European Globalisation Adjustment Fund, the Youth Guarantee, the Just Transition Fund and SURE (the temporary Support to mitigate Unemployment Risks in an Emergency). We argue that the EU increasingly provides 'buffer mechanisms' to support stressed national welfare states in tasks they would otherwise be unable to accomplish, and we identify the political factors that drive the expansion of this 'buffering' logic in EU social policy.